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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an empirical-based study of the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) and its implications in terms of corporate environmental and financial 
performance. The novelty of this study includes the extended scope of the data coverage, 
as most previous studies have examined only the power sector. The use of verified 
emissions data of ETS-regulated firms as the environmental compliance measure and as 
the potential differentiating criteria that concern the valuation of EU ETS-exposed firms in 
the stock market is also an original aspect of this study. 
 
The study begins in Chapter 2 by introducing the background information on the emission 
trading system (ETS), which focuses on (i) the adoption of ETS as an environmental 
management instrument and (ii) the adoption of ETS by the European Union as one of its 
central climate policies. Chapter 3 surveys four databases that provide carbon emissions 
data in order to determine the most suitable source of the data to be used in the later 
empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter, which is also Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
investigates the determinants of the emissions compliance performance of the EU ETS-
exposed firms through constructing the best possible performance ratio from verified 
emissions data and self-configuring models for a panel regression analysis. Chapter 5 
examines the impacts on the EU ETS-exposed firms in terms of their equity valuation with 
customised portfolios and multi-factor market models. The research design takes into 
account the emissions allowance (EUA) price as an additional factor, as it has the most 
direct association with the EU ETS to control for the exposure. The final empirical Chapter 
6 takes the investigation one step further, by specifically testing the degree of ETS 
exposure facing different sectors with sector-based portfolios and an extended multi-factor 
market model. 
 
The findings from the emissions performance ratio analysis show that the business model 
of firms significantly influences emissions compliance, as the capital intensity has a 
positive association with the increasing emissions-to-emissions cap ratio. Furthermore, 
different sectors show different degrees of sensitivity towards the determining factors. The 
production factor influences the performance ratio of the Utilities sector, but not the 
Energy or Materials sectors. The results show that the capital intensity has a more 
profound influence on the utilities sector than on the materials sector. With regard to the 
financial performance impact, ETS-exposed firms as aggregate portfolios experienced a 
substantial underperformance during the 2001–2004 period, but not in the operating period 
of 2005–2011. The results of the sector-based portfolios show again the differentiating 
effect of the EU ETS on sectors, as one sector is priced indifferently against its benchmark, 
three sectors see a constant underperformance, and three sectors have altered outcomes.
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1 Introduction to the thesis 
 
1.1 Background of carbon emissions management 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and global climate change have become common terms 
in recent years. The excessive stock of GHGs in the atmosphere, human activities-related 
in particular, is considered to be strongly associated with the increase in average 
temperature, which leads to global climate change (IPCC, 2001b: 4-5). GHG emissions 
most commonly refer to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and have raised increasing 
concerns world-wide. As cited in the Stern Review, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in their 2001 report that new and stronger evidence has 
been found that most of the warming observed over the past 50 years can be attributable to 
human activities (IPCC, 1990; IPCC, 1995; Stern, 2006: 7). Various publications (Smith et 
al., 2001; IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2008a) have expressed their concerns that the implications 
and risks of climate change on the environmental, economic and social dimensions 
globally can be unprecedented, and suggested that action against the potential harmful 
impacts of climate change is required. 
 
The potentially damaging consequences of climate change and its implications for our 
living environment and economy are undesirable. These consequences range from 
irreversible environmental events, such as the loss of species, land and, in the long term, 
the disruption of global oceanic circulation (IPCC, 2001a: 83), to damages to the global 
economy. The costs associated with the climate change issues could add up to 1% to 10% 
of global GDP, depending on the scenario configuration (Stern, 2006: 161; IPCC, 2007: 
64–65). While it is unlikely that all regions will suffer from the same degree of climate 
change impact, it can intensify the problem of inequality among the richer and poorer 
countries, as presumably the richer countries will possess more resources and advanced 
technology to tackle climate change-related issues., A response from societies, nations, as 
well as non-governmental and private organisations will be necessary, in order to mitigate 
these potential impacts. One of the major actors is the IPCC, established by the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) in 1988, whose primary mission is assess and react to climate change-related 
issues. It reviews and assesses the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic 
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information produced world-wide is relevant to climate change. The work of the IPCC is 
an aggregation of the voluntary contributions of numerous scientists (IPCC, 2013a). The 
most important outputs of the IPCC’s work are the assessment reports, which aim to 
inform the world of the latest state of climate change-related knowledge potential issues. 
Four assessment reports have been published, in 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2007, respectively, 
while the fifth assessment report was released in phases from September 2013 to October 
2014 (IPCC, 2013b).  
 
Another important response at international level is the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was adopted and opened for signature 
in 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, with the intention to prevent the catastrophic consequences of 
global climate change (UNFCCC, 2014). The members1 of UNFCCC meet annually in the 
Conference of Parties (COP) to assess and update the progress of dealing with climate 
change-related issues. One of the most important agreements that has underpinned the need 
for mandatory action on GHG emissions reduction was made during the third Conference 
of Parties (COP3), in Kyoto, in 1997 and named the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol requires 
37 industrialised countries and EU members commit to a legally binding target of reducing 
their emissions by 5% below the 1990 level,2 either solely or jointly during the period 
2008–20123 (UNFCCC, 1998). 
 
With the progress of these international initiatives regarding climate change, the path of 
adopting appropriate instruments for an effective GHG reduction became clearer. The 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 saw a substantial step in the direction of preparing 
market-orientated methods for GHG emissions management. Unlike the command-and-
control method, such as directly imposing a rigid and universal standard of emission limits 
indiscriminately on all emission sources, market-based methods offer the opportunity for 
the producers who are liable for these emissions to determine how much ‘the right’ to emit 
                                            
1 The Convention divides countries into three main groups: Annex I Parties contain the industrialised countries which were OECD 
members in 1992 plus the economies in transitions countries, such as the Russian Federation, the Baltic States; Annex II Parties consist 
of Annex I countries who are OECD members and are responsible for funding that enables developing countries to undertake emission 
reduction activities. Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries (UNFCCC, 2013) 
2 Details are specified in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). 
3 The first commitment period. In the COP18 in Doha, in 2012, several major amendments to the Kyoto Protocol were made. Parties 
committed to a new reduction target of 18% below the 1990 level during the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020; the compositions of 
Parties in the second commitment period has been different from that in the first (UNFCCC, 2012). 
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is worth to them. Three market-based mechanisms –  the International Emissions Trading, 
Clean Development Mechanisms, and Joint Implementation – were introduced in the 
Kyoto Protocol. These mechanisms can be utilised by countries with an emission reduction 
commitment to achieve their targets in a more flexible manner. 
 
Emissions Trading, one of the flexible mechanisms of particular interest in this thesis, 
works by first creating a market for emissions rights, which could be considered as a newly 
defined commodity. The market can be created in several ways, with the following two 
being the most common: the cap-and-trade system and the baseline-and-credit system. 
These two systems differ substantially in their design characteristics (Brohé et al., 2009: 
42), which involve primarily the process of defining the ‘commodity’. A cap-and-trade 
system is created by defining a new set of property rights and imposes an absolute cap 
within the system. The cap determines the amount of allowances available and the 
allowances are distributed to the participating parties in the scheme based on designated 
allocation methods. The baseline-and-credit system works through generating emissions 
reduction credits from projects that reduce emissions below a designated baseline. The 
reduction credits can be used to achieve the agreed emissions reduction commitment as 
well as being traded among different parties with reduction targets, as the credits can write 
off the emissions produced. The Clean Develop Mechanism and Joint Implementation are 
examples of the baseline-credit system. 
 
The third assessment report prepared by Working Group III of the IPCC (Bashmakov and 
Jepma, 2001) presents a full examination of the policies and measures that could be 
applied to GHGs emissions mitigation at national and international level, which serves as a 
practical guide for evaluating difference policy instruments. The report points out that 
market-based instruments became well received among governments for their potential to 
achieve environmental effectiveness in a relatively cost-efficient manner. It should be 
noted that the IPCC report stresses that it is unlikely that one policy alone can fully address 
GHG emissions as well as other climate change-related problems for most nations, which 
appears to be a consensus view among several other studies (Rayner and Prins, 2007; 
Stern, 2008b; Brohé et al., 2009: 36–39). 
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1.2 Research interests: The EU ETS and its implications 
This section provides essential background information on the subject of this thesis, the 
EU ETS and its environmental and financial implications. It starts by introducing why EU 
ETS has been chosen as the subject of interest, which is followed by the introduction of the 
research question proposal along with the key studies that have inspired the research 
question and analyses planned. The section ends with a short introduction to the data 
required. 
 
1.2.1 Why EU ETS? 
This section explains the reasons behind the main research interest of this thesis, the EU 
ETS, which is to date the largest cap-and-trade system for GHGs world-wide, and its 
implications. EU ETS is considered a topic of particular relevance for a number of specific 
reasons, which primarily include its scale and multisectoral and spatial coverage, as well as 
the current lack of empirical evidence on the subject of EU ETS-related impacts on the 
financial markets. The scale of EU ETS is significant in its multisectoral and multinational 
coverage. According to European Commission, EU ETS covers approximately 45% of 
total GHGs in the European Union, and for the first two trading periods after its 
introduction, EU ETS covered more than half of the CO2 emissions within the Community. 
 
Convery (2009) identifies the emerging trends in the literature on emissions trading in 
Europe by surveying the existing research work, and finds that the majority of EU ETS 
literature has so far focused on policy perspectives. The context and history, allowance 
allocation, as well as other EU ETS-associated policy implications, such as the alternatives 
to the current allocation method, have been of particular interest for researchers. However, 
the category of Markets, Trading, and Finance has seen a relatively low number of 
publications. A large number of studies inthe Market, Trading, and Finance category has 
attempted to identify and explain allowance price determinants, such as the studies by 
Alberola et al. (2009a; 2009b) and Creti et al. (2012), as well as the trading activities or 
strategies in the carbon market itself, for instance the study by Crossland et al. (2013). 
Studies with empirical analyses of the stock market implications of EU ETS are rarely 
seen. A similar review of the EU ETS literature can also be found in Zhang and Wei 
(2010). Oberndorfer (2009) and Veith et al. (2009) are the first studies that provide 
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empirical evidence of a potential link between the EU carbon market and the stock market, 
though with sample firms being limited to the power sector. The lack of publications on 
the subject of a carbon market–stock market link thus offers a significant opportunity to 
add more depth to the research area of emissions trading and the EU ETS, as well as to fill 
in gaps in the empirical literature. 
 
EU ETS is one of the the key instruments implemented by the European Union to comply 
with its emissions reduction target. It also represents the determination and intention of the 
European Union to take the leading position in shaping global climate policies. EU ETS 
has the aim of effectively reducing CO2 and other GHG emissions to the targeted level in a 
cost-efficient manner (EC, 2013c). While the environmental goal is the priority in order to 
fulfil the EU reduction commitment and ultimately to avoid the serious consequences of 
GHG-related climate issues, the additional benefit of minimising the mitigation costs 
makes EU ETS appealing to the compliant sectors. The scale and coverage of EU ETS is 
one of its unique features; it is to date the largest regulated GHG emissions trading system 
in the world, covering more than 11,000 installations, across 314 participating member 
states and covers the major emitters of various sectors. A more in-depth examination on 
the scale of EU ETS and the dominant position of EUA trading is presented in the next 
section to underpin the decision of focusing on the EU ETS. 
 
1.2.2 The European vs. the global carbon market 
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 show the position of the European carbon market relative to the 
global carbon market. The market created by the EU ETS began to dominate global carbon 
trading despite the trading activities during the initial launch period being rather 
conservative. The numbers reveal that the European Union Allowance(s) (EUA), the unit 
of emissions allowance defined by the EU ETS, accounts for a large proportion of global 
carbon trading activities. The EUA represents one tonne of CO2e emissions, which is 
designed to be the equivalent of the Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) defined under the 
Kyoto Protocol to provide a better link to the carbon market globally. The EUA market 
and overall carbon market saw a twofold growth in trading value in 2008, 
                                            
4 28 EU countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway from the European Economic Area (EEA) as of 2014, the third phase of the 
EU trading system.  
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Table 1.1 Trading activity of EUA and world carbon market 
 Volume (MtCO2e) Value (USD million) 
EUA World 
EUA % of 
World 
EUA World 
EUA % of 
World 
2005 321 710 45.21% 7,908 10,864 72.79% 
2006 1,104 1,745 63.27% 24,436 31,235 78.23% 
2007 2,060 2,984 69.03% 49,065 63,007 77.87% 
2008 3,093 4,836 63.96% 100,526 135,066 74.43% 
2009 6,326 8,700 72.71% 118,474 143,735 82.43% 
2010 6,789 8,772 77.39% 133,598 159,191 83.92% 
2011 7,853 10,281 76.38% 147,848 176,020 84.00% 
This table presents the share of EUA in relation to global carbon market trading activities. The first 
column indicates the year of the trading recorded. Source: Carbon Finance Unit at the World Bank 
annual carbon market report (WorldBank, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Trends in trading volume and value of carbon emissions allowances 
Source: Carbon Finance Unit at The World Bank (World Bank, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012)
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the first year of the new trading period of EU ETS, although the markets for the project-
based credits experienced a decline. This observation once more indicates the crucial status 
of EUA trading in driving the global carbon market. The financial crisis, which eventually 
led to a large-scale recession, also hit the carbon market particularly during the year 2008–
2009. Both EUA and the international carbon market saw a considerable amount of trading 
volume increase while the value of the market did not increase in a corresponding ratio. 
The global recession hit the carbon market from the demand side, as deteriorating 
economic conditions led to low production output, low energy consumption and thus low 
emission allowances demand. Firms with the allowance surplus aimed to cash in their 
allowances, which drove up trading activities. However, the value of allowances was 
suppressed due to oversupply, and hence the total value of trading did not see a 
proportional growth. 
 
In short, the unique status and dominant position of the EU ETS provides great research 
opportunities. The development of the market created under EU ETS and the output of real 
market data makes an empirical-based investigation feasible. The main research interest of 
this thesis and the emphasis on empirical investigation will be described in the following 
section. 
 
1.2.3 What are the specific issues of interest in this thesis? 
This section describes the main interest of this thesis, along with key references that shape 
the research questions and motivate the analyses. As this chapter focuses on introducing 
the main research interest, a more detailed review of the relevant empirical literature is 
provided in the respective empirical chapter. The research interest of this thesis originates 
from two aspects of the EU ETS after an extensive review of the relevant literature and 
reports. First, have EU ETS-exposed firms experienced any significant impact on their 
share prices? Second, does the implementation of EU ETS substantially influence the 
emissions behaviour of firms? Three independent yet inter-related sets of analyses are 
designed to investigate these questions with real market data and verified EU ETS data: 
 
 
1) An examination of the implications of EU ETS on the stock market value of the 
regulated firms is planned, which is the main interest of this thesis. The analysis 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 8 
examines the underlying assumption that emissions trading might provide a cost saving 
opportunity in emissions reduction abatement from a financial market perspective. This 
analysis is primarily inspired by Oberndorfer (2009), Veith et al. (2009), and Mo et al. 
(2012), who investigate the stock price performances of large electricity firms which are 
subject to EU ETS compliance. 
 
2) A follow-up investigation to identify the further factors that might alter the EU ETS 
impact on firms’ share prices is conducted. This analysis receives partial inspiration 
from Knight (2011), with a sector-orientated variation. The primary assumption builds 
upon sectoral differentiation driving investors’ considerations with regard to the carbon 
market–financial market linkage, instead of temporal and spatial factors. This analysis 
also draws inspiration from conceptual studies, such as Hourcade et al. (2007) and Lund 
(2007), as well as from empirical studies (Bushnell et al., 2013; Chapple et al., 2013). 
 
3) An analysis that identifies and empirically tests the factors associated with firm-
level carbon emissions efficiency for firms regulated by the EU ETS is performed. This 
analysis is motivated by the literature that investigates the interactions between carbon 
emissions and their determinants. The key reference is the study by Cole et al. (2012), 
who have empirically tested determinants of firm-level CO2 emissions per unit of 
production using an extensive dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms. Prior to their 
firm-level study, they also conducted an empirical-based study investigating the 
industry-level emissions determinants with UK data (Cole et al., 2005). This analysis 
also complements the previous two sets of analyses by enhancing the linkage between 
all empirical analyses and practicability of the thesis. 
 
In order to conduct these analyses, which are expected to provide insights into the research 
interests of this thesis, a comprehensive dataset, which can provide appropriate data points 
for a robust analysis, is required. To begin with, firms with compliance obligation in the 
EU ETS, i.e. the EU ETS-exposed firms, need to be identified for all investigations as well 
as the emissions of each company, as the subject of investigation in all three proposed 
research questions requires such information. Second, the status of the firm, particularly 
whether the company is publicly traded, is specifically required for the second and third 
questions, as the share price of the firm is the subject of investigation. After an extensive 
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survey of various sources of data, which is documented in Chapter 3, the Carbon Market 
Data’s EU ETS Company Database provides company-level data with sufficient 
geographical and temporal coverage as well as the assured level of verification. Most 
importantly, the emissions data from its EU ETS Database is within the regulated context, 
which provides a solid base for the empirical analyses to be conducted. More detailed 
discussions of the data required with regard to each research question, including 
explanatory variables for different model specifications, are presented in the respective 
empirical chapters (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). 
1.3 Research questions and the empirical findings 
 This thesis intends to empirically examine the effects of emissions trading on ETS-exposed 
firms in terms of their emissions behaviour as well as on stock price performances. The 
analyses and findings benefit from econometrics techniques and accountable real market 
data that is sourced from the transaction log administered by the European Commission. 
The finding adds value to various aspects of the current EU ETS literature, which is briefly 
presented in this section. 
 
Empirical Chapter 1 
Chapter 4 examines the effect of the planning and implementation of the EU ETS on the 
stock market performance of the regulated firms. Companies used to emit CO2 and other 
GHGs at no cost, whereby the costs are essentially externalised within the society. The 
situation has changed since 2005; the right to emit is now restricted and additional 
emission allowances must be obtained at extra cost where an entity emits over its 
designated cap, which forces the firm to internalise these costs. The EU ETS may thus 
have a negative effect on the stock market performance of regulated firms, as it forces 
them to pay, directly or indirectly, for their carbon emissions. (Baumert et al., 2003; 
Burtraw et al., 2001; Chapple et al., 2013). 
 
The main question asked in Chapter 4 is as follows: will the firms which are or will be 
subject to a mandatory emission restriction introduced by the EU ETS experience any 
significant impact in terms of their stock price performance? The planning and 
implementation of the EU ETS may have a negative effect on the stock price performance 
of the relevant firms, from the ETS regulation requiring the firms to internalise the cost of 
their emissions. Compliance with the emissions restriction, as a consequence, is expected 
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to cost the participating firms considerably more than the business as usual scenario before 
the ETS was proposed and implemented (Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006; Pope and Owen, 
2009; Linn, 2010). Through the introduction of an ETS, firms are also considered to be 
increasingly subject to potential environmental liabilities and cost impacts in the medium 
to long term (Bushnell et al., 2013; Bode, 2006; Hughes, 2000). 
 
Most of the empirical studies that have examined the EU ETS-related effects on the stock 
market focused on small sub-samples of all the listed firms participating in the EU ETS. In 
particular, four studies shed light on the impact of the EU’s emission trading schemes on 
the share prices of affected companies using actual market data. Oberndorfer (2009) 
conducted the first econometric analysis that investigated the relationship between the 
emission allowance prices and the stock returns of twelve major European electricity 
providers. Veith et al. (2009) investigated the capital market response to emission 
allowance price changes with the dataset of 22 major electricity companies in Europe and 
the APT-style market model. A more recent study with empirical analyses covering the 
first five years (2005–2009) of the EU ETS, by Mo et al. (2012), measures the impact of 
EU ETS on electricity firms in terms of their shareholder value. They use a modified 
multi-factor market model to estimate the sensitivity (beta) of stock returns of 12 
electricity firms to the allowance price variation. Their findings reveal that the allowance 
price effect on stock returns changes from Phase 1 to Phase 2. The EUA prices 
appreciation tends to be accompanied by the corporate value appreciation in Phase 1, while 
the opposite is observed in Phase 2. 
 
The results of the first part of the analysis show that EU ETS-exposed firms demonstrate 
the expected underperformance at the highest statistical significance level but only in the 
sample period 2001–2004 (pre-EU ETS period), during which the ETS Directive was 
proposed and being negotiated but not yet launched. This is of particular interest, as none 
of the previous studies has empirically examined the share price performance of the ETS-
regulated firms during the pre-ETS period. Once the EU ETS began in 2005, the regulated 
firms did not experience any subsequent negative effects on their stock prices. These 
results are in line with previous studies, which observe no adverse impacts on share prices 
of regulated firms within the EU ETS context (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009), as 
the performance impact appears to arrive ex ante in terms of reduced investor expectations 
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(Chapple et al., 2013; Hughes, 2000). This chapter therefore does not find a significant 
negative contemporaneous impact of the EU ETS on stock market performance, but only a 
significant negative ex ante impact of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of 
emission intensive firms. Hence, it is questionable if firms and eventually their 
shareholders are internalising sufficient costs to contribute in a meaningful way to the 
proposed climate change mitigation. The irony of the forward-looking nature of the 
financial market is that while the firms may have internalised sufficient cost during the 
period before the EU ETS (2001–2004), they have clearly not done so during the EU ETS 
itself. Since a meaningful climate change mitigation requires consistent efforts, it seems 
fair to argue that firms are currently not internalising sufficient cost (EC, 2009b; Hepburn 
and Stern, 2008). 
 
Empirical Chapter 2 
Chapter 5 investigates two questions. First, the differentiation of the EU ETS effects on 
share prices at sector level is empirically examined by estimating the stock return 
performance of the sector-based portfolios using standard and extended market models. 
Second, the effect of the emissions status, which is determined by the net allowance 
holding position, on the share prices of ETS-regulated firms is further examined at two 
levels. This analysis intends to find out whether the emissions status of firms is relevant in 
the valuation process of stock market investors, and whether the firms and sectors are 
valued differently due to their net allowance holding position. 
 
The sector differentiation regarding the ETS exposure was conceptually elaborated by 
Hourcade et al. (2007), who suggested that the carbon emissions-related characteristics of 
a sector, which determined the sector’s exposure to the EU ETS, depended on (i) its energy 
intensity, (ii) its ability to pass costs through to consumers and (iii) its carbon abatement 
opportunities. While they did not analyse each industry separately on these characteristics, 
they made simple predictions that the health care and consumer discretionary sectors were 
less energy intensive than the energy, utilities, and materials sectors and hence less 
affected by the EU ETS. Among the three more affected sectors, they considered the 
utilities’ sector to be in a better position due to its better opportunity to pass costs through 
to consumers given its relatively low international competition compared with the 
materials sector. Lund (2007) further argued that the EU ETS’ cost impact on the materials 
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sector would be 3–4 times higher than its impact on the energy sector and hence the 
materials-related industries should be affected most by the EU ETS. However, neither of 
these two papers (Hourcade et al., 2007; Lund, 2007) investigated the relationship between 
the carbon characteristics of these participating sectors and stock market returns.  
 
The only analysis of EU ETS-related effects on the stock market returns of different 
industries has been published by Bushnell et al. (2013). They focus on a specific event, the 
25 April 2006 carbon price crash, and investigate the responses of various industries. They 
find, somewhat counterintuitively, that carbon or electricity intensive industries are hurt 
most in their share price performance due to the carbon price crash. They explain their 
finding by the predominantly grandfathered emissions in the “trial” phase of the EU ETS, 
and the fact that the asset value of the emission allowances held in large quantities by the 
carbon and electricity intensive firms crashed on April 25, 2006. In other words, they 
believe that investors are more concerned with the potential revenue reduction than the 
cost reduction of carbon or electricity intensive industries. This finding is contrary to the 
climate change mitigating intention of the EU ETS policy makers, as the findings revealed 
that from the investors’ perspective, ETS does not appear sufficiently stringent to have 
internalised enough emissions-related costs to the emission sources. Hence, it seems very 
worthwhile to study if this effect also holds beyond the specific event for the full first 
phase and extended trading periods. 
 
The results reveal that six out of seven sectors significantly underperformed the market 
benchmark during the pre-ETS period of 2001–2004. The Energy sector has been valued 
indifferently by the stock market since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005. During the 
estimation period that covers both trading periods (2005–2010), the Utilities, Health Care, 
and Consumer Staples sectors experienced an underperformance while Materials, 
Industrials, and Consumer Discretionary saw an outperformance against the market 
benchmark. This finding suggests that the sector differentiation of the EU ETS effect on 
share prices of the regulated firms is significant. The further analysis that examines the 
performance of portfolios consisting of firms with different emission status in the main 
sectors appears fairly similar to the results of the sector portfolio performance estimation, 
regardless of the portfolio’s emission status.  
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The main conclusions drawn from the empirical findings in this chapter concern two 
aspects. The first aspect confirms that the stock price performance of ETS-regulated firms 
can be differentiated at sector level to a certain degree as different levels of abnormal 
portfolio returns are observed. It appears that performance can also be differentiated by 
sectoral emission status as the under-emitting sector sees a reward in the share value while 
the over-emitting sector consistently experiences a value penalty. The second aspect 
concerns the fact that stock return performances differentiated by emission status cannot be 
seen at firm level within the sectors. The results are interpreted as showing that stock 
market investors consider the emission status and the net allowance holding positions of 
the sector relevant and value stocks consistently with the positive value relevance proposal 
of Johnston et al. (2008). 
 
Empirical Chapter 3 
The main research question in Chapter 6 is: what factors systematically explain the 
emissions behaviour of firms which are regulated by the EU ETS? Two streams of 
literature motivate and help to build the main framework of the empirical design, which 
specifically investigates the determinants of the firm-level CO2 emissions performance of 
EU ETS-regulated firms. Inspiration is initially drawn from studies that focus on 
empirically examining the determinants of emissions, for this stream of the literature 
studies a similar subject, either GHG or carbon emissions. Although the specific subject of 
interest in this chapter is firm-level emissions, studies that investigate emissions at the 
aggregate level, such as industry or country levels, are also reviewed, for two reasons. 
First, the aggregate-level emissions provide a foundation for the estimation model to drill 
down to the firm-level emissions as the aggregate-level data ultimately are inclusive of 
disaggregate-level data. For instance, the overall industrial-level emissions consist of 
individual plant/firm-level emissions (Cole et al., 2005). Second, studies that concentrate 
on firm-level emissions are relatively limited, presumably due to data availability (Cole et 
al., 2012). The second stream of literature investigates more generally which factors are 
related to corporate environmental performance. The rationale behind referencing this 
stream of literature is inspired by Delmas and Blass (2010), who suggest a framework that 
uses the emission level an indicator for corporate environmental performance. Thus, the 
factors that influence corporate environmental performance, especially the emissions-
related aspects, could also affect the carbon emissions. 
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Cole et al. (2005, 2012) suggest that firm-level carbon emissions are related to a series of 
firm characteristics, among which capital intensity and production level are of particular 
interest in this chapter. This chapter is the first attempt to provide empirical evidence on 
the determinants of firm-level emissions behaviour within the EU’s emissions restriction 
setting on a multinational and sectoral scale, and the results are a valuable addition to the 
current literature in environmental management, in particular within the GHG emissions 
management area. This will be be helpful in identifying the factors associated with the 
carbon emissions of firms in order to more effectively manage emissions and achieve the 
reduction target. 
 
The analysis benefits from a panel dataset that comprises the largest EU ETS-regulated 
European listed firms, in terms of their shares of allowances allocated and verified 
emissions. The sample dataset covers in total a six-year operating period of the EU ETS 
and seven sectors, making the dataset the first one to include emission trading scheme data 
of industries outside the utilities sector. A new emission performance measure, the 
emission-to-cap ratio, is constructed to indicate the compliance level of respective firms 
regulated by the EU ETS. This is done by scaling the verified emissions of each firm by its 
emission cap, and serves as the dependent variable. A ratio larger than 1 indicates that the 
firm is emitting over its cap and needs additional emissions allowances to maintain the 
compliance level. The relationship between the ratio and the potential determinants is 
expected to reveal whether a certain factor can be significantly attributed to the 
increase/decrease in emissions. 
 
The estimation results of regressions with the baseline model show that among which the 
capital intensity effect and production output effect are prominent and consistent with the 
results in Cole et al. (2005, 2012) that both factors drive up the emissions of firms. The 
business model of a firm appears dominant in determining its emission compliance 
performance. The sector-specific analysis further reveals that the energy sector appears 
more sensitive to legislative action while the firm characteristics do not seem influential in 
explaining the emissions variation within the sector at any statistically accepted 
significance level. Estimation results with the materials sector and utilities sector-specific 
interaction terms-added models follow a similar pattern, as production, capital intensity, 
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and sector differentiation effects again remain supported at overall level, while the test of 
sector-specific effect has no significant coefficients. With an extended analysis that 
focuses on the utilities sector, it is revealed there is a shift of explanatory power from the 
utilities sector dummy caused by certain utilities’ sector-specific interaction terms. The 
extended regression indicates that the production effect within the utilities sector takes 
away the statistical significance of the utilities’ sector dummy, while the capital intensity 
effect within utilities demonstrates less dominance in taking over the explanatory power of 
the sector dummy. The main policy implications from the analysis in this chapter include 
the necessity for sector-specific environmental targets and incentives to achieve the target, 
as different sectors inevitably experience different levels of sensitivity to certain 
environmental issues, such as carbon emissions. 
 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of the mandatory emissions trading scheme and 
its implications for two main aspects, the corporate financial performance side and 
environmental performance side. The first empirical chapter examines the implications of 
the emissions trading scheme from the financial market perspectives. Although this thesis 
is not the first paper that investigates this particular relationship, it has enhanced this area 
of literature by largely expanding the scope of the dataset, with respect to both the number 
of firms and the coverage of multiple sectors. It further benefits from the verified data 
collected from the trading scheme, which allows an in-depth analysis concerning how 
stock market investors value different emissions compliance status. The research design is 
targeted specifically at revealing whether the EU’s emission trading scheme has had any 
significant effect on the valuation of the firms regulated. The design takes into account the 
most direct factor associated with the trading scheme, the emissions compliance status, 
which has not yet seen in the previous studies that have investigated a similar subject 
within the EU ETS context. 
 
The varying degree of exposure to emissions restriction facing different sectors is taken 
into account in the final empirical chapter. This expands the scope of the current empirical 
studies, which almost exclusively examine companies in the utility/power sector. The 
analysis in Chapter 5 provides the first piece of empirical evidence that confirms that 
differences in the level of exposure to the same environmental regulation can be detected 
at the sector level. While previous studies conceptually demonstrated that different sectors 
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are likely to have varied degrees of exposure to the EU ETS, Chapter 5 empirically tests 
the degree to which these sectors are exposed and quantifies the ETS-related effect on 
sectors in terms of equity valuation, which appears to be the first attempt so far to have 
done so. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 6 utilises emissions data from the EU ETS to examine the compliance 
behaviour drivers of the regulated firms, the first attempt to date to the author’s 
knowledge. A new emissions performance measure is made possible with the data 
produced and collected from a mandatory scheme as the data reported is subject to a 
mandatory verification and reporting process, which ensures the accuracy and reliability of 
the measure. The design of the sector-firm characteristic interaction terms identifies 
whether a certain factor has a stronger effect on the firms in any specific sector in terms of 
their emissions, which is also a novel attempt as a multi-sector dataset is available. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background 
information on the emissions trading mechanism and the EU ETS in particular. Chapter 3 
documents the data used in this thesis, including the requirements and the selection process 
of the dataset. The basic features and information contained in the dataset are also 
described and followed by an exploration of the emission allowance price trend during the 
first and second trading period of EU ETS. Chapter 4 examines the first research question 
proposed – does EU ETS have any significant effect on the share prices of the regulated 
firms? The analysis utilises the real market data and the verified emissions data of ETS-
regulated firms, as well as econometrics techniques involving regression applications with 
the standard and extended Carhart-style model (Carhart, 1997). Chapter 5 further explores 
the effects of EU ETS on share prices by focusing on sector-level differentiation. Chapter 6 
investigates the last research question proposed – which factors systematically explain 
firms’ emissions levels in relation to their respective emissions cap? – and intends to shed 
light on firm emissions behaviour within a mandatory emission cap context in Europe 
while also complementing the previous two empirical chapters by adding more 
practicability to the research composed in this thesis. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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2 The Background to Emissions Trading 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a building block of the thesis by giving a comprehensive 
review of the essential theoretical and technical aspects which are relevant to its central 
research interest, the European Union’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) and its 
implications. The chapter begins in Section 2.2 by introducing the concern of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, which EU ETS aims to manage. This is intended to reinforce the 
motivation of this research project by emphasising the need for subsequent action after 
recognising the issue of concern and its potential impact. The examination of the efforts 
and responses which are meant to assess and mitigate the problem, made aggregately by 
nations and organisations internationally, is presented in Section 2.3. These inputs, such as 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in essence chart the emergence of the market-
based instruments which have been used to manage emissions problem in recent years. 
Section 2.4 discusses the emergence of current climate change policies, which 
demonstrates an evident movement towards market-based mechanisms. The current state 
of the global carbon market, the product of such market-based mechanisms, is then 
presented in Section 2.5 to provide a picture of the scale of the application and 
development of emissions trading in practice. This also serves a second purpose, which is 
to view the European carbon market in a global context and evaluate its significance as the 
main research topic of this thesis.  
 
A more detailed review and examination of the fundamental knowledge and operational 
aspects of the EU ETS comprises the second half of Chapter 2. The EU ETS review starts 
with the origin and drivers of EU ETS creation in Section 2.6, which introduces the 
political foundations and other driving factors that led to the creation of EU community-
wide ETS. The regulatory framework of the trading scheme is described in Section 2.7 
following the introduction of the EU ETS. Section 2.8 describes the technical aspects of 
the EU ETS, including its implementation and operation, in particular the essential 
mechanisms that enable the smooth operation of the cap-and-trade system. An overview of 
the European carbon market – in particular, the price development of the ‘commodity’ of 
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the carbon, the EU allowances _ can been seen in Section 2.9. Section 2.10 reviews several 
studies and reports that have evaluated the performance of the trading scheme in terms of 
its operation, before the final Section 2.10 briefly concludes. 
 
2.2 The need for carbon emissions management 
 
This section briefly introduces the root from which the research questions in this thesis 
stems: carbon emissions and climate change. The section intends to reinforce the 
motivation of the research project by emphasising the need for subsequent action after 
recognising the issue of concern and its potential impacts. Human activities-related GHG 
emissions, most commonly referred to as carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, have raised 
world-wide concerns in recent years. A series of assessment reports compiled and 
published by the IPCC have indicated that excess amount of GHG inventory in the 
atmosphere is substantially associated with global climate change (GCC). For instance,  
the Stern Review comments that ‘The IPCC concluded in 2001 that there is new and 
stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over at least the past 50 years is 
attributable to human activities’ (Stern, 2006: 7; IPCC, 1990, 1995).  
 
Various publications have also stressed that the implications and risks of climate change on 
the environmental, economic, and social dimensions can be global and significant, and 
suggested that action against the potential harmful impacts of climate change is required. 
For instance, the IPCC’s third assessment report mentions that the increasing risks of 
certain irreversible events, such as loss of species, forests, and altered oceanic circulation 
regimes, are likely to occur due to the cumulative interaction of human activities-related 
factors. The report wrote that: ‘Observational evidence from all continents and most 
oceans shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional climate changes, 
particularly temperature increases’ (IPCC, 2007: 8). ‘Costs and benefits of climate change 
for industry, settlement and society will vary widely by location and scale. ... Where 
extreme weather events become more intense and/or more frequent, the economic and 
social costs of those events will increase.’ (IPCC, 2007: 12). The 1995 IPCC assessment 
also concluded that most parts of the world are highly likely to experience net negative 
climate change impacts (IPCC, 2001a, 1995). 
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The impact of climate change on the economic phase is another cause for concern. 
Although it is considered a highly complex and also controversial process to make 
numerical estimates of impact at the aggregate level, most of which remain at a medium-
to-low confidence level and speculative, nevertheless, these figures can provide an insight 
into various aspects of the potential impact on our vulnerability to climate change, 
including signs, orders of magnitude, and patterns (Smith et al., 2001: 941). The quantified 
economic loss in the Stern Review estimated a 5–10% loss in global GDP with 5-6 degrees 
Celsius warming, with poor countries suffering costs in excess of 10%, been considerably 
higher than in many previous studies (Stern, 2006: 161). The estimate from the 2007 IPCC 
assessment report showed on average a global loss of 1–5% GDP for 4 degrees Celsius 
warming. All regions would experience net negative impacts either by the decline in net 
benefits or by the increase in net costs for an increase in temperature greater than 2–3 
degrees Celsius. (IPCC, 2007: 64-65) 
 
The potentially damaging consequences with regard to climate change impacts on our 
living environment and the economy are undesirable, and a consensus on the need to 
undertake action internationally and collectively as the first step to mitigate the climate 
change has gradually emerged. The next step is to examine the efforts and responses made 
by societies, including governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in order 
to adapt to and mitigate climate change. 
 
2.3 Relevant inputs on climate change mitigations 
 
A brief introduction to climate change mitigation-related inputs is presented in the 
following section to give an overview of the trends of climate change concerns and a 
clearer understanding of how these inputs can shape the emergence of current climate 
change policies which target carbon emissions reduction. Table 2.1 provides summarised 
information on the objectives of each input, and a more detailed discussion of the features 
and contributions of each input follows. 
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Table 2.1 Relevant inputs on addressing the climate change and GHG emissions 
YEAR INPUT OBJECTIVES 
1972 
United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), established by United 
Nations General Assembly 
UNEP provides leadership and encourages partnership for environment concerns by 
inspiring, informing, and enabling people and nations to maintain a quality of life without 
compromising that of future generations. 
1988 
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), established 
by UNEP and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
IPCC is an intergovernmental body that provides opinions and assessments of scientific 
evidence concerning the current state of climate change knowledge and its potential 
environmental as well as socio-economic impacts.  
1992 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), set up and open for 
signature 
UNFCCC enables international cooperation on what can be done to limit global average 
temperature rise and climate change, and meanwhile to cope with any associated impacts. 
1997 
Kyoto Protocol adopted during the 
third annual Conference of Parties 
(COP) by the UNFCCC 
It was agreed during the negotiation of the Protocol to set a legally binding emissions 
reduction target for main industrialised (Annex I*) countries and allowing the use of flexible 
mechanisms by Annex I countries to meet their reduction commitments. 
2000 
European Climate Change Programme 
(ECCP) launched by the European 
Commission 
ECCP was established to respond to the needs of EU community-wide action on limiting 
CO2 emissions and aims to identify and establish all the elements required of EU strategies 
for the imposition of the Kyoto Protocol. 
2000 
Climate and Carbon Finance by The 
World Bank 
The World Bank Group’s climate finance aims to provide funds to support low-emissions 
and resilient developments, especially in developing countries.  
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YEAR INPUT OBJECTIVES 
2001 
GHG Protocol by the World 
Resources Institute and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable 
Development 
The GHG Protocol is a multi-stakeholder partnership of business, NGOs, and others and its 
mission is to develop internationally accepted GHG accounting and reporting standards for 
governments and business leaders to understand, quantify and manage GHG emissions 
2003 
Directive 2003/87/EC formally issued The ETS Directive established the scheme for GHG emissions allowances trading within the 
European community. 
2005 
Launch of EU ETS The EU community-wide trading scheme intends to assist the member states and the 
European Union as a whole to achieve emissions reductions in a more flexible manner. 
2012 
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol (COP18) 
A second commitment period of 8 years starting from January 2013, and a smooth 
continuation of the Protocol, were agreed. 
This table presents the relevant inputs that have shaped the current communal concerns on climate change and subsequent climate change policy proposals 
and implementation. Information on each input is gathered from publicly available sources and compiled by the author. The first column indicates the year 
in which the specific input was initiated, the second column lists each input, and the third column briefly describe the objectives of each input. The sources 
of information include: UNEP (UNEP, 2013a), IPCC (IPCC, 2013a), UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2013c), Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998), ECCP (EC, 2013b), 
GHG Protocol (WRI&WBCSD, 2004), Climate finance The World Bank (TheWorldBank, 2013a, 2013b)
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United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established in 1972, and has since 
become the voice for the environment within the United Nations system. UNEP’s work 
covers the assessment of global, regional, and national environmental conditions and 
trends, the development of international and national environmental instruments, and the 
enhancement of the wise management of the environment by institutions (UNEP, 2013a). 
The issues of concern to UNEP include climate change, disasters and conflicts, ecosystem 
management, environmental governance, and harmful substances as well as resource 
efficiency. UNEP addresses specific aspects surrounding climate change, including the 
adaption, mitigation, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+) as well as building new finance models to promote the green economy. Enabling 
individuals, organisations, and countries to address these issues in order to combat climate 
change is strengthened by the collaboration of UNEP with numerous partners, including 
the IPCC and UNFCCC, which are described in the following paragraphs (UNEP, 2013b). 
 
The IPCC was established by UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
in 1988 to be the leading international body that assesses global climate change. Its main 
function is to review and assess the latest scientific, technical, and socio-economic 
information produced world-wide which is relevant to the comprehension of climate 
change and the work of the IPCC is an aggregation of the voluntary contributions of 
numerous scientists (IPCC, 2013a). There are three Working Groups, a Task Force and a 
Task Group contributing to the work, and each has different assigned subjects. The 
assessment of the physical science aspects of the climate system and climate change is 
done by Working Group I, Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic 
and natural systems to climate change, consequences of climate change, and options for 
adapting to it, and Working Group III contributes to the assessment of options for climate 
change mitigation through reducing GHG emissions and promoting activities that remove 
GHGs from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2013c). The major outputs of the IPCC are the 
assessment reports, which aim to inform the world of the latest state of knowledge on 
climate change; four assessment reports have been published in 1990, 1995, 2001, and 
2007, respectively, while the fifth assessment report was released in phases from 
September 2013 to October 2014 (IPCC, 2013b). 
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5 was adopted 
and opened for signature in 1992, in Rio de Janeiro. It is the major international treaty that 
deals the climate change specifically, and plays a crucial role in shaping climate change 
policies. Its primary intention has been to prevent catastrophic consequences of global 
climate change since its adoption and its main objective has remained to seek means of 
maintaining the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere at a stablised level. 194 nations 
(Parties), including most of the industrialised countries, have signed the UNFCCC to date. 
The members of UNFCCC meet annually in the Conference of Parties (COP) to assess and 
update progress in dealing with climate change mitigation issues. The Kyoto Protocol is an 
international agreement that is linked to the UNFCCC, and it commits its signatory Parties 
by setting internally legally-binding emission reduction targets. It was adopted in Kyoto, in 
1997, where the third COPs (COP3) of UNFCCC took place. The most important emission 
reduction agreement in the Article 3.1 of the Protocol reads: ‘The Parties included in 
Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed 
their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provision of this 
Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least five per 
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012’ (UNFCCC, 1998: 3). The 
reporting and verification procedures, flexible market-based mechanisms, and a 
compliance system formed the ‘beating heart’ of the Kyoto Protocol, while the legally 
binding commitment began to internalise the formerly considered ‘unpriced externality’ – 
the GHG emissions. The Protocol has urged governments to prepare legislation and 
policies that can help them meet their commitments, motivated businesses to make 
climate-friendly investment decisions, and lead to the creation of a carbon market 
(UNFCCC, 2013c). The details of the implementation rules for the flexible mechanisms, 
including international emissions trading, clean development mechanisms, and joint 
implementation were discussed and adopted in subsequent COPs (UNFCCC, 2013d).  
 
The European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) was launched in June 2000 as the 
response of the European Commission to identifying and developing the necessary 
                                            
5  UNFCCC (2014), Background on the UNFCCC: the international response to climate change. [Online]. Available: 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php [Last Accessed Jan 2013]. 
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elements to implement the Kyoto Protocol (EC, 2013b). The ECCP is a multi-stakeholder 
consultative process that brings together all relevant players, and builds on current 
emissions-related activities at EU level. The Programme is separated into two distinct 
periods of time for different essential tasks. The first ECCP ran from 2000 to 2004, and 
examined an extensive range of instruments with potential for reducing GHG emissions; 
the work was shared among 11 working groups and each group was responsible for 
identifying options and potentials for emissions reduction on the basis of cost-
effectiveness. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is one of the most important and 
innovative initiatives that resulted from the first ECCP (EC, 2013d). The second ECCP 
was launched in October 2005, in Brussels, with the initial objective of facilitating and 
supporting the actual implementation of the priorities identified in the first ECCP, such as 
the ETS. The second ECCP has further explored cost-effective options for GHG emissions 
reduction in synergy with the EU’s Lisbon strategy for increasing economic growth and 
job opportunities (EC, 2013f). ECCP has been a crucial initiative that has led to a number 
of new policies and approaches for combating climate change since the European Union 
recognised that reacting to prevent the severe consequences of climate change should be 
among its top priorities. The ETS is considered to have become the key tool for GHG 
emissions reduction from industry most cost-effectively, and more effort has been devoted 
to the reformation of the system in order to make it more effective in terms of cutting 
emissions and saving overall abatement costs (EC, 2013c).  
 
Significant efforts devoted by the private sector is also an essential element of the response 
from society to realise climate change mitigation. The World Bank initiated the world’s 
first prototype carbon fund in 2000 with the intention of supporting the objectives of the 
Kyoto Protocol and facilitating GHG emissions reductions. Currently, the Carbon Finance 
Unit of the World Bank has created 15 carbon initiatives and facilities, which provide its 
fund participants with emissions reduction credits for their obligations under Kyoto 
Protocol while funding emissions reduction projects in developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition. These carbon funds and facilities have raised $3.4 billion to 
support over 150 projects in 65 developing countries, which has contributed to the 
reduction equivalent of over 181 million tons of CO2 emissions since 2000 (TheWorld 
Bank, 2013b). The World Bank has demonstrated that market-based instruments can play a 
part in enabling cost-effective emission reductions while conveying the mitigation finance 
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to developing countries, and has taken the lead role in shaping new-generation carbon 
instruments (TheWorld Bank, 2013a). 
 
2.4 Market-based instruments in the environmental policy context 
 
This section intends to provide a concise discussion on the emergence of current climate 
change policies, which demonstrates an evident preference for market-based mechanisms. 
The discussion starts with the classic economic theories of the treatment of an externality, 
which refers to the differences between the valuation of a certain item by society and that 
by the individual or company (Stern, 2006, 2008a; Brohe et al., 2009: 22). The discussion 
continues by showing how market-based mechanisms are placed in the modern 
environmental management context for mitigating global climate change through the 
acceptance of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol and the IPCC’s assessment 
reports on mitigation methods (Bashmakov and Jepma, 2001).  
 
Pollution problems are not a new issue. In fact, it has been long debated what is the most 
appropriate approach to manage pollution effectively. The widely cited Pigou6 (1920) and 
the Coase (1960) theorem7 of treatment for pollution, respectively, could be regarded as 
the two major foundation stones for environmental economics and economics instruments 
of externality control in the modern context. The classic Pigouvian proposal prescribes the 
use of taxation on externalities, while Coase (1960) opposes this approach for dealing with 
the problem of a harmful effect, if this effect comes internally from part of the production 
process (Brohé et al., 2009: 25; Baumol and Oates, 1971). 
 
With an imaginary example of a farmer and a cattle raiser, Coase aimed the explain that 
the liability of damage caused by any physical action possesses the nature of an 
inadequately defined property right, and if this right is made clearly defined, the loss of 
value due to executing it can be accounted for by calculating the additional costs 
associated with this action. Given perfect competition and zero transaction costs, the loss 
                                            
6 Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920) suggests imposing a unit-based tax on pollution output as a better approach than direct legal 
regulations.  
7 Coase, in The Problem of Social Costs (1960) presents externalities (harmful effects) as poorly defined property rights under 
regulatory system. By making these property rights more well defined, transparent, and transferable, the system can be improved and 
these rights should flow to their highest value of use (Brohe et al., 2009: 26) 
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of value is supposed to be less than the value created through this action, otherwise, there 
is no need for such a right to be exercised (Coase, 1960). Using any harmful effect – for 
instance, carbon emissions during the production process– the installation liable for this 
amount of emissions should be left with options to account for this additional cost 
associated with the emissions produced in such a manner that the cost does not exceed its 
gain. Since the late 1960s, works that show that emissions trading can be used in practice 
to manage pollution in a low-cost manner have emerged and shaped policy instruments for 
current environmental/pollution management. Dales (1968: 93) was among one of the very 
first to propose a market for pollution to deal with environmental problems. It was 
followed by Baumol and Oates (1971), who proposed a set of rather arbitrary standards of 
environmental quality and imposed a set of prices on waste emissions sufficient to achieve 
these standards. They considered that such a ‘resource-use prices’ system carried important 
optimality features and practical advantages. In the mid 1980s, Tietenberg (1985) 
discussed the rather successful role that emission trading had played in environmental 
policy reform in the US Clean Air Act context. 
 
While it is possible to directly impose regulations that restrict pollution sources 
indiscriminately, concerns over the negative economic consequences arise. Direct 
regulation, which often refers to a command-and-control (CAC) method, is overall a less 
complex method in terms of administration than market-based instruments, as universal 
standards are determined for all units. CAC would involve less unpredictable market 
mechanisms, such as behaviour of the market participants, hence the outcome could seem 
more controllable. However, it is argued that CAC offers little flexibility for compliance 
and can be costly despite the low transaction costs of execution; naturally, this method 
tends to encounter strong opposition and is a politically unpopular option (Brohe et al., 
2009: 28–31). 
 
With the increasing concern about GHG emissions and the progress of several 
international initiatives regarding climate change, such as the UNFCCC and IPCC 
mentioned in Section 2.3, the path of adopting appropriate instruments for effective GHG 
reductions becomes clearer. The third assessment report prepared by the Working Group 
III of IPCC (Bashmakov and Jepma, 2001) presents a full examination on the policies and 
measures that could be applied to GHG emissions mitigation at the national and 
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international level, which could serve as a practical guide for evaluating difference policy 
instruments. The report notes that market-based instruments have been well received by 
governments for their potential to achieve environmental effectiveness at an efficient 
overall cost. The IPCC report stresses that it is unlikely that a single policy instrument can 
fully address GHGs emissions as well as climate change problem for most nations, and 
other policy instruments should also be integrated at different levels, which is confirmed 
by several other studies (Rayner and Prins, 2007; Stern, 2008a; Brohé et al., 2009). 
 
2.4.1 Tax (prices control) or emissions trading (quantity control)? 
It is often of great concern, particularly for industry, that stringent environmental policies 
can be costly and hinder economic growth. Solutions to environmental problems, such as 
reducing GHG emissions, are thus required to be not only environmentally effective but 
also cost-efficient. While market-based mechanisms are currently preferred as the major 
tool to manage the emissions problem for their potential to be cost-effective (EC, 2013b; 
The World Bank, 2013a; Bashmakov and Jepma, 2001; Stavins, 2003), the decision of 
which method to apply still needs to be made. Brohe et al. (2009: 29) refer to the Stern 
Review (2006), and state that the context in which policies are applied is crucial. 
 
Market-based instruments can be a price control, as they form the taxes or quantity control 
for the tradable permit system. Summarising from an extensive review by Stavins (2003) 
that provides valuable observations on practical experience of market-based instruments, it 
should be noted that the efficiency of the instruments applied depends on the relative 
position of the marginal cost and benefits patterns related to the problem (in this case, 
emissions) that needs to be dealt with. This links to another cause of the complexity of 
choosing between price and quantity control, as pointed out by McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(2002): uncertainty. While price control produces uncertainty of environmental outcomes, 
quantity control brings uncertainty over the total costs of abatement. This uncertainty, 
which might hinder the decision making, can be rectified by examining the marginal 
abatement costs and benefits of the GHG emissions. 
 
Voß (2007) conceptualises of emissions trading as an instrument for controlling climate 
change as an innovative process in governance. The journey of emissions trading starts 
from its early theoretical articulation in the 1960s and 1970s, and goes through a ‘proof of 
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principle’ period and an experimental prototype, such as the Acid Rain program in the 
USA. Development of other regional schemes mushroomed in the 1990s and eventually 
emissions trading became centre stage with the increasing concern about global climate 
change in recent years. 
 
Hepburn (2006) examines the advantages of various instruments with regard to their 
respective efficiency under uncertainty. Weitzman (1974) suggests an illustrative 
modelling induction, that given one type of control, there is always a corresponding way to 
set the other control to reach the same result. From a purely theoretical perspective, if a 
quantity control is imposed and a certain amount of tradable permits are allocated and 
traded, the eventual permit price should equal the optimal price control – for instance, the 
taxation rate. Hepburn applies Weitzman’s framework to a climate change context and 
concludes that the choice of instruments depends on the position of the marginal abatement 
cost and the damage function. For example, given that the marginal abatement cost is steep 
and the damage function relatively flat, the benefit of abating the damage associated with 
climate change is rather flat, so a price instrument would be the preferred option. 
 
A similar illustration can be seen in Chapter 2 of Brohé et al. (2009: 34–36), introducing 
the concept of the discount rate, which indicates how future costs are translated into the 
present context. A low discount rate (on the overall costs related to climate change), as 
applied in the Stern Review, indicates that the damage cost has been considered a steep 
function, and the outcomes could be catastrophic in the case of failing to achieve the 
emission reduction targets, so that the marginal benefit of mitigating climate change 
problem is consequently high. The welfare of current and future generation should be 
considered on the same basis. Under these circumstances, trading is the preferred solution. 
This is open to considerable critiques – for instance, by Nordhaus (2007), who suggests the 
adoption of a high discount rate would be more realistic and the damage costs in the future 
would be less significant in today’s terms. 
 
Despite the fact that both price and quantity control proponents make sound arguments, it 
nevertheless seems unrealistic to simply pick price or quantity control as ‘there is no silver 
bullet solution to climate policy’ (Brohe et al., 2009: 39). Similar opinions were also 
expressed in the IPCC report, which pointed out that ‘GHG emissions will not be 
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addressed with a single policy instrument, but with a portfolio of instruments’ (Bashmakov 
and Jepma, 2001: 402). 
 
2.4.1(a) Benefits that can be generated by emissions trading 
 
The benefit of emissions trading in economic terms can be illustrated by drawing the 
marginal abatement curves of two individual firms. A detailed analysis can be seen in 
Ellerman and Decaux (1998) as well as in Brohé et al. (2009: 27). If two or more parties 
are committed to achieve a certain amount of emissions reduction, given the marginal 
abatement costs are different for each party, which is generally the case, the overall 
abatement costs will be lower with the emissions trading mechanism than without trading 
as the reduction can be made more by the party with lower abatement cost (Figure 2.1).8  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Benefits generated by emissions trading 
 
PQA and PQB represent the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of Firm A and Firm B, 
respectively, without emissions trading, under the scenario that a reduction of emissions in 
the total amount of Q*, which equals QA + QB, is required. It is more expensive for Firm A 
to achieve the abatement (QA) all by itself, as it will be paying the higher marginal 
                                            
8 Figure 2.1is mainly adopted from Ellerman and Decaux (1998) and Brohé et al. (2009:27). 
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abatement cost (PQA). With the introduction of emissions trading, Firm B can create more 
emission permits by increasing its abatement (from QB to QB*) at the lower marginal 
abatement cost (PQB) while Firm A can lower its total abatement costs (to reduce 
abatement from QA to QA*) by purchasing additional emission permits from Firm B. The 
benefit created by the introduction of emissions trading is shown by the coloured segments 
in the figure, which is essentially realised through the reduced abatement costs as the 
abatement is made mostly by the relatively ‘efficient’ emitter. 
 
2.4.1(b) A numerical example of cost saving under emissions trading 
 
The simple numerical example provided in Labatt and White (2007) can illustrate more 
clearly how economic benefits can be achieved in an emissions trading system. The 
example starts by assuming that both Installation A and Installation B have produced 5,000 
tonnes of emissions higher than their respective emission cap set by the trading scheme 
and therefore, they need either to reduce their actual amount of emissions or to purchase 
additional ‘permits’ to emit to cover the excessive emissions. For Installation A, the cost of 
reducing one tonne of emissions is €5 while for Installation B, the cost is €15 per tonne. 
We further assume that the current trading price for one unit of emissions permit is €10. It 
can be clearly seen that for Installation A, it costs less to reduce the emissions by itself 
(€5*5,000) than to purchase the emission permits (€10*5,000). On the other hand, for 
Installation B, to purchase permits from the market costs it less (€10*5,000) than to reduce 
its actual emissions (€15*5,000). If Installation A reduces its emissions by 10,000 tonnes 
and sells the 5,000 tonnes of permits on the market, it can have a gain of €25,000 after 
complying with the cap. For Installation B, to purchase 5000 tonnes of permits on the 
market can result in €25,000 saving on abatement costs. 
 
2.4.2 The Kyoto Protocol9 and its flexible mechanisms 
 
The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol saw a substantial step forward in more quickly 
preparing market-based instruments for GHG emissions management. The Protocol 
commits most industrialised nations to an emissions reduction target, which is legally 
                                            
9 Details and information obtained from http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol as well as UNFCCC (1998). 
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binding internationally and with an overall reduction target of 5% against the 1990 
emissions level. The detailed emission reduction targets of Annex B countries can be 
found in Appendix 2-A. The emission targets are expected to be achieved through mainly 
national measures, while nations with reduction commitments are allowed to use the 
flexible mechanisms specified in the Kyoto Protocol to achieve their reduction in a more 
cost-saving manner. A brief introduction to the three flexible mechanisms included in the 
Kyoto Protocol is presented in the following section. 
 
Three flexible mechanisms, International Emissions Trading, Clean Development 
Mechanisms, and Joint Implementation, were introduced in the Kyoto Protocol, while the 
details regarding their application are defined in the following COP of UNFCCC, and in 
the seventh COP in particular, during which the Marrakech Accord was agreed in 2001. 
 
• International Emissions Trading 
Emissions Trading works by first creating a market for the new commodity, emissions 
rights. Annex B countries that sign up to the Protocol can no longer emit unlimited 
GHGs as they commit to definite emissions targets, which are expressed as levels of 
emissions allowed. These allowed emissions are recorded in a unitary form and defined 
as ‘Assigned Amount Units’ (AAUs) (Brohe et al., 2009: 71; Labatt and White, 2007: 
10). AAUs are tradable among countries, which allows countries with an allowed 
amount of unused emissions to sell the rights to countries with excessive emissions. In 
addition to AAUs, other units could also be traded under the international ETS defined 
in the Protocol. These units can be created by the emissions reduction projects described 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
• Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol 
(UNFCCC, 1998), allows a country with an emissions reduction or emissions limitation 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Parties) to implement an emission-
reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn tradable certified 
emissions reductions (CERs) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be 
counted towards meeting Kyoto targets. This is the first global, environmental investment 
and credit scheme of its kind, providing a standardised emissions offset instrument, CERs. 
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A CDM project might involve, for example, a rural electrification project using solar 
panels or the installation of more energy-efficient boilers. The mechanism is expected to 
stimulate sustainable development and emissions reductions, while giving industrialised 
countries a degree of flexibility to choose how they will meet their emissions reduction or 
limitation targets (UNFCCC, 2013a; UNFCCC-CDM, 2014). 
 
A CDM project must provide emissions reductions that are additional (UNFCCC, 2004) to 
what would otherwise have occurred. The projects must qualify through a rigorous and 
public registration and issuance process. Approval is given by the Designated National 
Authorities. Public funding for CDM project activities must not result in the diversion of 
official development assistance (ODA). The mechanism is overseen by the CDM 
Executive Board, answerable ultimately to the countries that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. Operational since the beginning of 2006, the mechanism has already registered 
more than 1,650 projects and has been anticipated to produce CERs amounting to more 
than 2.9 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, 2008–2012 (UNFCCC, 2013a). 
 
• Joint Implementation 
Joint Implementation (JI), defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998), 
allows a country with an emissions reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emissions reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-
reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party, each equivalent to one 
tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target. JI offers Parties a 
flexible and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part of their Kyoto commitments, while 
the host Party benefits from foreign investment and technology transfer (UNFCCC, 
2013b). 
 
A JI project must provide a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of 
removals by sinks, that is additional to what would otherwise have occurred.  Projects 
must have approval of the host Party and participants have to be authorised to 
participate by a Party involved in the project. Projects starting as from the year 2000 
may be eligible as JI projects if they meet the relevant requirements, but ERUs may 
only be issued for a crediting period starting after the beginning of 2008 (UNFCCC-JI, 
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2014; UNFCCC, 2006). If a host Party meets all of the eligibility requirements to 
transfer and/or acquire ERUs, it may verify emissions reductions or enhancements of 
removals from a JI project as being additional to any that would have otherwise 
occurred. On such verification, the host Party may issue the appropriate quantity of 
ERUs. This procedure is commonly referred to as the ‘Track 1’ procedure. If a host 
Party does not meet all, but only a limited set of eligibility requirements, verification of 
emissions reductions or enhancements of removals as being additional has to be done 
through the verification procedure under the Joint Implementation Supervisory 
Committee (JISC). Under this so-called ‘Track 2’ procedure, an independent entity 
accredited by the JISC has to determine whether the relevant requirements have been 
met before the host Party can issue and transfer ERUs. A host Party which meets all the 
eligibility requirements may at any time choose to use the verification procedure under 
the JISC (Track 2 procedure) (UNFCCC, 2013b). 
 
To briefly conclude, the emissions trading gains its position as the key climate policy 
instrument in current years by its potential for being cost-effective when implemented 
properly (EC, 2013b; Stavins, 2003) as well as for its political acceptance over taxes 
(Bashmakov and Jepma, 2001). It has clearly become a preferred choice among scheme in 
different nations (The World Bank, 2010, 2012). The following section introduces 
emissions trading in practice, beginning by explaining two common types of ETSs and 
how they operate. An overview of the current state of the global carbon market in terms of 
trading activities is presented in Section 2.5. 
 
2.5 Emissions trading in practice 
 
Emissions trading works by creating a market for emissions allowances. The market can be 
created in several ways, with the cap-and-trade system and the baseline-and-credit system 
being the most common. These systems differ mainly in their design characteristics (Brohe 
et al., 2009: 42). A cap-and-trade system is created by determining a new set of property 
rights and imposes an absolute cap within the system. The cap decides the number of 
allowances available and the how allowances shall be distributed to the regulated parties 
(or parties voluntarily participating) in the scheme based on a designated allocation 
method. The regulated parties need to submit a corresponding amount of allowances that 
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equal to their emissions, which completes the compliance procedure (Brohe et al., 2009: 
43–44). Unlike cap-and-trade, the baseline-credit system works through generating 
emissions reduction credits from projects that reduce emissions against a baseline value. 
The reduction credits can be used to achieve the agreed emissions reduction commitment 
as well as being traded among different parties with reduction targets. The CDM and JI are 
examples of the baseline-credit system (Brohe et al., 2009: 53). Table 2.2 presents the five 
types of emissions allowance units that are most commonly traded.
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Table 2.2 Summary of different types of most commonly tradable units 
Type Unit and source Framework Validity 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) 
AAU is the emissions allowance allocated to Parties that sign 
up to the Kyoto Protocol. It is equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2e 
Kyoto Protocol Global 
Certified Emissions Reduction 
(CER) 
CER is a credit issued under CDM which equals 1 metric 
tonne of CO2e 
Kyoto Protocol Global 
Emissions Reduction Unit (ERU) 
ERU is a credit issued under JI which equals 1 metric tonne of 
CO2e 
Kyoto Protocol Global 
Removal Unit (RMU) 
RMU is generated in UNFCCC Annex1 Parties by Land use, 
Land use change and Forestry activities that absorb carbon 
Kyoto Protocol Global 
European Union Allowance (EUA) 
EUA is designed to be identical with the equivalent of the 
AAU, which represents 1 metric tonne of CO2e emissions and 
is issued within EU ETS 
EU ETS 
European 
Union 
This table presents the five types of tradable carbon emissions units which are the most widely known. The first column lists the type of carbon emissions 
allowance or credit, the second column provides the unit measure and the sources of respective unit, the third column shows the framework in which the unit 
is defined, and the fourth column shows the context in which the unit can be validated and traded; the European carbon market and the international carbon 
market is linked through the EU Linking Directive (EC, 2004). Sources: Brohe et al. (2009:72); Labatt and White (2007: 10); UNFCCC, (2013a).
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The current global carbon market can be categorised in two main segments, the allowance 
market and the project-based credits market, depending on what types of units are traded. 
Tables 2.3–2.6 present the position of EUA market relative to the global carbon market. 
The EUA market created under EU ETS begins to dominate global carbon trading despite 
the trading activities during the initial launch period of EU ETS being conservative. The 
numbers show the EUA trading account for a large proportion of global carbon trading 
activities. In addition, trends of EUA and global carbon market share great similarities, 
which can be characterised by rapid growth, influences from changing of trading phases, 
and impacts from economic recession. The EUA market was boosted between 2005 and 
2006, as the uncertainties over the demand–supply chain and market mechanisms were 
gradually clarified. EUA and international carbon markets both saw a growing trend 
through 2005–2007, which coincided with the first trading period of EU ETS, and EUA 
trading activities were described as the engine, even the laboratory, of the global carbon 
market. Due to the demand for the derivatives with the Phase 2 allowances as the 
underlying assets, trading activity was still growing during the change in trading periods, 
despite the fact that the transactions and price of Phase 1 assets were close to zero 
(Ellerman et al., 2010: 138–139).  
 
The EUA market and the overall carbon market saw a twofold rise in trading value in 
2008, the first year of the new trading period of EU ETS, although the markets for project-
based credits experienced a decline. This observation again indicates the crucial status of 
EUA trading in driving the global carbon market. The financial crisis, which eventually led 
to a large-scale recession, also hit the carbon market particularly during the year 2008–
2009. Both the EUA and the international carbon market saw a considerable amount of 
trading volume while the value of the market did not increase in a corresponding ratio. The 
global recession hit the carbon market in its demand fundamentals, as depressed economic 
conditions led to low production output, low energy consumption, and thus low demand 
for emissions allowances (The World Bank, 2010). Firms with surplus allowances aimed 
to cash them in, which drove up trading activities (The World Bank, 2009). However, the 
value of allowances was suppressed due to oversupply, hence the total value of trading did 
not see a proportional growth.
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Table 2.3 EUA and world carbon market trading volume overview 
 Trading Volume (MtCO2e) 
EU ETS Other 
Allowance 
Markets 
Spot & 
secondary 
offset market 
Project-based 
credits 
Global Market 
EUA% of the 
Global Market 
2005 321 7 328 – 382 710 45.21% 
2006 1,104 30 1,134 – 611 1,745 63.27% 
2007 2,060 48 2,109 – 874 2,984 69.03% 
2008 3,093 185 3,278 1,072 486 4,836 63.96% 
2009 6,326 1,036 7,362 1,055 283 8,700 72.71% 
2010 6,789 373 7,162 1,275 334 8,772 77.39% 
2011 7,853 228 8,081 1,822 378 10,281 76.38% 
This table presents the annual trading volume of separate segments of the global carbon market. The first content column shows the trading volume of EU 
ETS, the second column shows the trading volume of other allowances markets together, the third column shows the sub-total of all allowances markets, the 
fourth column shows the sub-total of the offset markets that consist of secondary Kyoto mechanisms’ credits, the fifth column shows the sub-total of project-
based transactions that consist of primary CDM and JI, the sixth column shows the total trading column of the global carbon market, and the seventh column 
indicates the percentage of the trading volume of EU ETS accounts for in relation to the global market. The numbers are extracted directly from the annual 
carbon market reports published by The World Bank; the total numbers may not add up precisely due to rounding, as well as to different presentations of 
carbon market segments in different years. Each annual report contains trading information on the previous two years, for instance, the 2010 report shows 
the trading volume and value for 2009 and 2008, and the 2009 report shows the trading details for 2008 and 2007. For the overlapping reported figures, the 
latest ones are used. Some figures which are shown with – are not available due to different reporting styles, suspension of the old trading systems and the 
addition of new systems. Source: The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit annual carbon market report (The World Bank, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013a). 
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Table 2.4 EUA and world carbon market trading value overview 
 Trading Value (USD million) 
EU ETS Other 
Allowance 
Markets 
Kyoto offsets 
Project-based 
credits 
Global Market 
EUA% of the 
Global  
2005 7,908 63 7,971 – 2,894 10,864 72.79% 
2006 24,436 263 24,699 – 6,536 31,235 78.23% 
2007 49,065 296 50,394 – 13,641 63,007 77.87% 
2008 100,526 966 101,492 26,277 7,297 135,066 74.43% 
2009 118,474 4,349 122,822 17,543 3,370 143,735 82.43% 
2010 133,598 1,336 134,935 20,637 3,620 159,191 83.92% 
2011 147,848 1,033 148,881 23,250 3,889 176,020 84.00% 
This table presents the annual trading value (in USD million) of separate segments of the global carbon market. The first content column shows the trading 
value of EU ETS each year, the second column shows the trading value of other allowances markets, the third column shows the sub-total of all allowance 
markets, the fourth column shows the sub-total of the offset markets that consist of secondary Kyoto mechanisms’ credits, the fifth column shows the sub-
total of project-based transactions that consist of primary CDM and JI, the sixth column shows the total trading column of the global carbon market, and the 
seventh column indicates the percentage of the trading volume of EU ETS accounts for in relation to the global market. The numbers are extracted directly 
from the annual carbon market reports published by The World Bank; the total numbers may not add up precisely due to rounding, as well as to different 
presentations of carbon market segments in different years. Each annual report contains trading information for the previous two years, for instance, the 
2010 report shows the trading volume and value for 2009 and 2008, and the 2009 report shows the trading details for 2008 and 2007. For the overlapping 
reported figures, the latest ones are used. Some figures which are shown with – are not available due to different reporting styles, suspension of the old 
trading systems and the addition of new systems. Source: The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit annual carbon market report (The World Bank, 2007, 2009, 
2011, 2013a) 
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Table 2.5 World carbon market (excluding EU Allowances) trading volume breakdown 
 Trading Volume (MtCO2e) 
Other 
Allowance 
market 
New South 
Wales 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
Regional 
Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative 
Assigned 
Allowance 
Units 
Project-
based credits 
Clean Development 
Mechanisms Joint 
Implementation 
Others 
/Voluntary 
Market Primary Secondary 
2005 7 6 1 _ – 382 341 10 11 20 
2006 30 20 10 _ – 611 537 25 16 33 
2007 48 25 23 _ – 874 551 240 41 42 
2008 185 31 69 62 23 486 404 – 25 57 
2009 1,036 34 41 805 155 283 211 – 26 46 
2010 373 – – 210 62 1,609 224 1,260 47 69 
2011 228 – – 120 47 2,200 264 1,734 104 87 
This table presents the detailed breakdown of other allowances markets (excluding EU ETS) and project-based transactions in terms of trading volumes each 
year. The header column indicates the year of trading recorded. The first content column shows the sub-total trading volume of all other allowances markets 
(excluding EU ETS), the second column shows the trading volumes of the New South Wales GHG Abatement Scheme, the third column shows the Chicago 
Climate Exchange trading volume, the fourth column is the trading volume of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives of North America, the fifth column 
shows the trading volume of the AAUs under the UNFCCC Kyoto flexible mechanism framework, the sixth column shows the sub-total trading volumes of 
project-based transactions, the seventh and eighth columns show primary and secondary CDM transactions (CERs), respectively, the ninth column shows 
the JI transactions (primary and secondary ERUs) and the tenth column shows all other transactions. The numbers are extracted directly from the annual 
carbon market reports published by The World Bank; the total numbers may not add up precisely due to rounding, as well as due to different presentations 
of carbon market segments in different years. Each annual report contains trading information for the previous two years, for instance, the 2010 report shows 
the trading volume and value for 2009 and 2008, and the 2009 report shows the trading details for 2008 and 2007. For the overlapping reported figures, the 
latest ones are used. Some figures which are shown with – are not available due to different reporting styles, suspension of the old trading systems and the 
addition of new systems. Source: The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit annual carbon market report (The World Bank, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013a). 
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Table 2.6 World carbon market (excluding EUAs) trading value breakdown 
 Trading Value (USD million) 
Other 
Allowance 
market 
New 
South 
Wales 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
Regional 
Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative 
Assigned 
Allowance 
Units 
Project-based 
credits 
Clean Development 
Mechanisms Joint 
Implementation 
Others 
/Voluntary 
Market Primary Secondary 
2005 63 59 3 - - 2,894 2,417 221 68 187 
2006 263 225 38 - - 6,536 5,804 445 141 146 
2007 296 224 72 - - 13,641 7,426 5,451 499 265 
2008 966 183 309 198 276 7,297 6,511 - 367 419 
2009 4,349 117 50 2,179 2,003 3,370 2,678 - 354 338 
2010 1,336 - - 458 626 3,620 2,675 20,453 624 414 
2011 1,033 - - 249 318 3,889 2,980 22,333 1,119 569 
This table presents the detailed breakdown of other allowances markets (excluding EU ETS) and project-based transactions in terms of trading value (in 
USD million) each year. The header column indicates the year of trading recorded. The first content column shows the sub-total trading value of all other 
allowance markets (excluding EU ETS), the second column shows the trading value of the New South Wales GHG Abatement Scheme, the third column 
shows the Chicago Climate Exchange trading value, the fourth column is the trading value of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives of North America, the 
fifth column shows the trading value of the AAUs under the UNFCCC Kyoto flexible mechanism framework, the sixth column shows the sub-total trading 
volumes of project-based transactions, the seventh and eighth columns show primary and secondary CDM transactions (CERs), respectively, the ninth 
column shows the JI transactions (primary and secondary ERUs) and the ninth column shows all other transactions. The numbers are extracted directly from 
the annual carbon market reports published by The World Bank; the total numbers may not add up precisely due to rounding, as well as due to different 
presentations of carbon market segments in different years. Each annual report contains trading information for the previous two years, for instance, the 
2010 report shows the trading volume and value for 2009 and 2008, and the 2009 report shows the trading details for 2008 and 2007. For the overlapping 
reported figures, the latest ones are used. Some figures which are shown with – are not available due to different reporting styles, suspension of the old 
trading systems and the addition of new systems. Source: The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit annual carbon market report (The World Bank, 2007, 2009, 
2011, 2013a). 
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The specific knowledge of the fundamental and operational aspects of the EU ETS is 
required in order to better picture the research interests of this thesis, the environmental 
and financial implications of the EU ETS, in its theoretical and empirical context. A 
detailed review on this new regulation and its related issues is provided in the following 
sections and is structured as follows: Section 2.6 presents the origin of the EU ETS and is 
followed by a description of the regulatory framework of the trading scheme in Section 
2.7. Section 2.8 discusses technical aspects of the EU ETS including its implementation 
and operation, and Section 2.9 provides an overview of the European carbon market, in 
particular the price development of the ‘commodity’ of carbon, the EU allowances. Section 
2.10 reviews studies and reports that assess the effectiveness of the performance of the 
trading scheme. 
 
2.6 The creation of European Carbon Market: the origins10 
 
Emissions trading was not the first market-based instrument considered by the European 
Union to manage GHGs emissions. The European Commission proposed to impose a 
community-wide carbon/energy tax in early 1990s, however the attempt ended in failure. 
During the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol concerning the legally binding emissions 
restriction for developed countries, European representatives were strongly opposed to the 
inclusion of emissions trading as a flexible mechanism in the Protocol. Nevertheless, with 
the insistence of US delegates to the negotiations, emissions trading between countries 
along with CDM and JI were eventually included in the Protocol as flexible mechanisms 
which Annex B countries could use to comply with their reduction commitment (Ellerman 
et al., 2010: 16-17). 
 
Convery (2009) gives a detailed review on the legislative and institutional context of the 
EU ETS, and summarises the successful creation of community-wide emissions trading 
which can be attributed to the following two key points: first, the political foundations and 
second, the building of knowledge to turn emissions trading theory into practice. These 
two aspects are briefly addressed in the following paragraphs. 
 
                                            
10 The references for this section are based largely on Convery (2009), Ellerman et al. (ed. 2010) and documentation from the European 
Union, which can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/documentation_en.htm. 
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The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the European Union Treaty (TEU) in 
Maastricht in 1993 provided the political and legal framework for the establishment of a 
European single market, which formed the first step for the creation of the EU ETS. The 
final key decision that prepared for the emergence of emissions trading in Europe was the 
Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) in summer of 1998. On the basis of the EU-15’s BSA 
(European Council, 1998), fifteen member states agreed on a varied emissions reduction 
target, which in total should amount to the 8% reduction committed to in the Kyoto 
Protocol (Convery, 2009). 
 
Among the earlier literature that specified emissions trading as having a policy instrument 
status on the basis of the Coase theorem, Klaassen (1997, 1999) provides first 
comprehensive overview on the practicability and potential scope of applying emissions 
trading in the European Union, which formed the theoretical foundations of the adoption of 
such trading. The European Union has endeavoured to take the leading position in shaping 
global climate policies since the Kyoto Protocol and aimed to fulfil its commitment of 
reducing GHG emissions. The European Commission made the first major 
communications to the Council and European Parliament in 1998 with regard to the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and specified how the community could set up an 
internal trading scheme of its own by 2005. The subsequent process of pushing the 
European Union from considering the establishment of an ETS to actually acting on it 
began officially in 1999 after the adoption of the second Commission communication in 
which the need for a sustained policy response was emphasised (Ellerman et al., 2010: 18). 
 
The Green Paper (EC, 2000) presented by the Commission in 2000 officially launched the 
discussion on the crucial policy options that were required to be resolved in order to 
construct the framework for implementing a European community-wide trading scheme. It 
received inspiration from three studies commissioned by the European Commission that 
focused on three main areas, including a study that examined the cost-saving potential of 
the EU ETS (Capros and Mantzos, 2000), experience of the US emission trading evolution, 
as well as the establishment of legal guidelines. The paper provided the fundamental 
implementation rules, and specifically addressed the issue of allowances allocation.  
Another substantial input in drawing up the EU ETS was the establishment of the first 
European Climate Change Programme, which functioned as a multi-stakeholder 
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consultation process. The first ECCP from 2000 to 2004, focused on exploring the 
potential policy sectors and instruments for effectively reducing GHG emissions (EC, 
2013b).  
 
The draft proposal of the ETS Directive was submitted to the Council and the Parliament 
for formal considerable after a feedback period and a public consultation with key 
stakeholders by the Commission in 2001. The making of the EU ETS was characterised as 
a quick and entrepreneurial process (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010; Wettestad, 2005; 
Ellerman et al., 2010: 30). The legislative process of the EU ETS is outlined in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7 Timeline of EU ETS legislative process related events 
Time Event 
2001 The draft proposal of the ETS was submitted. 
October 2002 First reading of the proposal was completed by the Parliament. 
March 2003 
The common position was presented by the Council, and several points 
differed between the Parliament and the Council. 
Spring 2003 
The Parliament presented the Amendments based on the Council’s 
position. 
July 2003 
The amended draft went through a second reading by the Parliament. 
The Linking Directive draft, which intended to link the EU and the 
international carbon market was proposed. 
Late July 2003 The ETS Directive proposal was accepted by the Council. 
October 2003 The ETS Directive was formally issued. 
April 2004 The Linking Directive was agreed by the Council and the Parliament. 
2008 The amendments concerning the reform of the ETS were adopted.  
This table presents the procedure for the passage of the EU ETS. The first column lists the time the 
event occurred and the second column lists the respective event. Source: Ellerman et al. (2010). 
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2.7 The regulatory framework of the EU ETS11 
The EU ETS remains rather unfamiliar to most people due to the fact that emissions 
trading is not a simplistic CAC instrument, but instead has some degree of complexity. 
Second, the current coverage of EU ETS focuses on the largest emitters, thus the direct 
impacts are upon industrial sectors while general public may experience very limited 
degree of influence. 
 
2.7.1 The ETS Directive: what does the EU ETS regulate, and how? 
The entire ETS mechanism is defined by and constructed upon the Directive 2003/87/EC 
(EC, 2003a). It has since been further amended by a number of directives and regulations 
for the improvement of the whole scheme (EC, 2009a). The EU ETS draws substantially 
on the US sulphur dioxide (SO2) trading programme but is largely distinct from the latter 
program as it works in a relatively decentralised manner for the first two trading periods, 
meaning that the member states have been left a great degree of discretion on allowances 
allocation, monitoring and auditing, and management of sources (Kruger et al., 2007). 
Three main mechanisms work as gears of this community-wide trading scheme: 
monitoring, reporting, and verification. At the end of January 2004, the Commission 
decision on establishing the guidelines for monitoring and reporting was issued, which 
outlined the main responsibilities of member state with regard to these matters (EC, 
2004a). 
 
The EU ETS regulates CO2e
12
 emissions for installations used for activities specified in 
Annex I13 of the ETS Directive. Activities covered include combustion, metal, minerals, 
pulp, and papers. The ETS Directive targets the larger emitters of industrial sectors, as 
indicated in the Annex I declaration that installations with thermal inputs or capacity 
exceeding specified standards are subject to EU ETS regulation (EC, 2003a, 2009a). The 
information on EU ETS participants regarding allowances holding, transfer, submission, 
and verified emissions is recorded at installation level. Every change in ownership of 
                                            
11 Information regarding EU ETS is obtained from European Commission website, especially the Question and Answer section for each 
relevant topic. 
12 CO
2
 equivalent emissions 
13 Details of the criteria for inclusion in the EU ETS can be seen in Appendix 2-B. 
Chapter 2. Background of Emissions Trading 
45 
allowances for each installation is recorded within the National Registry, which works like 
a bank account for money. The Commission requires each member state to develop and 
maintain its registry to ensure the accurate accounting of the issue, holding, transfer, and 
cancellation of allowances (EC, 2003a: 37). In addition to National Registry, the European 
Commission runs and maintains the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL),14 a 
central administrator that records the issue, transfer, and cancellation of allowances. It also 
conducts automated checks on each transfer of allowances to ensure that transactions are 
free of irregularities (EC, 2003a: 38).  
 
The process of compliance with emissions restriction is a annual cycle and comprises three 
major events: 
 
1. Participants are expected to have their the actual carbon emissions report 
verified for the calendar year by 31 March of the following year. All emissions must be 
approved by independent verifiers. For example, the emissions for 2008 should be 
verified by the end of March 2009. 
2. All installations are given one month, until 30 April to surrender a sufficient 
quantity of allowances in their accounts to cover their verified emissions. 
3. The publication of the emissions data and surrendered allowances would be 
on 15 May, together with the cancellation of surrendered allowances, which must be 
finished by 30 June . 
 
Article 16 defines the penalties, which shall be applied for failing to submit a 
corresponding amount of allowances to cover the verified emissions, which is 40 EUR (for 
the first trading period 2005–2007) and 100 EUR (for the second trading period 2008–
2012), for each unit of that EUA installation operators fail to surrender (EC, 2003a: 37). 
From 2013 onwards, the excess emission penalty will increase commensurately with the 
European index of consumer prices (EC, 2009a: 79).  
 
 
 
                                            
14 A European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) has replaced the CITL since 2012, which has been prepared for the more centralised 
third phase of EU ETS. 
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2.7.2 The Linking Directive 
EU ETS was established as a domestic scheme for the European community. In order to 
increase the cost-effectiveness of reducing the committed amount of emissions, the 
Directive (EC, 2003a) states that the recognition of emissions reduction credits generated 
from the Kyoto mechanisms (CDM, JI) could fulfil such a purpose, and thus provide for 
linking EU ETS to international emissions trading and project-based mechanisms, which 
are recognised in the Kyoto Protocol. Internationally linked emissions trading is 
considered the most efficient in terms of overall abatement costs, a statement supported by 
Stern (2008) and Hepburn and Stern (2008). 
 
The Directive 2004/101/EC15 issued by the European Commission in 2004 (EC, 2004c) 
amends the Directive 2003/86/EC and outlines the rules regarding the use of Kyoto 
mechanism credits to achieve emissions reduction. The major points regarding usage are 
summarised as follows: 
  
• The use of reduction credits will take place through their issuance and an 
immediate surrender of one allowance in exchange for one reduction credit. 
• The limit on the use of project-based reduction credits by each installation 
should be specified in the member state’s National Allocation Plan (NAP) for each 
trading period.  
• Reduction credits should not be issued for projects that are undertaken for 
installations covered in the trading scheme to avoid double counting allowances. 
• The use of CERs by operators may be from 2005 while the use of ERUs is 
from 2008. 
  
Based on an assessment report by Rathmann et al. (2006) and Betz et al. (2006), the 
proposed purchase of reduction credits from Kyoto mechanisms is around 5% of the total 
allowances within the scheme for the second trading period. Nevertheless, the planned 
limits on the use of Kyoto credits varies considerably across member states. 
 
 
                                            
15 Also known as the Linking Directive EC (2004c), Directive 2004/101/EC, amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for 
GHG emissions allowances trading within the community,. Source: European Commission Strasbourg. 
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Current status of the Linking Directive 
 
The Linking Directive is also subject to amendments as the ETS Directive for post-Kyoto 
trading for the beginning of post-Kyoto emissions reduction target. The European Union is 
actively working on linking EU ETS to other domestic trading schemes, and the European 
Commission has announced an agreement that aims to build a linking pathway with the 
Australian system, which should take place no later than 2018. The planned use of Kyoto 
credits is around 1.7 billion tonnes of emissions from 2013–2020, which represents 50% of 
the reduction that will be made and is under one-third of the limits that have been used by 
2011 (EC, 2013e).  
 
2.8 Technical Aspects of EU ETS 
EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system to achieve the best possible outcome of the 
environmental goal and works in a decentralised manner, particularly for the first and 
second trading period as it is a preferred option of member states. A decentralised system 
leaves member states with a large degree of autonomy in certain critical decisions 
regarding the technical aspects of EU ETS (Kruger et al., 2007). The first technical point is 
to determine the cap. The following section introduces the main technical issues regarding 
the operation of the first and second trading periods of EU ETS, in the following order, 
cap-setting, allowances allocation method, and the Linking Directive. As several major 
changes have been made for the third trading period of EU ETS, the last part of this section 
will provide information on the changes made. 
 
2.8.1 Cap-setting and National Allocation Plan (2005–2012) 
The Commission decided to adopt a decentralised framework for the first and second EU 
ETS trading period, and as a result the overall cap on emissions is not directly determined 
by the central authority. Instead, each member state is required develop its own NAP, 
indicating the total quantity of allowances that is to be distributed for each trading period 
and how such allowances are to be allocated (European Commission, 2006). The NAP 
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should be developed on the basis of objective and transparent criteria, which are specified 
in Annex III16 of the EU ETS Directive (EC, 2003a) and summarised in Table 2.8. 
 
 
Table 2.8 Annex III of Directive 2003/87/EC with regard to the National Allocation 
Plan 
Criteria Key information 
1&2 The allowances allocation should be consistent with the EU Kyoto target. 
3 The potential reduction target should be considered. 
4 Legislation and laws within the community should be taken into account. 
5 No discrimination between companies and sectors will exist in the plan. 
6 Information regarding new entrants will be provided. 
7 Information regarding early action may be included and how early action is 
taken into account. 
8 Information regarding clean technology, including energy efficiency 
technologies will be included in the plan. 
9 Provision for public comments and on incorporating them into the final 
decision should be included in the plan. 
10 The list of installations covered in the ETS Directive and their allocation 
should be provided. 
11 Information regarding international competition may be included in the plan. 
12 The intention of using other Kyoto credits and the maximum percentage of the 
credits which can be used will be specified.  
This table introduces the criteria on which each member state’s NAP will be based, which is 
extracted from the Annex III of Directive 2003/87/EC (EC, 2003a). The key information in the 
content column is summarised from the original text by the author.  
 
The principle of NAP guidelines derives from the Kyoto Protocol commitment of the EU 
members. The guidelines require the proposed total quantity of allowances to be in line 
with a member state’s target on the Kyoto Protocol after consideration of sectors outside 
the ETS. In addition to guidelines from European Commission, it was suggested that 
public comments should be taken into account during the development of a member state’s 
                                            
16 The full content of Annex III of Directive is presented in Appendix 2-D. 
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NAP (EC, 2003a: 43). The Commission has the authority to reject a NAP for failing to 
fulfil certain criteria, but it is required to state clearly the grounds for a rejection. The 
member state should revise its NAP until the grounds for rejection has been removed or the 
allowances cannot be issued and distributed. The final amount of allowances from each 
approved NAP becomes the cap for each trading period (Ellerman et al., 2010: 33–34). 
 
2.8.2 The NAP and the allocation method 
The NAP determines not only the total amount of emissions allowances issued, but also the 
way these allowances are allocated. The majority of allowances were allocated for free in 
the first and second trading period, despite member states having the option to auction up 
to 5% (for Phase 1) and 10% (Phase 2) of total allowances approved, specified in Article 
10 of the Directive 2003/87/EC (EC, 2003a: 36). A simple illustration in Figure 2.2 
presents the procedure and the parties involved with regard to a NAP. 
 
A number of studies have analysed the NAP and come to a conclusion that most 
allowances distributed are largely on the grandfathering basis, which essentially grants a 
certain amount of allowances for free to the regulated entities, in the sense of these entities 
inheriting the emission rights from the past. A report by Swedish Environmental Research 
Institute which analysed the NAPs of twelve countries pointed out that the NAPs of 
different countries were likely to differ in various aspects naturally, such as the choice of 
base year and allocation basis. Nevertheless, the historical emissions-based or production-
based allocation are the most common methods adopted. The final allocation is often based 
on the projected demand, which results from historical data multiplied by a growth factor. 
The report also mentions that during the first phase (2005–2007) the NAP may favour the 
trading sectors after taking into consideration the overall Kyoto commitment (Zetterberg et 
al., 2004). Grubb et al. (2005) raise the concern that the first phase allocation plans appear 
weak due to the lack of coordination among member states as well as the fact that there is 
no substantial cutback from business-as-usual (BAU) level; this should be of concerns as 
weak allocation could impair the creditability of the entire scheme. An analysis of phase 2 
NAPs by Betz et al. (2006) suggested that the NAP drafts submitted by eighteen member 
states showed limited progress in achieving more harmonised allocation rules. They also 
came to the conclusion that non-ETS sectors may need to bear an excess share of 
emissions reductions burden due to the allocation of allowances in favour of ETS sectors. 
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Figure 2.2 Allowances allocation for the first and second trading period of the EU 
ETS 
 
• Post-Kyoto commitment period (2013–2020) 
The European Union has set up three plans for a low-carbon economy beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period and intends to carry on improving the overall emissions level. 
A single EU cap, instead of a NAP from each member state, is to be determined directly 
for the third trading period (2013–2020). Through the third trading period, the annual cap 
is designed to decrease each year by 1.74% of the average annual allowances for the 
second trading period (2008–2012). The power sector no longer receives free allowances 
but needs to acquire their allowances through auctioning, and 40% of the total allowances 
were acquired through auctioning in 2013, followed by a progressive rise in proportion 
throughout the following years. This is to ensure that the European Union reaches its 2020 
climate and energy target (EC, 2013a). 
 
2.8.3 Review of current allocation and alternatives 
The allocation method is crucial to the effectiveness of an ETS as it can influence overall 
costs, including abatement and the indirect costs imposed on end consumers; as to the cost 
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efficiency of the trading scheme (Burtraw et al., 2002; Klepper and Peterson, 2004). 
Burtraw et al. (2001) demonstrate that different allocation methods result in different 
overall costs for the ETS based on the self-constructed electricity market model. The cost-
effectiveness and distributional effects of three major allocation methods – auctioning, 
output-based and grandfathering – are investigated under the SO2 trading program for the 
US electricity sector. The auction leads to the lowest overall costs and grandfathering, 
most preferred by regulated parties, would impose substantial costs on consumers. The 
output-based method has similar social costs as grandfathering; it yields the lowest 
electricity prices and the highest natural gas prices while auctioning does the opposite. 
 
Many have proposed that auctioning is a superior method to grandfathering for allocating 
allowances within the trading scheme (Cramton and Kerr, 2002; Ehrhart et al., 2005; 
Hepburn et al., 2006); however, it was difficult to avoid free allocation, particularly in the 
initial stage of EU ETS. Free allowances can be considered a compensation for energy 
intensive sectors in order to reduce these adverse effects on production as well as 
competitiveness (Böhringer and Lange, 2005; Egenhofer, 2007). However, several issues 
can arise from free allocation using baseline emissions as a reference, such as distortion of 
scarcity rent and windfall profits (Martinez and Neuhoff, 2005; Neuhoff et al., 2006). 
Neuhoff et al. (2006) investigate the incentive effects and magnitudes of impacts from 
different allocation methods for the electricity sector in EU ETS using analytical models 
and simulations. Their results indicate that different allocation methods lead to different 
impacts and distortions, with auctioning showing the best efficiency while the baseline 
emissions method has the most negative impacts and distortions. Hepburn et al. (2006) 
explain in further detail that auctioning is evidently in the public interest; nonetheless 
substantial obstacles remain in the path of implementing large-scale auctioning in a EU 
ETS from a political economy perspective. 
 
2.9 The European Carbon Market 
The launch of the EU ETS in 2005 not only set up an illustrative example in shaping 
climate policy but also had a significant impact on global carbon markets. This section 
describes the main institutional aspects concerning the market development of European’s 
carbon market, based on Convery and Redmond (2007), the Chapter 4 in Brohé et al. 
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(2009), Chapter 5 in Ellerman et al. (2010), and the annual state and trends reports 
published by The World Bank (2007, 2008). 
2.9.1 An overview of market development 
One aspect that substantially shaped the European carbon market was the establishment of 
institutional forms in addition to a regulatory structure, and thus the question arose: who 
were participating in the EUA market? The participants in the EUA market can be 
classified into two groups: first, the compliance players and, second, the intermediaries. 
The design of EU ETS means that the main compliance actors are installations with high 
emissions outputs, and in many cases several installations are owned by the same firm. 
Based on Trotignon and Delbosc’s analysis of EU ETS participant data, it can be seen that 
aggregate allowances allocation has been largely concentrated at firm level (Trotignon and 
Delbosc, 2008). As aggregate-level data is not made available by the European 
Commission, the best approximation is provided by private data providers, such as Carbon 
Market Data,17 and individual research studies.  
 
There are currently more than 13,000 operator holding accounts active in the transaction 
log, while 1,000 firms account for around 94% of the allowances within EU ETS. 
Combustion activity is evidently the dominant factor among all participants, which 
amounts to more than 8,000 installations. There are four countries with more than 1,000 
installations participating the trading scheme – Germany (with more than 1,900 
installations), the UK,  France, and Spain (all with more than 1,100 installations). A more 
detailed analysis with regard to EU ETS participants is provided in Chapter 3. 
 
The participation of financial intermediaries forms another notable feature of EU ETS. The 
main function of intermediaries is to ensure smooth transactions among the compliance 
parties. Derivatives products, which enable compliance players to more flexibly manage 
their exposure to allowance price associated risks, are provided by these mediators. Both 
brokers and traders can perform a role as an intermediary, with differences in the way they 
facilitate transactions. While brokers act purely on behalf of their clients, traders can own 
and operate their own accounts. It is possible that traders can profit from differences 
between purchases and sales, meanwhile the market liquidity can be improved as any 
                                            
17 http://www.carbonmarketdata.com. 
Chapter 2. Background of Emissions Trading 
53 
entity can more easily find a counterparty in case of either buying or selling (Ellerman et 
al., 2010: 129–131). 
 
Transactions can take place in the following three forms of trading: bilateral, over-the-
counter (OTC), and open exchanges. Bilateral transactions are transactions directly 
between two parties without facilitation by mediators. These transactions are often large in 
trading size and prices remain undisclosed. They were the most common transactions at 
the initial stage of the EUA market and remain well received among major players. OTC 
transactions take place between two parties through an intermediary, either a broker or a 
trader. It saves the time for the party that wishes to buy or sell EUA to search for a suitable 
counterparty, and details on the transaction remain private for most transactions. 
Exchanges work as an organised marketplace for any party who wishes to trade on 
allowances. Buyers or sellers can submit orders and execute trades through electronic 
platforms developed by certified exchanges, thus the trading remains anonymous and bears 
minimal counterparty risk. In addition, exchanges offer a clearing service for both bilateral 
and OTC transactions as well as a block trade facility by which a large volume of EUA 
transactions can take place off the exchange (Ellerman et al., 2010: 132–133). 
 
2.9.2 Performance evaluation of EU ETS 
It is in many people’s interests, particularly for policy makers, to evaluate and review the 
performance of EU ETS in order to mitigate its shortcomings and improve its overall 
effectiveness. Given the pioneering statue of utilising emissions trading to achieve GHG 
emissiosn reductions, EU ETS is by no means flawless. However, it is important to be 
aware of issues that may jeopardise the merits of EU ETS and reduce such issues. This 
section reviews studies that assess the general performance of, and major issues 
concerning, the EU ETS function. 
 
Boemare and Quirion (2002) comment on the ETS proposal submitted by the European 
Commission on the basis of an extensive investigation of the discrepancies between 
existing trading schemes or similar instruments and the economic literature in order to 
understand how far practical experience can drift away from theory and reason. They 
pinpoint several issues that can substantially influence the overall effectiveness of a trading 
scheme – for instance, spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility (banking and 
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borrowing), trading organisations, monitoring, and enforcement. The authors conclude that 
EU ETS Directive proposal has shown many positive provisions, including wide spatial 
and sectoral coverage, banking of allowances, and trading organisations without the need 
of governmental approval but mandatory registration. The provisions mentioned above 
make the EU’s emission trading system stand on firmer grounds in the economic literature 
than most previous systems reviewed in the study. 
 
Another discussion paper by Kruger and Pizer (2004), from the Resources for the Future 
institute, also comes down on the optimistic side and recognises the swift process of 
launching such a large-scale GHG trading scheme as an impressive political achievement. 
Most elements designed in the EU ETS Directive appear sound in the authors’ opinion, 
nevertheless, they expect a bumpy initial stage due to the challenges that faced the first 
trading period of EU ETS. The challenges identified in the discussion include delay in 
meeting various deadlines (such as NAP submission and assessment), diverse allocation 
rules, and inconsistent enforcement regulation across member states, as well as uncertainty 
over the allowances market. 
 
Convery et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive analysis on how EU ETS performed in the 
pilot phase, with a focus on functional aspects. Their results show that the ‘pilot phase’ of 
EU ETS demonstrated several merits, including successfully imposing carbon prices on a 
considerable segment of economic activity in Europe, and building an essential 
infrastructure for long-term carbon market. The ETS also provides incentives for emission 
reduction projects outside Europe and carbon price formed within European market can 
also become a valuation basis for pricing credits generated from CDM/ JI, as well as other 
opportunities.  
 
Several controversial issues during Phase 1 of EU ETS are documented and discussed in 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008), with a cautious reminder from the authors that it should be 
kept in mind that the first trading period of EU ETS was set to be a learning period. The 
authors point out the most criticised aspects are the windfall profits, that result from free 
allocation and indicate that the cap for phase 1 is very far from having sufficient 
constraining power. Windfall profits, which are considered to originate from the free 
allowances received by entities, such as electricity firms who are able to pass the ETS-
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related costs to customers, has also been discussed in studies by Wettestad (2007), and 
Skjærseth and Wettestad (2009), and also been empirically investigated by Sijm et al. 
(2006a, 2006b). Another issue that is often raised regarding the first trading period is the 
significant price volatility, which was mainly caused by a mixture of uncertainty towards 
market fundamentals, oversupply, and insufficient intertemporal flexibility (Egenhofer, 
2007; Convery and Redmond, 2007). 
 
A few studies have focused on the performance of EU ETS in term of overall 
environmental commitment through examining specifically the existence of abatement 
behaviour or overallocation within the trading scheme. Similarly to the allocation issue 
raised above, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) empirically tested the existence of 
overallocation and abatement in 2005 and 2006 in their analysis. The authors indicate that 
judgement of overallocation or abatement should be made after consideration of economic 
activities, energy, and carbon intensity. With a self-constructed measure that empirically 
estimates the degree of overallocation by examining the ratio of an aggregate net position 
to the sum of the net position of all components from the aggregation, they reach a result 
that overallocation up to 125 million EUA occurred for the first two years of EU ETS. 
Anderson and Di Maria (2011) discover that overallocation, with a magnitude of 
approximately 280 million EUA, occurred along with abatement during the pilot phase. 
Clo (2009) takes a step further by analysing a number of inefficiencies caused by 
overallocation and finds that ETS sectors received subsidies from both national-level and 
non-ETS sectors as a consequence of member states’ support for major industries. The 
author also shows that competition distortion can result from inconsistencies in allocation 
methods in different member states and concludes hat EU’s emissions trading has not 
shown a sufficient level of effectiveness.  
 
In summary, EU ETS has received positive opinions on its political feasibility and the first 
phase built the essential infrastructure for future trading activities as well as being a 
successful demonstrative example. The criticisms are mainly upon the overly generous cap 
and free allowances, which can seriously harm policy efficiency, as the scarcity that 
creates the market hardly exists (Clo, 2009). A lack of harmonised allocation methods 
across member state also raises the concern of inequality among firms as well as industrial 
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sectors. Enforcement across member states is also an issue that needs to be addressed for a 
better functional trading scheme in the post-Kyoto period. 
2.10 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has reviewed the fundamentals of emissions trading as well as the main 
institutional aspects of EU ETS, and is intended to provide essential background 
information with regard to the subject to be studied in the empirical chapters in this thesis. 
The first four sections provide fundamental knowledge on the background of the problem, 
possible solutions and theoretical grounds of market-based instruments. It should be noted 
that there is no absolute right or wrong in deciding on a policy instrument, as stressed by 
Weitzman (1974): an instrument works towards its optimal outcome in an appropriate 
context. Market-based instruments have gained popularity among governments mainly for 
their cost-efficiency potential; as for emissions trading, it has tended to be better received 
by affected industries than taxation. 
 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 introduced the institutional aspects of EU ETS, including its origins 
and regulatory framework. The political foundation that enables the making of a single 
European market is one of the essential aspects for the implementation of a community-
wide trading scheme. Section 2.8 provides a detailed explanations of relevant technical 
aspects with regard to the operation of the EU ETS. Cap-setting is through the aggregate of 
each member state’s allocation plan, which is to be replaced by a single EU cap from the 
third trading period onwards. The large degree of grandfathering during the first and 
second trading period have been subject to considerable change. In particular, the power 
sector is required to obtain its allowances through auctions instead of free allocation.  
 
In addition to policy effectiveness in terms of performance regarding environmental 
commitment, implications of EU ETS has been another relevant issue since the issue of the 
EU ETS Directive. Economic implications, such as effects on industrial competitiveness, 
and financial implications, like the interaction between the carbon and financial markets 
are both of interests to various groups including policy makers and affected (or potentially 
affected) industrial sectors. The implications of EU ETS, in particular with regard to the 
stock market, will become the main focus of empirical analyses in this thesis. Chapter 3 
introduces the elements required for the empirical analyses planned, which will cover the 
data selection and sampling process. 
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Appendix 2-A 
Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC 
Australia Greece Norway 
Austria Hungary Poland 
Belarus** Iceland Portugal 
Belgium Ireland Romania 
Bulgaria Italy** Russian Federation** 
Canada Japan Slovakia** 
Croatia** Latvia Slovenia** 
Cyprus Liechtenstein** Spain 
Czech Republic** Lithuania Sweden 
Denmark Luxembourg Switzerland 
Estonia Malta Turkey** 
(European Union) Monaco** Ukraine** 
Finland Netherlands UK 
France New Zealand USA 
Germany   
** Party for which specific decisions have been made.  
Source: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php. 
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Appendix 2-B 
Annex I to Directive 2009/29/EC replaced Annex I to Directive 2003/86/EC regarding the 
activities and GHGs to be covered in EU ETS. The types of activities covered include 
combustions, the production of metal, cement, pulp and paper. CO2 is the main type of 
GHG subject to emission restrictions, with the following exceptions listed below. 
 
Activity Greenhouse gases 
Production of primary aluminium CO2 and perfluorocarbons 
Production of nitric acid CO2 and nitrous oxide (NO2) 
Production of adipic acid CO2 and NO2 
Production of glyoxal and glyxylic acid CO2 and NO2 
Note: Installations used for the purpose of research, development and testing of new 
products/processes are not covered in ETS Directive (EC, 2009a). 
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3 Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the data used in the empirical analyses in this thesis, which attempts 
to explore the impact of the European Union’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) on 
companies subject to this regulatory context. More specifically, the research questions 
introduced in Chapter 1, which concern two aspects of potential EU ETS impact – first, the 
impact on emissions behaviour of firms regulated by the EU ETS and, second, the value 
impact on stock prices of firms regulated by the EU ETS – are empirically examined in the 
following chapters. 
 
One key component needed for the empirical analyses is the company-level carbon18 data, 
which need to be carefully accounted for. Compared with standard market data, such as the 
stock prices and accounting data of corporate operations, the firm’s carbon emissions data 
is still a relatively new type of data used in empirical analyses, as the demand for such data 
has only becomes obvious with the growing concern about greenhouse gases (GHG)-
related environmental issues in recent decades (Horster, 2013; CDP, 2013a; Trotignon and 
Delbosc, 2008). 
 
The majority of company-level carbon emissions data available to date is produced 
primarily through the voluntary disclosure and reporting of companies, as the mandatory 
reporting of carbon for either public or private companies is not yet in place at a national 
level in all countries except the UK, which introduced it on 12 June 2013 for about 1,100 
large listed firms (DEFRA, 2012). As a consequence of the increasing awareness of the 
necessity of making climate change-associated information more publicly available, a 
number of environmental disclosure programmes and regulations have emerged (Kolk et 
al., 2008; Sullivan, 2006; 2iiInvestingInitiative, 2013). These include the EU-wide cap-
and-trade scheme, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), as well as other investor-
orientated specialised private data providers. All, directly or indirectly, are positive actions 
in terms of increasing the availability of company-level carbon data. Based on these 
developments, this thesis intends to utilise reliable company-level carbon information to 
                                            
 18 The GHG specified in Annex 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC (EC18, 2003) indicates only carbon dioxide (CO
2
) for all activities 
regulated. Annex 1 was only amended in 2009 by Directive 2009/29/EC to include perfluorocarbons for one activity and nitrous oxide 
(NO
2
) for three activities. The majority of the GHGs regulated remains CO
2
, and so does the focus of this thesis. 
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investigate the research questions proposed for the empirical chapters. The four most 
relevant data sources plus two newer private data providers are initially examined and 
assessed in this chapter for their capacity to provide the most suitable data. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the background of carbon data, 
which includes the emergence of GHG19 disclosure, and the data produced and utilised in 
the empirical research in this thesis. Section 3.3 describes in detail the carbon emission 
databases that currently exist, and their potential to offer suitable data for the empirical 
analyses planned. Section 3.4 presents the assessment process for selecting the principal 
database, which starts with a summary table containing information on each database 
candidate concerning their scope and method. The assessment continues with a discussion 
of the criteria concerning the abilities of the database to provide relevant and suitable data 
for the empirical analyses. Section 3.5 presents a numerical analysis with regard to the 
distinct features of the database which have been selected after the assessment process. 
 
3.2 Background 
This section comprises two parts. The first part briefly introduces the origin of the research 
interests in this thesis. It explains what type of data is required for the empirical analyses in 
the following chapters. The second part reviews a number of studies that empirically 
investigate carbon emissions-related topics, especially the topic of the relationship between 
firm-level carbon emissions and the ‘financial’ market. Particular attention is paid to which 
carbon emissions data are utilised in these studies in order to determine the most suitable 
type of data to be used in the empirical analyses. 
 
3.2.1. Carbon emissions data: origin 
According to the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (Stern, 2006) and the 
third and fourth IPCC assessment reports (IPCC, 2001a, 2007), climate change would not 
only severely damage our environment, but also cause substantial amount of loss to the 
value of the global economy, if mitigating action is not taken or taken too late. Climate 
                                            
19 The main research interest of this thesis is the EU ETS, which at this moment regulates CO
2
 equivalent emissions. As the term GHG 
is inclusive of various types of gases,of which CO
2
 currently has the more rigorous coverage and political and economic implications, I 
use GHG, carbon, and CO
2
 interchangeably. 
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change and its related issues are posing growing concerns to various stakeholders, 
including policy makers, academic researchers, investors, and the public, as substantial 
effort will be needed to avoid the catastrophic situation projected by the reports mentioned 
above. 
 
Voluntary disclosure of environmental issues is one major step taken by both corporations 
and investors in order to understand and manage these risks better. With voluntary 
disclosure, the disclosure of information by the corporation is done on a non-compulsory, 
voluntary basis. When done properly voluntary disclosure is supposed to mitigate the 
‘information asymmetry gap’ between corporations and stakeholders outside the 
corporation, such as investors, either individual or institutional. (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). This reduction of information asymmetry enables a better valuation of corporations, 
and also enhances the opportunities for investors to influence corporations’ performance 
regarding environmental issues with their investment decisions (Griffin et al., 2012; Reid 
and Toffel, 2009). Establishing the accurate carbon emissions management of firms has 
become a primary concern for investors, as carbon emissions can affect the firm 
substantially in various aspects, such as the direct and indirect costs that will occur due to 
required abatement or future environmental liabilities. 
 
Voluntary disclosure of environmental impacts – or, specifically, of carbon emissions by 
corporations – is being done in two main ways. The company can simply decide itself what 
type of information is to be disclosed, either in its annual reports, or in a stand-alone, non-
compulsory sustainability/ESG20 report. The other way to make voluntary environmental/ 
carbon emissions disclosure is to become a signatory and provide relevant information for 
the specific disclosure initiatives that gather, organize, and publish such information, such 
as the CDP21 and The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  
 
At the other end of the reporting spectrum stands mandatory reporting. Currently, there are 
very few cases of a mandatory environmental disclosure requirement for companies at the 
national level. The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
                                            
20 Environmental, Social and Governance. 
21  The CDP has for over a decade worked with companies, investors, and communities to disclose GHGs as well as other 
environmental sustainability issues. Given the aim of this thesis, more detail on CDP’s company and investor initiatives for GHG 
disclosure are provided in Section 3.3. 
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announced in June 2012, that the UK would become the first country to make it 
compulsory for large companies to report their GHG emissions for the entire organisation 
in their annual reports from 2013 (DEFRA, 2012). The Company Act 2006 (Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013 requires all UK companies which are 
quoted on the main market of the London Stock Exchange to make full GHG emissions 
disclosure in their annual Directors’ Report. This is a milestone and an encouraging 
outcome, following the consideration of extensive evidence and detailed consultation with 
businesses and individuals, most of which supported mandatory reporting.  
 
A degree of mandatory reporting of carbon emissions was also effected by the 
implementation of EU ETS, on the basis of the ETS Directive 2003/87/EC and the 
guidelines for monitoring and reporting (EC, 2003b, 2004b, 2007a). The ETS Directive 
specifies the conditions under which an installation shall be included in the EU ETS and 
requires that all installations monitor and report their emissions at the end of each 
compliance cycle. The EU ETS reflects the concern of investors, as well as of researchers, 
regarding the economic and financial effects of this unique mechanism, as they are keen to 
find out whether carbon emissions restriction-related risks have become substantial in 
terms of affecting firms’ profitability and eventually equity value. A number of studies 
(Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; Knight, 2011) have attempted to investigate the 
relation between stock price performance of EU ETS regulated firms, mostly utilities 
sector firms, and the carbon market created by the ETS regulations. 
 
This thesis, following the previous literature that specifically explores the ETS-related 
economic and financial impacts on companies (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; 
Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012) and the carbon emissions effect (Bushnell et al., 2013; 
Chapple et al., 2013; Oestreich and Tsiakas, 2013), intends to explore a series of research 
questions regarding EU ETS’ impacts, which were introduced in detail in Chapter 1, and 
briefly in Section 3.1 of this chapter. Similar to earlier literature, econometric techniques 
and real market data are used to examine these questions. The scope and depth of the 
sample dataset will be extended in terms of the number of firms, multi-sector context, and 
length of the sample period, which are presented in the following sections of this chapter.  
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Company-level carbon emissions data are one of the essential components needed in 
conducting the analyses planned in the following empirical chapters. Compared with 
standard market data, such as a firm’s share price, the firm’s carbon emissions data is still 
a relatively new type of data, as the demand for it has only becomes obvious with the 
growing concern about GHG-related environmental issues in recent decades. There is thus 
the need to specifically introduce and explain in detail such carbon emissions data and its 
availability, which begins in the next section by providing a concise review of the different 
types of carbon emissions data used in previous studies. 
 
3.2.2. Carbon emissions data: usage 
Since the implementation of the EU ETS in 2005, a small but growing body of literature 
has explored the financial implications of ETS regulation with empirical analyses. A 
number of these studies have focused on the relationship between firm value and the 
carbon emissions. While firm value can be proxied by several indicators, such as the firm’s 
equity value reflected by its stock prices, or accounting measures, such as its profitability 
and assets, the accessibility of these figures for public companies is relatively simple. 
However, access to reliable company-level carbon emissions data can be less 
straightforward, as GHG emissions disclosure has not been made mandatory. The carbon 
emissions data produced from the EU ETS thus provides one of the very rare sources of 
data on regulated carbon emissions reporting. Although the original data kept in the EU’s 
transaction log (EUTL) is at installation level, which includes over 100,000 installation-
year data points, these installations can be manually matched to company level through the 
account holder’s data. However, this is a time-consuming process and the quality and 
scope of the final data product is dependent on the accuracy of the account holder’s 
databases.  
 
Nevertheless, the data from the EUTL (formerly the Community Independent Transaction 
Log, CITL) has been utilised in some studies albeit, understandably, for only small and 
short samples. Bushnell et al. (2013) empirically examine the asset values of the emissions 
allowances holdings by regulated firms. They match the allowances and verified emissions 
data of 90 public firms for 2005, and examine whether the abnormal returns found in their 
event study analysis in the previous stage can be explained by the firms’ allowances 
positions.  
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With a slightly different subject of research interest, Oestreich and Tsiakas (2013) also use 
data from the EUTL to examine whether the carbon premium created by the EU ETS 
regulation is significant, in the context of the German stock market. The authors pick 66 
firms that are listed in two main German exchanges. The firms are separated into two 
groups, according to whether they receive free allowances, and the stock price 
performances of these two groups are estimated against the market benchmark in order to 
determine the extent of the carbon premium on which the study focuses. The EUTL data 
are used by the authors purely to indicate whether the firm is clean or dirty, depending on 
whether or not they receive free allowances. This approach appears slightly simplistic as 
the verified emission data, which are also a crucial indication of the firm’s carbon emission 
profile, are not utilised at all. 
 
Since the voluntary GHG disclosure, in particular the CDP, has gained an exposure and 
acceptance among companies world-wide, a body of literature has endeavoured to explore 
whether the information disclosed on the voluntary basis is value relevant from the 
investors’ perspectives. Undoubtedly, the CDP provides good research opportunities and 
appears the most commonly used source for company-level carbon data, judging by the 
number of studies that have utilized such data. 
 
An analysis focusing on the relationship between firm value and firm carbon emissions 
was conducted in the context of the proposed Australia ETS by Chapple et al. (2013), who 
investigated the impact of the ETS proposal in Australia on the stock market of firms listed 
on the major exchange (ASX22). They explicitly hypothesise that the firm value reflected 
in the stock market can be negatively influenced by the firm’s carbon intensity profile. 
They rely on data sources from two private providers, as ASX listed firms are not obliged 
to report carbon emissions data. The authors specify in their study that the carbon data 
from one of their providers, Citigroup, was derived mainly from the CDP, and the data 
from the other provider, VicSuper,23, involved a great proportion of estimated numbers so 
that the actual emissions data are not really provided: their empirical design needs to be 
altered given this caveat. The firms are categorised into high or low carbon intensity 
                                            
22 Australian Securities Exchange. 
23 The VicSuper Carbon Count (2007) is used in Chapple et al. (2013). 
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groups according to their carbon intensity measure, and the hypothesis is tested on an 
aggregated measure basis, instead of being tested on each firm’s precise carbon intensity 
figure. 
 
Griffin et al. (2012) explore how relevant the companies’ GHG emissions disclosure is to 
investors in the North America financial market context. They construct large samples of 
American S&P 500 and Canadian TSE200 firms that voluntarily disclose their GHG 
emissions to CDP to investigate the valuation effect of such disclosure and non-disclosure 
for firms. As they investigate both disclosing and non-disclosing firms, the emissions data 
used in the regression analyses essentially contain self-estimated figures, which are 
produced by the authors’ prediction model. Their analysis reveals that CDP disclosed and 
self-estimated emission levels are negatively associated with the stock prices of the sample 
firms, which points to the existence of a negative valuation effect. This effect appears more 
pronounced for S&P500 firms than for TSE200 firms, and the magnitude of the negative 
effect increases for emissions intensive industries. The authors consider the negative 
valuation effect to be at approximately the same level for the CDP disclosing and non-CDP 
disclosing companies in their sample, which suggests that the stock market also values 
GHG emissions information from mediums other than the CDP. 
 
In a similar North American context, Matsumura et al. (2014) investigate the relationship 
between carbon emissions level and firm value for S&P500 firms that report voluntarily to 
CDP using hand-collected carbon emissions data for 2006–2008 from the CDP reports. 
After explicitly addressing the self-selection bias of the sample due to firm and industry 
characteristics related to the decisions made by the firms to voluntarily disclose, they find a 
negative relationship between carbon emissions levels and firm value measured by stock 
prices. The authors raise concerns on the limitations of their study due to the quality of the 
reported data in CDP reports, which include diverse methods of measuring emissions by 
firms even within industries, varying scopes of reporting, and the fact that firms’ self-
reported emissions lack external verification. In their opinion, the need for carbon 
emissions allowances information is self-evident, nevertheless due to the lack of a national 
trading scheme in the US, this type of information is not yet available, even for large 
public firms. 
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Ennis et al. (2012) utilise CDP data to examine a series of carbon emissions-related 
questions in the context of UK-based FTSE350 firms. The authors examine the 
relationship between the companies’ emissions performance and their financial 
performance, in addition to the relation between the carbon disclosure and carbon 
emissions performance of firms, as well as the carbon emissions performance and the 
firm’s operational performance. Their results show that at present the emissions 
performance of the firm appears less value relevant to investors, and conclude that the 
financial market is not yet responsive to companies’ emissions performances, or that the 
information which is currently available has not been sufficient in terms of differentiating 
among companies’ performance. 
 
Other sources of GHG emissions data are also being utilised. Kim and Lyon (2011) 
explore the motivations and impacts of the strategic disclosure behaviour of firms that 
participate in the US Department of Energy’s voluntary GHG registry.24 The authors 
extract the data from the Registry and compare the self-reported reduction to the actual 
emissions. Their results reveal that participants in the voluntary disclosure programme 
adopt highly selective reporting practice, and in aggregate the participants even increase 
emissions over time, but report reductions. A number of critical caveats concerning its 
design are documented in the authors’ review section on this voluntary reporting program. 
As they point out, the reductions in emissions can be reported at different levels (at entity 
or project level) in the voluntary scheme, and the choice of baseline emissions against 
which the reductions are measured appears liberal due to the lack of rigorous rules 
regarding how to report the reduction. These aspects inevitably impact the data quality as 
well as the extent to which the voluntary reporting program is environmentally effective. 
 
Inevitable shortcomings face such voluntary/non-regulated reporting, despite the 
undoubted good intentions. The biggest issue facing data provided by CDP and other 
voluntary reporting schemes has to be the quality of GHG emissions in terms of accuracy 
and consistency across reporting firms (Sullivan, 2006, 2009). Several aspects regarding 
the quality of reported GHG inventories of firms in the CDP are raised in Sullivan (2009), 
which points out in particular that it is not certain that applications of the emissions 
                                            
24 It is established by Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act 1992, which is currently suspended. More information is available at 
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/index.html. 
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calculation protocols are strict and uniform in all cases. The unclear practice of 
establishing reporting boundaries is also an issue.  
 
Another aspect concerns the degree of verification for the reported emissions data of the 
participating companies. In particular, the scope of the verification process reported on the 
verification statements is unclear. These issues reflect the concerns raised in previous 
studies (Sullivan, 2006; Kolk et al., 2008; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Matsumura et al., 2014) 
regarding the overall quality of the voluntary reported data. Kolk et al. (2008) explicitly 
point out that the major challenge that CDP faces remains the low level of comparability of 
the disclosed information, which is supposed to be the primary objective of the initiative. 
Similar opinions are seen in the practitioner field. Sullivan (2006) produced a report that 
stimulated the discussion on the future direction of companies’ climate change disclosure 
standards and initiatives. The analysis was based on the author’s experience with the 
design and implementation of climate change disclosure initiatives, including CDP and 
GRI. The report raises several caveats concerning current disclosure initiatives like CDP 
from the investors’ angle – in particular, the poor quality and presentation of reported data, 
the confusion that can arise from the concurrent existence of multiple initiatives, and the 
lack of consistency and comparability among data.  
 
3.3 Carbon databases of relevance 
The following section introduces six databases that provide company-level carbon 
emissions data, which could potentially be the principal provider of the carbon emissions 
data needed for this thesis. The basic features, such as coverage in terms of geography and 
time, and level of data provided, for each database are described. 
 
3.3.1 Carbon market data: EU ETS company database 
As the interest of this thesis lies with the carbon emissions-associated impact on 
companies, the world’s largest carbon emission trading scheme – the EU ETS – naturally 
becomes the most likely source of relevant data. The regulatory framework and operation 
of the EU ETS was introduced in Chapter 2, and so the following section focuses on data-
related aspects. 
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To properly and effectively manage a legislative scheme of such relative novelty, a 
systematic and standardised mechanism is necessarily required. The EUTL 25 (formerly 
CITL), serves this purpose by keeping records of annual allowances allocation and verified 
emissions at the installation level for all installations in all participating member states. An 
example of the information recorded in the Allocation/Compliance section of the 
transaction log is provided in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Example of information provided in the European Union Transaction Log 
Installation 
Number 
(1) 
Installation 
Name 
(2) 
Allowances 
Allocation 
(3) 
Total Emissions 
Verified 
(4) 
Allowances 
Surrendered 
(5) 
6 
Forties 
Charlie 
154,936 295,349 295,349 
The example is taken from the UK26 Registry for 2010 in the EUTL. The log provides information 
on the assigned installation number (column (1)), the name of the installation (column (2)), the 
annual allowances allocation of the installation (column (3)), the total verified emissions of the 
installation (column (4)) and the total number of allowances surrendered at the end of the 
compliance cycle (column (5)). 
 
While installation-level data are accessible from the EUTL, the EU log has no intention to 
make aggregated-level (firm, industrial, national) data publicly available. The installation-
level data has been utilised by Trotignon and Delbosc (2008) to analyse the transaction 
patterns during the trial period of EU ETS; however, it is not directly usable in the analyses 
for firm-level investigations as proposed in this thesis as a company can own multiple 
installations in different locations. The authors point out in their study that the real market 
players would be the firms that own installations rather than the installations themselves 
due to the possibility for ‘pooling’ offered in the ETS Directive. Research questions and 
empirical analyses that aim to explore company-level data have in consequence a large 
potential to provide more insight into this unique trading scheme and its impacts. 
 
After extensively surveying the available resources that could offer relevant company-level 
carbon data, Carbon Market Data is found to be the database that seems to provide the 
most essential data needed for the empirical analyses planned. There is a considerable 
                                            
25 The log can be accessed from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/. 
26 The accounts had still been held in each National Registry before the suspension of national registries took place in June 2012. 
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amount of valuable data provided free of charge on its online World ETS database, most of 
which is at national level. There is also a small amount of company-level data, although 
restricted to iron and steel firms, as well as simple analytical tools of national-level 
compliance status for each trading year available free of charge. There are various types of 
paid products available through Carbon Market Data, including databases of different 
ETSs worldwide,27 the Clean Develop Mechanism–Joint Implementation database and, 
most importantly, the EU ETS Company Database, all of which appear to contain essential 
data needed for the empirical investigation planned for this thesis.  
 
Table 3.2 An Overview of the Carbon Market Data EU ETS Database 
Number of 
Companies 
(1) 
Number of 
Installations 
(2) 
Number of 
Activities 
(3) 
Phase 1 
Coverage (%) 
(4) 
Phase 2 
Coverage (%) 
(5) 
887 8410 18 92 89 
The table describes the scale of the Carbon Market Data’s EU ETS Company Database. Column 
(1) indicates the number of companies included in the database. Column (2) shows the number of 
installations included in the database. Column (3) shows how many types of operating activities for 
which the installations are subject to ETS regulations. Activity refers to the operating activities for 
which the installation is regulated, defined in Annex 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC (EC, 2003a).  
Column (4) and (5) show the coverage of the entire database. Coverage is calculated by the 
allowances allocated to companies in the database in relation to all allowances distributed within 
the EU ETS. The incomplete percentage of coverage results from small-scale installations/firms, 
such as independent power and heat plants. 
 
 
As indicated in Table 3.2, the coverage of the EU ETS Company Database contains 887 
participating companies. These companies in total account for more than 90% on average 
of the allowances issued within the entire EU ETS. The precise percentage of total verified 
emissions covered in the database is 92% for Phase 1 and 89% for Phase 2. The database 
provides the amount of annual allowances allocated to each company. An example of the 
original data provided in the database is presented in Table 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
27 By the time this thesis was planned and the empirical analyses were conducted, the Carbon Market Data offered databases of EU 
ETS, RGGI, and part of CDM-JI. Their inclusion of the ETS database has extended substantially ever since. 
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Table 3.3 An example of the data points provided by Carbon Market Data 
Company - E.ON Activity - Power & Heat # of installations: 266 
Year 
(1) 
Allocated 
allowances 
(2) 
Verified 
emissions 
(3) 
Emissions-to-
cap (= e–c) 
(4) 
e–c ratio (as % 
of cap) 
(5) 
Verified 
emissions 
evolution (%) 
(6) 
2005 104,524,721 114,328,927 9,804,206 9.38  
2006 102,588,985 112,749,422 10,160,436 9.90 –1.38 
2007 103,505,341 115,288,280 11,782,939 11.38 2.17 
2008 77,552,319 107,446,707 29,894,387 38.55 –6.81 
2009 76,192,522 93,558,007 17,365,485 22.79 –12.96 
2010 79,155,014 94,664,817 15,509,802 19.59 1.20 
This table presents an example of the original company-level data points provided by the EU ETS 
Database of Carbon Market Data. The activity refers to the installations’ operating activity for 
which they are regulated by Directive 2003/87/EC. Column (2) shows the annual emissions cap as 
determined by its allowances allocation for the company. Column (3) shows the actual amount of 
CO2 emissions for the company in each compliance year. Column (4) shows the differences 
between the emissions and the cap, which is calculated by Verified emissions (of the current year) 
– Cap (of the current year). Positive figures mean that the actual emissions are higher than the cap 
while negative figures mean that the company’s emissions for the year are lower than the cap. 
Column (5) shows (the emission-to-cap)/the annual cap. This number shows the proportion of the 
difference between emissions and cap to the annual cap. For example, a 15% e–c ratio means that 
the company’s position of actual emissions is 15% more than the annual cap. Column (6) shows the 
number that indicates the evolution of the company’s actual emissions, compared with the previous 
year: –1.38% means that the actual amount of emissions for the company in the current year is 
1.38% less than the emissions of the previous year. 
 
 
3.3.2 Carbon Disclosure Project28 
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is one of the first initiatives that promoted and 
specialised in corporate environmental information disclosure and sharing of climate 
change-associated risk. The CDP works closely with various groups with climate change 
concerns, such as institutional investors, shareholders, local communities, and 
governments. On behalf of these groups the CDP requires large companies world-wide to 
report on a voluntary basis information about GHG emissions, energy usage, climate 
                                            
28 https://www.cdproject.net;  
   https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Programmes/Pages/climate-change-programs.aspx 
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change strategies management, and risks and opportunities from climate change. The CDP 
aims for an ultimate systemic transformation of the global economy, which is required to 
induce the essential actions to prevent the severe consequences of climate change which 
would occur if the necessary actions were not taken. The following paragraphs explain 
how the CDP works using its Climate Change Program as an example.  
 
The CDP gathers information by inviting companies to participate in responding to 
questionnaires specially designed to demonstrate the overall performance of companies in 
terms of combating climate change. The questionnaire contains questions that are 
categorised into three groups: management, risk and opportunities, and emissions. 
Participating companies utilise the CDP’s Online Response System. As participation in the 
CDP is optional rather than mandatory, companies are encouraged to respond by 
emphasising reputational rewards and facilitating the company’s future obligations to 
report similar information. CDP’s scale to date is impressive; it works with more than 700 
institutional investors holding 78 trillion USD, requests company climate change data, and 
produces disclosure scores. The number of responding companies has grown seventeen 
times, from only 235 in 2003 to more than 4,000 in 201229. 
 
Although the questionnaires are designed with well-structured questions and the CDP also 
provides guidance on reporting, participating companies are given discretion on their 
disclosure in certain aspects and the CDP does not verify any disclosure itself. The 
assurance level of verification of the reported data can range from ‘assurance not 
applicable’ to ‘high assurance’. The CDP also declares that it is not possible to explicitly 
reject a certain standard/methodology of GHG inventory calculation, so its scoring 
mechanism does not differentiate between methodologies used by companies to calculate 
their reported GHG inventory. The CDP’s Online Reporting System through which 
companies respond to the questionnaire includes 54 standards/protocols/methodologies for 
GHG inventory calculation (CDP, 2013b). 
 
The CDP began the Carbon Action Initiative,30 another investor-led initiative, in 2011 to 
further encourage companies to adopt and implement GHG reduction action. This initiative 
                                            
29 Data from CDP’s Reports and Data section, accessed from https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Results/Pages/overview.aspx. 
30 https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Programmes/pages/what-is-cdp-carbon-action.aspx. 
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has a similar aim to that taken in the original CDP climate change programme, which is to 
invite companies to respond to a request to set year-on-year reduction targets, publicly 
disclose such targets, as well as produce ROI-positive investments in projects. Their 
Carbon Action Report (CDP, 2012) stated that 57% of the 256 companies in the emissions 
intensive industries had set up emissions reduction targets in 2012, and the initiative 
intends to work further with investors to promote company action to deliver cost-effective 
carbon emissions reduction. However, it appears the data produced from this initiative 
focused on the emissions reduction activities of companies, and no actual emissions data 
were found in both reports of the initiative (CDP, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
3.3.3 ASSET4 Thomson Reuters31 
ASSET4 now operates as a business under Thomson Reuters and specialises in corporate 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data. Annual CO2 equivalent emissions at 
firm level are available under the environmental factors of the dataset. The coverage of 
ASSET4 is extensive, including listed firms on most major stock exchanges. The sources 
of data are all publicly available information, through company reports and other public 
sources. However, it is not clear from Thomson Reuters’ description how the CO2e 
emissions data are compiled, and thus research into this aspect is done mainly through 
digging in news archives as the original ASSET4 AG official website is no longer existent. 
 
The origin of the CO2 emissions data contained in the ASSET4 Thomson Reuters 
ESG/CSR database is presumably the ASSET4 Carbon Data and Estimates, launched in 
April 2009 by Asset4 AG before its acquisition by Thomson Reuters later in the same year. 
According to the news release32 by ASSET4 AG, when the Carbon Data and Estimates 
were made available, their CO2 emissions data come from two sources: company reports 
and self-constructed estimated models. Based on the comments in the news release made 
by Peter Ohnemus, a Swiss entrepreneur and co-founder of ASSET4 AG, the overall 
quality, including timeliness and completeness, of reporting total CO2 emissions differs 
among sectors, industries, and companies. For non-reporting companies, ASSET4 AG 
                                            
31 ESG/CSR content overview on the Thomson Reuters website, which can be accessed here: 
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/content_news/content_overview/content_az/content_esg/#tab1. 
32 Accessed at http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/13695-ASSET4-Carbon-Data-Estimates-Available-Now. 
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produced estimated CO2 emissions based on three self-constructed models: the CO2 model, 
the energy model, and the median model.  
 
3.3.4 Carbon Monitoring Action (CARMA)33 
CARMA is a database dedicated to providing carbon emissions data of power plants and 
power companies world-wide. It is financed by Confronting Climate Change Initiative 
within the Center for Global Development (CGD)34 and declares itself to be non-partisan.  
 
 
Table 3.4 An example of data points provided by CARMA 
Name 
(1) 
Year 
(2) 
Tons CO2  
(3) 
MWh Energy 
(4) 
Intensity 
(5) 
E.ON AG 
Germany 
2004 145,520,000 251,210,000 579 
2009 120,280,000 238,770,000 504 
Future 184,280,000 304,230,016 606 
ENEL 
s.p.a. 
Italy 
2004 148,230,000 226,370,000 655 
2009 107,290,000 193,910,000 553 
future 133,840,000 240,150,000 557 
This table shows the company-level data provided by CARMA database. Columns (3) and (4) 
show two years’ of historical data of CO2 emissions and energy produced by the company for 2004 
and 2009. Column (5) shows the intensity, which is defined in CARMA’s methodology as 
estimated amount of CO2 a plant emits for each MWh of energy produced (kgCO2 / MWh). For 
companies that do not report accurate data, the projected figures of emissions, energy produced, 
and intensity are recorded using CARMA’s internal statistical model. Source: 
http://www.carma.org. 
 
The coverage of CARMA appears huge, containing the carbon emissions of more than 
60,000 power plants and 20,000 power companies world-wide. According to its Frequently 
Asked Questions section, the data are compiled from various sources, which can be 
approximated by the geographic location and reporting activity of power plants. For 
reporting plants and companies, the data is sourced from official reports, governmental 
departments, such as US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), International Energy 
                                            
33 Information on CARMA can be accessed from http://carma.org/blog/about/. 
34 Founded in 2001 and based in Washington, D.C., CGD aims to provide independent research and practical ideas for global 
prosperity. CGD’s information is obtained from http://www.cgdev.org/section/about/. 
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Agency (IEA), and International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA). For non-reporting plants, 
the emissions figures are estimated based on CARMA’s internal statistical model, which is 
fitted to a comprehensive dataset of US facilities with disclosed carbon emissions (Ummel, 
2012). 
 
The CARMA database provides good opportunities for empirical analyses that require 
huge cross-sectional datasets; however, two aspects limit the utilisation of the CARMA 
dataset for the proposed analyses in this thesis. First, the coverage of two separate years, 
one of which is outside the EU ETS trading period, limits the use of emissions data on 
planned investigations into the relationship between firm emissions performance and firm 
stock price changes. Second, CARMA data contain both reported and estimated figures, so 
emissions data from different plants can come from different sources. This can impose 
inconsistency problems among plants and the aggregate-level data could be subject to 
bigger estimation errors arising from plant-level data. CARMA currently provides 
emissions data at plant and aggregated level for 2004 and 2009 and the future based on 
development and retirement plans. An example of company-level data provided by the 
CARMA database is shown in Table 3.4. 
 
3.3.5 Other private data providers: Trucost and South Pole Carbon 
There are a number of private data providers that have started to build up sets of carbon-
related information on companies and underlying investments, as investors world-wide are 
becoming more aware of global climate change-related risks and their potential impact. 
Two are identified as possible sources of carbon emissions data. Trucost is a company that 
specialises in assisting various stakeholder groups to understand the economic 
consequences of natural capital dependency, which covers not only carbon but also other 
natural resource-related issues, such as land use, water, and waste. The centre of Trucost’s 
methodology is an advanced environmental profiling model for calculating the 
environmental impact across various sections of business operations. It offers an academic 
research portal service for subscription, which contains the Trucost Environmental 
Registry, the databases of natural capital metrics, and natural capital performance metrics. 
The database provides an extensive coverage of environmental impact data, including 
carbon and other GHG emissions of more than 4,500 companies gathered from various, 
often self-reported information sources (Trucost, 2013). 
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Another provider that maintains a substantial GHG database is South Pole Carbon, which 
targets climate change even more specifically and provides specialised services for helping 
companies achieve sustainability aims. South Pole Carbon also specialises in developing 
emissions reduction projects, creating novel climate change solutions as well as managing 
carbon. It is stated on their website35 that South Pole Carbon maintains a unique database 
of company GHG emissions, which is the largest world-wide, and also possesses several 
merits such as transparency and affordability. The highlights of the database include the 
coverage of more than 40,000 companies, which include self-reported and modelled data 
points, the scope of emissions, transparency and measurement regarding data usage and, 
most crucially, plausibility checks on self-reported carbon data.  
 
While the databases described above all seem to have the potential to provide relevant data 
for empirical analyses, criteria checks need to be done for each database to ensure that the 
the data obtained meet the requirements specifically established for the research questions 
proposed in this thesis. This assessment process is described in the Section 3.4. 
 
3.4. Assessment of available databases 
Six database sources with carbon emissions data available were introduced in the previous 
section and the information on each database is summarised in Table 3.5. This section 
presents the assessment process of examining each database and details the selection 
criteria and process of determining the most suitable carbon database for the empirical 
investigation designed in the following chapters. Each database is assessed on the basis of 
two main aspects: the first concerns the scope of the database and the second concerns the 
method adopted by the database in compiling its company-level carbon data. 
 
3.4.1. Assessment of scope 
The databases are first assessed by their scope, which could determine not only the scale of 
the empirical analyses to be conducted, but also the relevance of the results produced. The 
scope comprises three assessment criteria, which are coverage in terms of geography, the 
                                            
35 http://www.southpolecarbon.com/solutions/finance_solutions/ghg_emissions. 
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coverage in terms of time, and level of reported data; other relevant information is 
discussed when appropriate. 
 
The coverage of the database concerns the amount of data that are available to be used to 
construct the sample dataset for the analysis. Six out of seven databases announce an 
extensive global coverage of company carbon/GHG emissions data, while the EU ETS 
Company Database provide by Carbon Market Data has a specific European coverage, 
which is the minimum requirement to be met. It should be noted that as a carbon data 
provider, Carbon Market Data has a comprehensive coverage of global carbon data, and 
chooses the EU ETS database, the RGGI database, and the CDM-JI database36. 
 
In terms of length of time covered, CDP’s climate change programme has the longest 
coverage. However, it should be noted the spatial coverage of CDP varies substantially 
through time progresses. The EU ETS Database of Carbon Market Data covers eight years 
which spans two separate trading periods (2005–2012); only the first six years (2005–
2010) of data are used in this thesis after considering the state of the EUA market during 
the last two years of the second phase. The last two years of EU ETS coincided with the 
period that saw ‘[t]he marked reduction of prices in the second half of 2011 to levels below 
€ 10’ (EC, 2012: 5), which led commentators to doubt the functionality of the market. For 
instance, The Economist considered that ETS allowances will remain below the level of 
junk bonds (Economist, 2013). The average price of spot contracts during 2011–2012 was 
marginally over the €10 mark, at €10.08,37 which is only 1/10 of the penalty for failing to 
surrender one unit of EUA. Hence, the choice of 2005–2010 for the EU ETS scheme as the 
sample period appears reasonable, as this represents the period during which emissions 
allowances prices were not criticised for their functionality. The CARMA database, 
however, has a relatively limited coverage of two individual years, which restrict the types 
of analyses that could be done. 
 
                                            
36  A full list of Carbon Market Data products can be seen at https://www.carbonmarketdata.com/en/products/world-ets-
database/presentation. 
37 Source: European Energy Exchange EUA daily futures closing price. 
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Table 3.5 An analysis of carbon databases 
 
 
DATABASE 
METHOD SCOPE 
 
Regulated?    Source / Accuracy / Verification 
Coverage 
 
Reporting Level Other 
Spatial Temporal 
CDP – Climate Change 
Programme 
Not regulated Data is collected from responses to CDP 
questionnaires from invited companies, of which 
some claim to have been verified by third parties 
against a verification fee (CDP, 2013a) 
Global 2000– 
present 
Company-level; 
CDP does not 
verify the 
information in any 
company response 
CDP – Carbon Action 
Initiatives 
Not regulated Data is collected from responses to self- designed 
questionnaires from invited companies; the focus 
of the project appears to be emissions reduction 
actions (CDP, 2013a, 2013b) 
Global 2011– 
present 
Company-level; 
CDP does not 
verify the 
information in any 
company response 
EU ETS Database – 
Carbon Market Data 
Mandatory 
reporting to the 
European 
Commission 
Data is aggregated from the EUTL; calculation, 
reportin, and verification requirements of 
reporting emissions are specified in EC (2003a, 
2004a, 2007a) 
28 EU 
member 
states plus 
3 EEA 
countries 
2005– 
present 
 
Company-level; 
reporting verified 
CO2e emissions; 
subscription 
required 
Carbon Monitoring 
Action 
Not regulated Data is compiled from original reports, various 
organisations, and internal statistical model, see 
Ummel (2012) 
Global 2004, 2009 Company/Plant; 
reporting CO2 
emissions 
(tonnes); Publicly 
available 
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ASSET4 ESG – 
Thomson Reuters 
Not regulated Data is collected from publicly available company 
reports; estimated figures are produced by self-
constructed models for non-reporting companies 
Global  
(3,400+ 
companies) 
2009–
present 
Company; 
reporting CO2e 
emissions; 
Subscription 
required; CDP 
data partner 
Bloomberg Not regulated Data is collected from company reports or CDP 
responses 
Global 2009– 
present 
Company-level; 
emissions of 
scopes 1 and 2 
plus supply chain 
emissions; 
subscription 
required 
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C
D
P
 
d
a
t
a
Natural Capital Metrics 
– T r u c o s t  
Not regulated Data is collected from company reports, CDP 
responses, and direct engagement with companies 
Global Up to 10 
years 
historical 
Company; 
emissions of all 
scopes in GHG 
Protocol; 
subscription 
required 
 
S
u
b
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
;
 
C
D
South Pole Carbon Not regulated Database combines self-reported GHG emissions 
data with plausibility checks and approximated 
data for non-reporting companies 
Global 2005– 
present 
Company; scope 
1 and scope 2 
emissions; 
subscription 
required 
 
S
u
b
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
This table analyses carbon emissions databases from two aspects: the methodology undertaken in establishing the database and the scope of the database. The names / 
providers of the databases are listed in the first column from the left. In the method section, the first column states the regulation status of the carbon emissions data, and 
the second column explains how data is obtained and levels of verification. In the scope section, the first column describes the geographic coverage of the database, the 
second column shows the length of time coverage, the third column shows what level of carbon emissions has been reported, and the fourth column contains other 
information of relevance for the empirical analyses in this thesis. The table is based on the following sources of database information: CDP-Carbon Disclosure Project 
(https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Results/Pages/All-Investor-Reports.aspx;   https://www.cdp.net/Documents/Guidance/CDP-2013-Scoring-Methodology.pdf); Carbon Market 
Data (https://www.carbonmarketdata.com/en/products/world-ets-database/eu-ets); Carbon Monitoring Action (http://carma.org/blog/about/faq/); Asset4 
(http://cdn1.im.thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/ASSET4-ESG-Data-Factsheet.pdf) (http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/13695-ASSET4-Carbon-
Data-Estimates-Available-Now); Bloomberg terminal; Trucost (http://www.trucost.com/_uploads/Academic%20pages/    Trucost%20Academic%20Services.pdf) 
(http://www.trucost.com/publications); and South Pole Carbon (http://www.southpolecarbon.com/solutions/finance_solutions/   ghg_emissions). 
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The reporting level shows whether the data are ready to be used or need further processing, 
which eventually affects the efficiency of conducting the analyses. All databases provide 
company-level carbon emissions data, and the CARMA database additionally has 
installation and national-level data available. In terms of the level of carbon reported, all 
databases except one appear relatively inconsistent, as different scopes of emissions are 
measured and reported. The one exception is the EU ETS Company Database. The other 
information mainly concerns the accessibility and costs of the database. Most CDP reports, 
such as the climate change reports of S&P500 and Global 500 are accessible free of charge 
online; however the full Carbon Action Initiate reports are provided for signatory access 
only. The CARMA database is also freely available while the other databases require paid 
subscriptions. Three private providers, including Asset4 ESG, Bloomberg, and Trucost are 
data partners of the CDP, which indicate that a certain proportion of the company data of 
these providers may be of the same origin, with inconsistent verification practices.  
 
3.4.2. Assessment of the method underlying the database 
The method adopted by the database plays the most crucial role in directly shaping the 
quality of the data, which itself essentially influences the empirical analysis and the 
relevance of the empirical finding. Thus, the databases need also to be assessed by the 
method they adopt, which comprises two assessment criteria. 
 
The first aspect concerns whether the carbon emissions data produced and reported is on a 
mandatory basis. Mandatory reporting is rated higher in the assessment process as it 
ensures a higher degree of scrutiny and reduces any uncertainty over the creditability of the 
reporting quality (DEFRA, 2012; Erion, 2009; Matsumura et al., 2014). Empirical 
evidence provided by Kim and Lyon (2011) indicates that the flexibility in voluntary 
reporting programmes can considerably compromise the creditability and effectiveness of 
the results. Other concerns about non-regulated carbon emissions reporting have also been 
discussed in Section 3.2 and it is interesting to compare carbon with financial reporting. As 
of 2005, the European Union requires all listed companies to prepare their financial reports 
in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards adopted by International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is to enhance the confidence in international 
financial markets as well as to offer better protection for investors (EC, 2002). Reports 
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prepared under the same standards can more easily be compared and can be utilised to 
produce more meaningful analyses (Sullivan, 2006). While carbon reporting is nowhere 
near the level of these procedures for financial accounting, the carbon accounting and 
reporting issue has raised considerable concern and become more urgent since the 
development of the emissions trading scheme in Europe (Bebbington and Larrinaga-
Gonzalez, 2008). The UK has become the first country in the European community to 
impose compulsory disclosure requirements for GHG emissions levels for the entire 
organisation, which came into force in April 2013 and was targeted at businesses listed on 
the main market of London Stock Exchange. The consultation response from businesses 
and individual has been positive on the implications of a compulsory measure, as it can 
increase the transparency for companies and provide a single consistent standard (DEFRA, 
2012). 
 
Based on the survey of all databases, the EU ETS Database appears the only one which 
exclusively offers regulated carbon emissions data. The CDP is evidently a voluntary-
based reporting portal which requests, collects, and organises the data reported by the 
voluntarily responding companies. The other databases do not seem to distinguish between 
regulated and non-regulated carbon emissions data. 
 
The second criterion concerns the sources of data, the accuracy of the data points, and their 
reliability, which is judged by the level of verification of the data reported. The source of 
data concerns whether the final ‘data product’ is in its original state or has been processed 
by certain methods. Reported data is preferred in terms of accuracy over estimated data 
produced by the provider’s own estimation models, while independent verification and 
assurance are also value-added to the overall quality of the carbons emission data. CDP 
relies solely on companies’ responses to their questionnaire to obtain the GHG emissions 
data. The methodologies of GHG inventory calculation and measurement, and the 
verification of reported data are determined by the responding companies rather than CDP, 
which can cause difficulties in making consistent comparisons among companies. The EU 
ETS Database of Carbon Market Data sources installation-level data from the EUTL and 
produces aggregated-level company data, for which no estimation is involved. The 
emissions data reported by each installation to the EUTL is subject to the principles and 
guidelines specified in ETS Directive 2003/87/EC and related European Commission 
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documents (EC, 2003a, 2004a, 2007a). This ensures that the reported data of companies is 
produced under the same standards and can be consistently compared.  
 
The other databases adopt similar approaches to producing their finished data points, 
which involve both collecting self-reported data and producing estimated figures for non-
reporting companies. The CARMA database makes its methodology more clear than 
others, specifying that the compilation of its database involves collecting carbon data for 
installations and companies from various sources, including original reports and 
governmental agencies, in particular the environmental department. It also incorporates 
commercial databases, and data from international organisations, such as the IEA, in 
conjunction with its own statistical models for non-reporting facilities and companies 
(Ummel, 2012). 
 
It should be noted that essentially these databases are assessed on the basis of meeting the 
requirements of the analyses planned, and thus the assessment criteria are made on a 
customised, qualitative basis and do not necessarily reflect the absolute quality or value of 
the specific database. Overall, Carbon Market Data provides company-level data points 
with sufficient geographical and temporal coverage as well as the assured level of 
verification, which meets all the requirements set for the empirical analyses. Most 
importantly, the emissions data from the EU ETS Database is produced within a regulated 
context, which provides a solid base for the empirical analyses to be conducted. 
 
3.5 Comparative and descriptive statistics for Carbon Market Data 
This section provides a numerical analysis concerning the features of the database selected 
after the assessment process of Section 3.4. As concluded there, the EU ETS Company 
Database provided by the Carbon Market Data seems the most suitable option for the 
analyses in this thesis, given the criteria checks for each database’s capacity. Carbon 
Market Data is chosen is for its EU ETS specialisation, which provides a good coverage of 
firm-level allowances and emissions data for all trading periods. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, Carbon Market Data is currently the data provider with exclusive aggregate-
level data that is sourced directly from the central-administrated EUTL of the EU ETS. 
The reliability and comparability of data is assured for the data are submitted to the EUTL 
following the standards and guidelines established by European Commission. The detailed 
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presentation of the Carbon Market Data is given in this section, and the distinct features of 
the EU ETS-based database are also analysed. 
 
It should be kept in mind that the EU ETS is unique for its multi-sectoral coverage, in 
comparison with other ETSs such as the US SO2, and the Australian NSW Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme. 38  A closer look at the companies’ distribution and allowances 
allocation patterns across different industrial activities of the database could reveal the 
most emissions intensive sectors, as well as which industry is expected to experience more 
impacts than others and could become the main players in the European carbon market. 
 
As described in Section 3.3.1, the Carbon Market Data company database contains 887 
companies regulated under EU ETS. These companies account for more than 90% on 
average of the allowances issued in the entire ETS. The first feature of the database is the 
vast differences in scale in terms of the number of companies covered by the ETS , which 
is revealed by the number of installations owned by a single company. The number of 
installations owned by one company ranges from 1 to 656, with a mean of 9.5 and a 
standard deviation of 33. It should be noted that the number of installations owned serves 
as a proximate indicator as EU ETS currently excludes installations with lower emissions 
intensity. 
 
Another feature revealed in the database is that the firm-level allowances allocation shows 
a considerable degree of concentration, which is also demonstrated in Trotignon and 
Delbosc (2008). The overall cap, which is the amount of allowances approved and issued 
to the regulated firms, together with the average annual cap, are shown in the Table 3.6 
below. The Phase 2 sees a more stringent emissions restriction, as expected, than Phase 1 
with a 6.5% reduction in annual cap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
38 The scheme started in 2003 and has since been closed. 
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Table 3.6 Allowances distribution within the EU ETS Database 
Phase 
(1) 
Emissions Cap 
 Total 
(2) 
Annual average 
(3) 
Annual average per 
firm 
(4) 
Phase 1 6,321,069,007 2,107,023,002 2,375,449 
Phase 2 9,845,746,393 1,969,149,279 2,220,010 
This table shows the allowances distribution within the database companies for separate trading 
periods in units of EUA. The emissions cap is determined by the aggregated amount of allowances 
allocated in each National Allocation Plan (NAP). Column (2) shows the Emissions Cap Total, 
which is the total allowances allocated to database companies in Phase 1 (Phase 2). Column (3) 
shows the Cap Annual Average, which is the average allowances allocated to database companies 
each year in Phase 1(Phase 2). Column (4) shows the Cap Average per company, which is the 
average annual allowances allocation of each company in Phase 1 (Phase 2). 
 
Table 3.7 shows the company distribution across different operating activities39 along with 
the proportion of the allowances allocation each activity segment receives in relation to the 
entire database. The four largest sectors, which total 612 firms, account on average for 
90% of the allowances issued through the two phases of the EU ETS. While the power and 
heat activity segment receives nearly 7% fewer allowances in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, the 
other three sectors see a 2% increase in the allowances received. 
 
A closer look at the biggest emitting segment, the power & heat companies, reveals a 
staggering level of allowance allocation concentration, as seen in Table 3.8. The power & 
heat sector, which comprises large electricity producers, predictably accounts for the 
largest segment of allowances issued within the trading scheme. The allowances’ 
allocation concentration can also be seen within the sector, as the analysis below reveals 
that the top 100 firms within the 273 firm-strong power sector account for more than 90% 
of the overall sectoral allowances allocation, and on average more than 50% of the total 
allowances allocated to the participating firms in the database. 
 
 
 
                                            
39 The activity refers to the installations’ operating activity for which they are regulated by Directive 2003/87/EC. The activity type is 
defined in Annex I of the ETS Directive (EC, 2003a). They are not equivalent to the commonly used equity index sector classification. 
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Table 3.7 Database overview at activity level  
Activity 
(1) 
Company 
Counts 
(2) 
% of Total 
Companies 
(3) 
% of 
Allowances in 
Phase 1 
(4) 
% of 
Allowances in 
Phase 2 
(5) 
Power & heat 271 30.55% 60.935% 53.771% 
Iron & steel 157 17.70% 10.216% 12.418% 
Oil & gas 96 10.82% 10.598% 12.641% 
Cement & lime 88 9.92% 9.789% 11.62% 
Others 69 6.99% 1.404% 1.56% 
Chemicals 45 5.07% 3.345% 4.125% 
Pulp & paper 41 4.62% 1.324% 1.278% 
Food & drinks 29 3.27% 0.662% 0.642% 
Glass 20 2.25% 0.717% 0.897% 
Motor industry 20 2.25% 0.275% 0.265% 
Pharmaceutical 10 1.13% 0.056% 0.062% 
Bricks & ceramics 9 1.01% 0.131% 0.159% 
Coke ovens 9 1.01% 0.165% 0.158% 
Aluminium 6 0.68% 0.261% 0.261% 
Mining 6 0.68% 0.109% 0.129% 
Waste 
management 
4 0.45% 0.001% 0.001% 
Water utilities 4 0.45% 0.003% 0.004% 
Education 3 0.34% 0.010% 0.007% 
Total 887  
*92% of total EU 
ETS coverage 
*89% of total EU 
ETS coverage 
This table provides information on company and allowances distribution within the database at 
activity level. Column (1) lists the activities for which each installation is regulated by the ETS 
Directive. Column (2) counts the number of companies that own installations of specific activity in 
the database. Column (3) shows the percentage count of a specific activity in terms of the number 
of companies relative to the total companies in the database. Columns (4) and (5) show the 
percentage of allowances allocated to the specific activity in relation to total allowances in the 
database in Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively. The activity ‘Others’ refers to companies which are 
not subject to ETS regulation but choose to opt-in the trading scheme. 
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Table 3.8. Firm-level allowances allocation within Power & Heat activity segment 
Firms (1) % of allowances allocated to all 
power and heat companies 
% of allowances allocation to all 
companies 
 PHASE 1 
(2) 
PHASE 2 
(3) 
PHASE 1 
(4) 
PHASE 2 
(5) 
Top 100 93.20% 90.62% 56.79% 48.71% 
Top 133 96.260% 93.83% 58.660% 50.44% 
Total 271 100% 100% 60.94% 53.77% 
This table presents the concentration of the allowances allocation within power & heat activity 
operating firms. Columns (2) and (3) show the % of allowances received by the Top 100 and Top 
133 companies in relation to total allowances distributed to power & heat companies in Phase 1 
and Phase 2, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) show the % of allowances received by Top 100, 
Top 133 power and heat companies in relation to total allowances distributed to the whole database 
in Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively. 
 
Table 3.9 provides the firm-level allowances allocation for the top emissions intensive 
firms, most of which predictably belong to the power & heat sector. This analysis can 
show more clearly the degree of allowances allocation concentration analysed similarly in 
Trotignon and Delbosc (2008). In addition, the average annual cap for each of the top 6 
firms is also calculated for comparison with the average annual cap for firms within the 
database. The result that the top 6 firms account for on average a quarter of the total 
allowances issued within the database show the extreme emission intensity of certain 
sectors and large-scale companies. One implication that can be drawn is these emissions 
intensive firms would be expected to influence the demand side for allowances. 
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Table 3.9 Allowances allocation analysis in top 6 firms 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Company 
(1) 
Activity 
(2) 
Number of 
Installations 
(3) 
Allowance 
allocation % 
(4) 
Firm-specific 
annual cap 
(5) 
Position to 
Avg. cap 
(6) 
Allowance 
allocation % 
(7) 
Firm-specific 
annual cap 
(8) 
Position to 
Avg. cap 
(9) 
RWE Power & Heat 131 7.15% 150,610,811 6,340.0% 4.56% 89,862,866 4,048.0% 
E.ON Power & Heat 266 4.91% 103,539,682 4,359.0% 3.92% 77,189,617 3,477.0% 
Vattenfall Power & Heat 161 4.47% 94,223,472 3,967.0% 3.08% 60,622,850 2,731.0% 
ArcelorMittal Iron & Steel 87 4.12% 86,737,124 3,651.0% 4.45% 87,637,398 3,948.0% 
Enel Power & Heat 78 3.85% 81,202,059 3,418.0% 3.71% 73,013,806 3,289.0% 
EDF Power & Heat 656 3.59% 75,739,032 3,188.0% 3.07% 60,517,758 2,726.0% 
Sub-total 1379 28.09% 22.79% 
This table presents the concentration of the allowances allocation in large companies that each received more than 3 % of all available allowances in 
both periods in the whole database. The cut-off rate in relation to total allowances is determined in a similar manner as seen in Trotignon and Delbosc 
(2008). Column (1) lists company names. Column (2) indicates which activity the company mainly involves. Column (3) shows the number of installations 
owned by the company. Columns (4) and (7) show the % of allowances the company accounts for in relation to the total allowances in Phase 1 and Phase 2, 
respectively. Columns (5) and (8) indicate the firm-specific annual cap and the position of the average cap in all database companies for Phase 1. Columns 
(6) and (9) show the equivalent for Phase 2. Annual cap is the average amount of allowances allocated to the firm each year during the respective phase. 
Position to average cap is calculated by the ratio of ‘firm-specific annual cap’ to ‘average annual cap per firm of the whole database’, to indicate the 
relative position of the firm-specific allowances allocation 
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3.6 The price trend in the EUA market4041 
Another key element in the overall dataset used in this thesis is naturally the EU emissions 
allowances (EUA) price. The EUA price will serve as one of the explanatory variables that 
directly captures the relationship between the stock and carbon market and reveals to what 
extent the variation in the stock prices of ETS-exposed firms is associated with that of 
EUA prices. The implementation of distinct phases of EU ETS results in an inevitable gap 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2, especially in terms of the EUA price trend. This section 
presents the trends in EUA prices and trading activities from the beginning to the recent 
state of the EUA market.  
 
• The supplementary commitment period (2005–2007) 
The Phase 1 of EU ETS has been largely characterised by uncertainty, which was reflected 
in two price shocks through the three years of trading. The EUA market experienced rapid 
growth after the launch of EU ETS, with 3.5 times as many allowances traded in the first 
three months of 2005 as were traded in the whole of 2004. The demonstrative trades in 
EUAs had been carried out in 2003, with an estimated trading volume of 650,000 tCO2e in 
2003 and 9 MtCO2e in 2004, respectively. The overall value of the global carbon market 
summed to over 10 billion USD in 2005, among which 8.2 billion USD worth of EUAs 
was traded. The amount of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) traded in EU ETS was 322 
million tonnes, a forty-fold increase over the volume of previous years (The World Bank, 
2005, 2006). The EUA unit price stayed below €10 for the first 3 months in 2005, but it 
rose to nearly €30 in the same year. The demand for EUA during this period was fairly 
uncertain and there was an imbalance between potential buyers and suppliers in the 
market. The EUA price remained steadily above €20 before April 2006 without drastic 
fluctuation (The World Bank, 2006, 2007). As the demand for allowances for compliance 
remained at a certain level, this was not beyond expectations (Ellerman et al., 2010: 141).
                                            
40 Data on trend analysis is obtained from the annual carbon market report published by the World Bank carbon finance unit and 
Tendances Carbone, a montly bulletin specialising in European carbon prices in partnership with CLIMPACT METNEXT.  
41. The EUA price trends analysis in this section benefits largely from de Perthuis in Ellerman et al. (2010) and Ellerman and Joskow 
(2008) as well as The World Bank’s annual global carbon market reports. 
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Figure 3.1 The price trend of EU allowances, 2005–2012.  
Source: European Energy Exchange’s EUA daily futures (spots) closing price (extracted from DataStream).
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The EUA price dropped drastically to €10, one-third of its highest price, following the 
submission of installation compliance information in April 2006, as the information 
revealed a clearly overall long position in allowances for the ETS sectors. The expectation 
of demand and supply was quickly adjusted during this period of time, as the demand for 
phase 1 allowance was no longer large. This was characterised as the ‘information shock’ 
(Ellerman et al., 2010: 141). The price of Phase 1 allowances saw a mild rebound after the 
information shock and remained around the €15 mark during this stage until October 2006, 
before entering the last year of Phase 1. Trading for Phase 1 allowances came to an end in 
2007 as the completion of Phase 1 approached, as marked out by point (c) in Figure 3.1. 
The compliance data and allowances surrendered made it clear that a net-long position in 
allowances for Phase 1 was certain. The value of spot and futures contracts in Phase 1 
allowances ended near zero due to the banking restrictions between different trading 
periods (Alberola and Chevallier, 2009). 
 
• The first commitment period (2008–2012) 
The second trading period of EU ETS coincides with the EU commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The European Union set a target of 8% emissions reduction compared 
with 1990 emissions level, from 2008 to 2012 and therefore a more stringent cap than 
Phase 1 was imposed (Egenhofer, 2007). The Phase 2 EUA opened in 2008 with the price 
slightly higher than €20 and maintained a slow but steady climb until it reached its peak in 
July 2008 at €29. However, the price level was not sustained for long as the global 
economy faced a substantial ‘cool-down’ period (marked as (d) in Figure 3.1). The global 
financial crisis, associated largely with the US sub-prime mortgage, started to have a 
global impact after mid-2007 and led to the global financial crisis, which lasted nearly two 
years. The financial crisis ultimately led to an economic recession and had a huge impact 
on economic conditions in several European countries. These inevitably affected the 
demand side of emissions allowances through the impact on industries and led to a 
downward movement of EUA prices (The World Bank, 2009). 
 
The allowances price experienced a continuous decline from the summer of 2008 and was 
down to below €10 in February 2009. This could be attributed to constantly low energy 
prices and deteriorating economic conditions and, as a result, decreasing industrial output 
affected the demand for emissions allowances. In addition, firms with more free 
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allowances available sought to cash in by selling EUA on the market, which boosted 
supply and thus depressed allowances prices. This has been a typical response in industrial 
sectors (The World Bank, 2010). The price of allowances appeared to stabilise after the 
crisis and bounced back in 2009. The price has remained steadily within the range of €10 
and €16 since March 2009 and ended 2009 above €13. 
 
The spring of 2010 saw the rebound in the EUA price, reaching above €15, which could 
mainly be attributed to the slight easing in the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, this 
particular period of time was still characterised by great volatility due to global political 
and economic turbulence. The EUA trading volume experienced a marginal growth while 
the global carbon market overall shrank by $2 billion (The World Bank, 2011; cdcClimat, 
2010: No.45–No.53). The trading volume continued to grow in 2011 though the average 
price of EUA dropped nearly 13%, ending the year at €13, the same price level at the 
beginning of the financial crisis. The World Bank annual report suggests that strong 
trading activities despite the reducing verified emissions and declining prices can be due to 
hedging against future restrictions, and strategic considerations on portfolio adjustment as 
well as arbitraging. However, opinions remain less optimistic on the demand side of 
allowances, due to the current weak industrial recovery. Additional factors that need to be 
accounted for concerning EUA development include the high level of allowances supply 
outside Europe, as well as growing national investment in renewable energy capacity in 
recent years. As marked at (e) in Figure 3.1, the EUA market began to see the end of the 
second trading period from mid-2011, with the monthly average price dropping more than 
17% in July and never exceeding the €10 mark since October 2011 (The World Bank, 
2012).  
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4 The stock price performance of EU’s emission trading-exposed firms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The EU ETS was implemented by the European Union as one of its key climate policies. It 
aimed to alleviate the damage of climate change, environmentally and economically. It is 
suggested that the carbon emissions reduction can be more cost-efficient through emissions 
trading (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Labatt and White, 2007; Brohé et al., 2009; 
Böhringer et al., 2009; EC, 2010). The scale and coverage of the EU ETS are 
groundbreaking. Despite the EU ETS being not the first mandatory emissions trading 
scheme, it is by now the largest scheme in the global carbon market and it is still 
expanding (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009; The World Bank, 2012, 2011). 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of the planning and 
implementation of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of directly exposed firms. 
The basic expectation is that the planning and implementation of the EU ETS would have a 
negative effect on the share price performance of such firms, as it would force them to pay, 
directly or indirectly, for their emissions. Hence, compliance with the ETS regulation is 
expected to cost the participating firms more financial resources than a business-as-usual 
(BAU) scenario without a direct economic cost for carbon (Baumert et al., 2003; Burtraw 
et al., 2001; Diltz, 2002; Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006; Pope and Owen, 2009; Linn, 2010; 
Chapple et al., 2013). In other words, the companies used to emit CO2 and other GHGs at 
no financial cost, and so externalised the costs on society. However, the right to emit more 
than their given allowances needs to be purchased at extra cost after the implementation of 
the EU ETS, which forces the firms to internalise these costs. If this chapter found no 
significant negative impact of the EU ETS on stock market performance, the firms, and 
eventually their shareholders, would not internalise sufficient costs to justify a significant 
reduction in shareholder value. This would imply one possibility, that neither the firm nor 
its investors would financially contribute in a meaningful way to climate change 
mitigation, though it is argued that the limited contribution and internalised costs of firms 
would still be more cost-effective eventually than being non-responsive towards climate 
change (Stern, 2006, 2008b; Guo et al., 2006; EC, 2009c). More specifically, by analysing 
whether there is a negative impact of the EU ETS on share price performance and what 
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extent this effect might have, this chapter can relate the overall shareholder value reduction 
of EU ETS-regulated firms to the expected cost of climate change mitigation, to gauge the 
degree to which these firms and their shareholders contribute financially. Certainly, 
another possibility, that the investors have not fully realised and taken into consideration 
the ETS-related costs, cannot be ruled out. This chapter makes a relatively novel attempt to 
explore this aspect by incorporating the criterion that distinguishes the ETS-exposed firms 
with potentially lower ETS-related costs from the firms with potentially higher costs in the 
second part of the analysis.  
 
Previous empirical studies of the relationship between emissions-related regulation and the 
stock market have largely focused on the SO2 market operating in certain regions of the US 
from 1995 until 2011,42 to investigate the impact of the regulation on stock prices 
(Hughes, 2000; Diltz, 2002; Kahn and Knittel, 2003), or they focused on small sub-
samples of all listed firms participating in the EU ETS (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 
2009; Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012). They have all been inconclusive, as some find no 
carbon emissions induced performance penalty (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009) 
while others identify evidence of a negative impact on firms’ equity prices (Mo et al., 
2012; Diltz, 2002)43. This range of these findings from the previous empirical-based EU 
ETS studies indicates that the allowances market is not yet integrated as a determinant 
relevant from the equity market perspective. Besides the small datasets of previous EU 
ETS studies, another explanation for this range in the previous findings, is the fact that the 
carbon market created under the EU ETS is still an emerging market with the first phase of 
EU ETS being labelled a trial phase (Betz and Sato, 2006; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; 
Convery et al., 2008). In this trial phase, the EUA price failed to sustain a level necessary 
to promote a low-carbon economy, and collapsed several times due to regulatory 
uncertainties as well as substantial reductions in demand in the context of the economic 
crisis (Alberola et al., 2008; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Hoffmann, 2007; Declercq et 
al., 2011; Creti et al., 2012). 
 
                                            
42 It was replaced by the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. Details available at www.epa.gov/crossstaterule/. 
43 Oberndorfer (2009) does not find significant results in his time series market models; however, he finds significantly positive though 
relatively small intercepts in the pooled regressions, which have considerably lower explanatory power despite them artificially 
increasing the degree of freedom. 
Chapter 4 The stock price performance of EU’s emission trading-exposed firms 
93 
To thoroughly examine the effect of the planning and implementation of the EU ETS on 
the stock market performance of the regulated firms, the analyses of this chapter comprise 
two parts: the first tests the impact of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of 
participating firms. This analysis intends to reveal whether the equity prices of ETS-
exposed firms in aggregate are influenced in the expected negative or the unexpected 
positive direction at any statistically significant level. The estimation result shows that the 
firms regulated by the EU ETS display the expected underperformance at the highest 
statistical significance level, but only in the period 2001–2004 during which the EU ETS 
was proposed and in development but not yet launched (Ellerman et al., 2010; EC, 2003b). 
Once the EU ETS began in 2005 regulated firms did not experience any subsequent 
negative effects on their stock market performance. These results are in line with those 
previous studies that observed no performance penalty for regulated firms during the EU 
ETS (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009), as the performance penalty appears to have 
arrived ex ante in terms of reduced investor expectations (Chapple et al., 2013; Hughes, 
2000). 
 
The second part takes the investigation one step further, by testing whether the emissions 
status of participating firms influences the EU ETS effect on their stock return 
performance. For this purpose, access to a so far unexplored database, Carbon Market 
Data’s ETS Company Database, was bought for the years 2005–2010. The results of this 
second empirical analysis are intended to reveal whether the financial performance of the 
participating firms is associated with their emissions management performance, as 
indicated by their emission-to-cap status. The emission-to-cap status is based on the 
difference between the firm’s verified emissions and its allocated European Union 
Allowances (EUA). A negative sign indicates an under-emitting status, while a positive 
sign indicates an over-emitting one.44 
 
The results show distinct differences in the performance of over-emitting firms and under-
emitting firms. Over-emitting firms underperform substantially in Phase 2 of the EU ETS 
but do not seem endure a shareholder value loss in the first ‘trial’ phase. In contrast, firms 
with surplus allowances even benefit slightly during the entire EU ETS sample period. 
                                            
44 Both concepts, verified emissions and EUA, are widely discussed in the EU ETS literature (i.e., Alberola et al., 2008; Hintermann, 
2010) though have not yet been related to each other supposedly due to a lack of accessible and reliable data. 
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These results highlight the fact that the corporate management of carbon can have a 
material impact on a firm’s stock market performance in the expected direction. In other 
words, caring for carbon emissions reductions is a shareholder value driver in the EU ETS 
context. This finding confirms those seeing potential positive effects of the EU ETS for 
some firms (Sijm et al., 2006b; Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008). It also generally 
indicates that there can be a business case for corporate environmental responsibility 
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Cohen et al., 1997; Cormier and Magnan, 1997). The 
substantial discrepancy between over-emitting and under-emitting firms also highlights the 
fact that during the EU ETS trading period it is necessary to go beyond analysing regulated 
firms (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; Mo et al., 2012) and study reliable data on 
corporate emissions performance, as done in this chapter. 
 
There are two main contributions of this chapter. First, the size and scope of the dataset 
used in this chapter have been substantially extended compared with previous empirical-
based studies researching this particular topic (by far the largest in terms of the number of 
ETS-exposed firms examined). The sample dataset comprises 153 European listed firms, 
which is at least seven times bigger than the samples used in previous studies. The 
expanded dataset allows an understanding of how major ETS-exposed firms, rather than 
being limited to electricity firms, are valued by the stock market in a broader context. More 
insights into how these firms are perceived in terms of their profit prospects are gained 
from this chapter. The integration of firm-level verified emissions data from the EU ETS 
for six years also advances previous studies, by extending the length of the sample period. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 45.2 provides the 
background to the empirical analyses proposed, which includes a review of the relevant 
literature and establishing the research questions. Methods, model specifications, and data 
are presented in Section 45.3. The results of the estimations, and the discussion of major 
findings and implications from investors’ and policy makers’ points of view follow in 
Section 45.4. Section 45.5 concludes and discusses the limitations of the analysis in this 
chapter, followed by proposing future research opportunities. 
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4.2 Background and research questions 
This section provides an overview by reviewing the literature that specifically explores 
how ETS is associated with the stock market, and how regulated firms can be influenced in 
terms of their value reflected by their share prices. The main question in this chapter is 
whether the firms that are or will be subject to the mandatory emissions restrictions 
introduced by the EU ETS experience any significant impact in terms of their stock market 
performance. The basic expectation is that the planning and implementation of the EU ETS 
would have a negative effect on the stock market performance of regulated firms, because 
it requires them to internalise the cost for their pollution. Consequently, compliance with 
ETS regulation is expected to cost the participating firms considerably more than the BAU 
scenario before the ETS was proposed and implemented (Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006; 
Pope and Owen, 2009; Linn, 2010). In other words, the companies that used to emit CO2 
and other GHGs at no cost have had since 2005 to purchase the right to emit more than 
their given allowances. Furthermore, through the introduction of an ETS, firms are 
increasingly subject to potential future environmental liabilities and compliance costs 
(Bushnell et al., 2013; Bode, 2006; Hughes, 2000). 
 
However, while the EU ETS is expected to have a negative shareholder value effect for the 
average regulated firm, there is an argument that the most carbon efficient firms actually 
have the opportunity to profit from the ETS. This argument rests on the two aspects: first, 
firms with effective and efficient carbon management might benefit from the ETS as they 
are more likely to emit under their designated cap and hence possess an allowances 
surplus. This allowances surplus represents a valuable asset that can lead to a positive 
shareholder value effect, either through selling the additional allowances or reducing the 
compliance costs of purchasing extra allowances (Johnston et al., 2008). The second aspect 
is the cost pass-through of firms, which describes the ability of firms to pass the 
compliance costs, such as for purchasing emissions allowances, to the end consumers. 
Given that firms receive their allocated amount of allowances for free, in particular during 
the Phase 1, firms could even profit from the ETS if they passed a cost of carbon through 
to the consumer which they do not pay themselves (Sijm et al., 2006b; Zachmannm and 
von Hirschhausen, 2008). Hence, while the average firm is expected to have a negative 
stock market performance as result of the EU ETS, and below average carbon efficient 
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firms are expected to experience an even worse stock market effect, carbon efficient firms 
may well enhance their shareholder value. 
 
The previous literature on the effects of EU ETS on the stock market has predominantly 
focused on fairly small sub-samples of all participating listed firms; in particular, four 
studies that empirically examined the impacts of aspects of the EU’s ETS on the share 
prices of affected companies (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; Knight, 2011, Mo et 
al., 2012). Oberndorfer (2009) conducted the first econometric analysis that specifically 
investigated the relationship between European carbon price changes and stock returns of 
twelve selected major energy providers. A capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework 
is applied to test the hypothesis that EU allowances price changes affect stock returns in 
the electricity industry. Utilising the firm-level data of 12 major electricity providers in 
Europe and aggregating them within an equal-weighted portfolio, Oberndorfer’s results 
provide supportive evidence to the hypothesis at statistically significant levels. This shows 
that the corporations tested in the analysis during the first phase of EU ETS experienced an 
increasing shareholder value in the context of allowances price appreciation, while their 
shareholder value decreased when allowances prices dropped. It could be interpreted that 
the EU ETS had an impact on the stock market and hence affected the shareholder value of 
firms covered by the trading scheme. 
 
Veith et al. (2009) investigated the capital market response to emission allowances price 
changes. Using a sample dataset of 22 major firms from the power sector in Europe and the 
arbitrage pricing theory (APT)-style market model, they find a positive correlation 
between stock returns and emissions allowances price variation during the period April 
2005 to mid-2007, which covers most trading activities of emission allowances during the 
pilot phase. A very similar finding was made by Knight (2011: 824), who studied a sample 
size of 19 electricity companies and considered the sample size comparable to similar 
studies in the literature (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009) based on an extended 
CAPM model. He found that seven of his nineteen companies saw a significantly positive 
relationship between EUA price and stock market performance in the first years of EU 
ETS operations, while only one of these positive coefficients remains in the following year 
(i.e. the Finish company Fortum). 
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A more recent study with empirical analyses covering the first five years (2005–2009) of 
the EU ETS by Mo et al. (2012) aimed to measure of the impact of EU ETS on electricity 
firms in terms of their shareholder value. They relied on the modified multi-factor market 
model to estimate the sensitivity (beta) of stock returns of 12 electricity firms to 
allowances price variation. Their findings revealed that the allowances price effect on 
stock returns changed from Phase 1 to Phase 2. EUA prices appreciation tends to be 
accompanied by corporate value appreciation in Phase 1, while the opposite is observed in 
Phase 2. This result is consistent with Oberndorfer (2009), Veith et al. (2009), and Knight 
(2011) regarding Phase 1, which indicates that the companies seemed on average to have 
benefitted from EU ETS operations in Phase 1, which counters the policy intention of 
having the companies internalise their costs of emissions (EC, 2009a). 
 
Support from studies with a maximum sample size of 22 firms, however, cannot really be 
generalized even when it is consistent, as the sample selection effects can be severe. The 
results of Mo et al. (2012) cannot be confirmed by any other previous studies regarding 
Phase 2, as none examined this period. It is also very interesting that none of the previous 
studies investigated if investor expectations in the period between the EU ETS proposal 
and its launch affected stock price performance, though Hughes (2000), Diltz (2002), and 
Chapple et al. (2013) studied a similar question in the US and Australian context. The 
reason for this lack of interest in the pre EU ETS period might result from these studies 
focusing on the effect of emissions prices on stock market performance rather than the 
effect of being regulated by the EU ETS itself, since emissions prices were only available 
after the launch of the EU ETS, whereas regulated firms could be examined from the 
proposal of the EU ETS (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009). In light of this, this chapter 
poses the following two research questions: (i) How does the EU ETS impact stock market 
performance of regulated firms on aggregate? (ii) How does the impact of the EU ETS on 
stock market performance differ across the pre-EU ETS period (2001–2004), Phase 1 
(2005–2007), and Phase 2 (2008–end of data sample)? 
 
Studying the stock market performances of regulated firms during the pre-EU ETS period 
in particular might be rather promising, as both Hughes (2000) and Chapple et al. (2013) 
find significant expected stock market performance penalties as a consequence of proposed 
emissions trading (as a form of environmental regulation) legislation. These results 
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confirm Barth and McNichols’ (1994) finding that future environmental liabilities affect 
share price performance. 
 
However, it is unlikely that the impacts of the EU ETS on corporate stock performance are 
homogeneous across companies. Johnston et al. (2008) study 58 firms in the US SO2 
market from 1995 to 2000 and provide empirical evidence that an emissions permits 
surplus is related to an increase in the market value of firms. In their view, SO2 emissions 
allowances have two elements linked to valuation in equity markets. One is the asset value 
of the permits, which is realised through selling permits. The other is the real option value, 
which is related to deferred capital investment. Both elements are expected to generate 
positive shareholder value. Similarly, Chapple et al. (2013) finds that in the context of the 
proposed Australian ETS among their 58 sample firms, higher levels of carbon intensity 
significantly reduce shareholder value. 
 
Within the EU ETS, Bushnell et al. (2013) conduct an event study of the carbon price 
crash impact on 25 April 2006 using the daily stock returns of 90 carbon intensive stocks. 
They that find firms in carbon or electricity intensive industries are hurt the most by the 
collapse in carbon prices that indicates the ineffectiveness of the trial phase. However, they 
also find that firms’ specific reactions depend substantially on the emissions status of their 
industries. In industries that are net long in permits, the firms with the most emissions 
allowances granted to them at no charge experienced the greatest loss as the result of the 
carbon price crash. Conversely, in industries that are net short of carbon emissions rights, 
the cleanest firms are hurt more relative to their peers. 
 
Hence, the question arises whether firms with different emissions status experience 
different impacts on their share prices. If the EU ETS is effective in setting incentives for 
the reduction of carbon emissions, firms with an allowance surplus should show a better 
stock market performance than firms with an allowances shortage. Addressing this 
question enables this chapter to provide empirical evidence on the relevance of firms’ 
carbon exposure and management, a research opportunity raised in Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008). In light of this, this chapter poses the third research question: 
(iii) How are EU ETS-exposed firms valued by the stock market when they emit more 
(over-emitters) or less (under-emitters) than they are allowed to? 
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4.3 Method and data 
This section describes the methods, models, and data utilised in this chapter. The principal 
research method and estimation models to be applied are described first, followed by the 
data and variable preparation process, including sample formation and portfolio 
construction model specification for each analysis to be conducted in the chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Portfolio research 
Portfolio research is one of the most commonly applied methods for estimating 
corporations’ stock market performance. It allows the possibility of comparing groups of 
firms (equities) with specific characteristics and has the advantage that the portfolios can 
easily be customised according to the need of the research question (Wagner and 
Wehrmeyer, 2002). As the objective of this chapter is to examine the performance of a 
group of firms with the characteristic of being subject to the EU ETS, portfolio research is 
a suitable tool. In addition, portfolio research approach, with its monthly or weekly 
observation interval, has a much high statistical power and consequently yields more 
explanatory power than the alternative (i.e., panel) approach. It is unsurprising that many 
studies have employed this approach to examine the corporate environmental and financial 
market performance relationship for the strengths mentioned above, such as Cohen et al. 
(1997); Derwall et al. (2005); Kempf and Osthoff (2007); Statman and Glushkov (2009). 
 
4.3.2 Model specification 
The Fama–French three-factor pricing model, which has been widely applied and 
empirically tested in the area of equity pricing, is selected as the baseline model. It is 
reasonable and appropriate that the estimation model used in analyses in this chapter builds 
on the Fama–French three-factor model, for two reasons. First, the dependent variable in 
the analyses is the return of a self-constructed equity-based portfolio, and hence an equity 
pricing model is an appropriate choice. Second, the risk factors in the Fama–French model 
have been extensively tested and proven robust in providing good explanatory power for 
average equity returns (Fama and French, 1993, 1996, 2012). Moreover, a momentum-
styled factor that controls for fund performance similar to Carhart (1997) is also included 
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in the model to better capture the effect caused by the potential trend towards a strategy 
that emphasises momentum. 
 
Thus, the variation in portfolio return that is associated with common risk factors, such as 
size, book-to-market value of firms, and momentum, are adequately controlled for. The 
Carhart four-factor model can be written as follows: 
 
Eq (4-1) 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕(𝑬𝑻𝑺) − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝒎,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕  
 
where Rp,t(ETS) denotes the logged weekly return of an equal-weighted Portfolio (ETS) in 
excess of the risk-free rate and Rmt represents the logged weekly return of the market 
benchmark proxied by the MSCI Europe Market Index. Rriskfree,t is weekly risk-free rate 
constructed geometrically from the stated rate of the three-month EURIBOR. SMBt is the 
return differential between the MSCI Europe Small Cap and the MSCI Europe Large Cap 
indices, HMLt is the return differential between the MSCI Europe Value and the MSCI 
Europe Growth indices. The MOMt is manually adjusted using the difference between the 
return of the MSCI Europe Momentum Index and Rmt multiplied by 2, as a pan-European 
control factor is more desirable in this case. According to the description of MSCI 
methodology (MSCI, 2014), the Momentum Index is designed to reflect the performance 
of the winning stocks. However, the Momentum factor in the Carhart model is expected to 
capture the difference in performance between winning and losing stocks. Thus the MOM 
factor used in this chapter is a hand-configured version, which is calculated by 2*(Return 
of Momentum Index minus Return of Market Index) to better simulate the effect of 
winners minus losers. 𝜺𝒕 is the error term that captures all unexplained randomness. 
 
Following estimation with the basic three-factor market model, an additional factor that 
controls for the variation of emissions allowances price, which is intended to measure the 
firm’s exposure to emissions trading, is added to the estimation model. This enables the 
investigation of the stock market–carbon market linkage while the portfolio performance 
can be measured more precisely with the variation in carbon allowances prices captured. 
This analysis is inspired particularly by Oberdorfer (2009) and Veith et al. (2009), who 
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add the emissions allowances price factor to a simple market model without controlling for 
Fama–French factors. They also investigate the relationship between the EUA price and 
stock returns only for a small sample of electricity firms regulated by EU ETS, whereas 
this chapter applies the model to a much larger sample across multiple sectors. The second 
model extends Eq (5-1) by including the emission allowance price, and can be written as:  
 
Eq (4-2) 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕(𝑬𝑻𝑺) − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝒎,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒕+𝜷𝟓𝑬𝑼𝑨𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕  
 
where EUAt is the logged emissions allowances price return and all other variables are 
defined as above. It is constructed using the EUA spot settlement price quoted from the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX), which offers the most data points starting from late 
March 2005, and is calculated as: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐴,𝑡
𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐴,𝑡−1
) 
 
The estimation equation so far allows only the examination of a contemporary relationship 
between the portfolio return of EU ETS-regulated firms and the allowances price, and it 
should also be taken into account that the reaction of the stock market to emissions 
allowances price changes might not be reflected instantly. Hence, a lagged EUA return 
factor is added to capture this relationship, which could indicate how much of the variation 
in the examined portfolio return is associated with lagged EUA price changes, a similar 
factor also controlled for in Mo et al.’s (2012) analysis of another small sample of 
electricity companies. The resulting equation Eq (5-3) can be written as: 
 
Eq (4-3) 
𝑹𝒑,𝒕(𝑬𝑻𝑺) − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑹𝒎,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆,𝒕) + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑴𝑶𝑴𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑬𝑼𝑨𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑬𝑼𝑨𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕  
 
where REUAt-1 is the emissions allowances price of the previous week and all remaining 
variables are defined as above. All three models are analysed for the first phase of the EU 
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ETS (2005–2007), the second phase of the EU ETS until the end of the available carbon 
emissions data (2008–2011), and for the period from the proposal of the EU ETS to its 
launch (2001–2004) (EC, 2003a). The full available EU ETS sample (2005–2010) is also 
studied. 
 
All financial data have been collected from Datastream. Given the length of the sample 
period, the observation of a weekly frequency is preferred in this chapter as it avoids the 
daily data noise while able to provide more than twice the statistical power (i.e., square-
root of the degrees of freedom) than the alternative monthly data would. All estimations 
are conducted using the OLS with a Newey–West estimator, which is intended to manage 
the potential autocorrelation in error terms (Newey and West, 1987). 
 
4.3.3 Data and sampling preparation 
The objective of the analyses in this chapter is to understand the effect of the EU’s ETS on 
stock prices by examining firm-level data, and thus the access to a reliable database is the 
key to achieving a robust research design that tackles the research questions. Liesen et al. 
(2013) provide evidence that voluntarily reported carbon data are not fully reliable, as 
about 85% of the 431 European listed corporations studied by them used footnotes to 
identify the issue that their self-reported carbon data described an insufficient scope of 
corporate-wide activities. Hence, a database of companies which are subject to mandatory 
carbon reporting is preferable. The only viable choice when this research project was 
planned and conducted, Carbon Market Data’s EU ETS Company Database, 45 was 
selected, as explained in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
After the Carbon Market Data’s EU ETS Company Database was chosen as the source of 
company-level data, the data preparation process began with identifying the listed firms to 
be included in the sample. The full database provided by Carbon Market Data contains 885 
firms, including listed and private firms. All firms were checked for their properties via 
                                            
45 Full description in Chapter 3 Data. CMD sources the official EUTL installation-basis emission data and aggregates them into 
company-level data.  
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various sources46 and listed firms were identified through this process. After checking the 
data availability through Datastream, 15347 European listed companies that fulfilled all 
requirements of the analysis in this chapter were selected to form the principal sample 
dataset. The primary requirements for a firm to qualify was the accessibility of data on 
share prices at least for parts of the period from 2005–2010 and domicile in Europe. The 
focus on European firms ensured that the analysis was done with more precise European 
benchmarks and was fully in line with previous literature (i.e., Oberndorfer, 2009; Knight, 
2011; Mo et al, 2012; Veith et al., 2009). In terms of sample size, this chapter represents a 
major improvement compared with the previous literature, as a sample of 153 firms is at 
least seven times bigger than the samples of each of the previous four papers studying the 
stock market effects of the EU ETS (Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012; Oberndorfer, 2009; 
Veith et al., 2009). 
 
Table 4.1 Allowances allocated and emissions of the 153 firms in Portfolio(ETS) 
Year 
(1) 
Allowance 
(EUA) 
(2) 
% of Total 
(3) 
Verified 
Emissions 
(3) 
% of Total 
(4) 
2005 1,047,120,205 43.79 1,045,368,626 44.60 
2006 1,029,341,624 43.60 1,052,184,657 44.50 
2007 1,055,823,697 43.45 1,089,344,233 44.38 
2008 932,366,567 43.52 1,064,557,107 44.56 
2009 935,170,264 43.45 932,798,841 44.35 
2010 939,481,395 43.36 945,348,694 44.35 
The table shows the proportion of allowances and emissions the sample firms account for. 
Allowances allocated is the ‘cap’ of regulated firms, verified emissions is the actual amount of 
emissions produced by regulated firms, % of total is the respective amount relative to the total 
amount of the entire Carbon Market Data Company Database 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the 153 listed European firms account for over 40% of the allocated 
allowances and verified emissions covered in the full Carbon Market Data’s ETS 
                                            
46 Companies Research by Financial Times (http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Companies-Research), Bloomberg market data 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/companies/), and Datastream are the sources to check whether the company is listed and for their 
main listing markets. 
47 As this chapter is primarily interested in the stock prices of ETS-exposed firms, only listed companies are included in the sample 
dataset.  
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Company Database from which data is sourced. In each year, the listed firms represent a 
slightly higher percentage of verified emissions than emissions allowances, indicating that 
they are a little more polluting than the average firm in the database. This is unsurprising 
as the ETS Directive (EC, 2003b)48 does indicate that the emissions restriction is imposed 
on the installations with thermal inputs or capacities exceeding the specified threshold. 
That is to say, the EU ETS essentially targets the bigger installations that tend to produce 
higher emissions, which are in general owned by bigger firms. It can be reasonably 
inferred that the listed firms are on average bigger, and thus more emission intensive, than 
the non-listed firms, with the differential between being small though consistent. 
 
While the first analysis in this chapter examines the impact of the EU ETS on the stock 
market performance of exposed firms based on the equal-weighted portfolios of all sample 
firms, the second analysis attempts to further explore whether the stock market is able to 
identify the firms which are supposedly facing additional ETS-related costs and price 
accordingly. This is conducted by forming annually updated equal-weighted portfolios of 
two sub-groups of the ETS-exposed firms based on their emissions compliance status, a 
criterion that is most directly related to the ETS regulation and clearly differentiates the 
firms. The rationale behind this criterion is the firms that produce emissions exceeding 
their assigned cap will need to acquire additional allowances to comply with the ETS 
regulation, from which additional costs incur. On the other hand, the firms with a surplus 
of allowances will be facing no cost or have the opportunity to profit from the allowances, 
and thus it is expected these firms will not experience any negative impact. 
 
The first sub-group includes those regulated firms that have more verified emissions than 
their emissions allowances in any given year, which indicates that their emissions status is 
over their cap, and thus this sub-group portfolio is labelled Portfolio(Emissions Over-
Cap). Similarly, the second sub-group comprises the firms that have fewer verified 
emissions than their emissions allowances in any given year, and hence have the status of 
emissions under the cap. This second sub-group portfolio is labelled Portfolio(Emissions 
Under-Cap). This allows the investigation of the third question: is the stock market impact 
of being EU ETS regulated dependent on the emissions status (i.e. verified emissions over-
                                            
48 The Annex I of the Directive. The details are documented in Appendix (2-B) in Chapter 2.  
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cap vs. under-cap) of the regulated firms? The components in each portfolio are updated 
annually to reflect the new data on verified emissions.  
 
The total number of firms in each portfolio is presented in Table 5.2. It can be noted that 
the percentage of all regulated firms classified as over-cap increases gradually from 23.2% 
in 2005 to 30.4% in 2008 but experiences a sharp drop which coincides with the economic 
crisis in 2008-2009 to only 18.4% although it bounces slightly to 22.3% in 2010. 
 
Table 4.2 The number of firms in portfolios with emission over (under) cap 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emission-over-cap 35 38 43 45 27 33 
Emission-under-cap 116 113 107 103 121 115 
Percentage of over-
cap firms in sample 
23.2% 25.2% 28.5% 30.4% 18.4% 22.3% 
Emission status is determined by the reported verified emissions of each firm relative to its cap, 
which is made available annually, thus the portfolio constituents are updated annually accordingly. 
The number of firms for each portfolio during different sample period varies slightly due to 
accessibility of emission data. Some companies, such as Eastern Sugar, Greencore, Linde, and 
Valeo appear to drop out from the EU ETS Phase 2. 
 
 
4.4 Results and discussion 
This section presents the estimation results for each of the two major analyses. The first 
analysis examines the impact of the EU ETS on the stock market returns of regulated 
firms, while the second analysis investigates the stock market impact on two groups of EU 
ETS regulated firms with a different net position of allowances, i.e., over-emitting and 
under-emitting firms. These two analyses are expected to reveal two aspects of interest. 
First, the stock market impact of the EU ETS on regulated firms estimated by their 
portfolio performance is discussed. More specifically, the result shows whether there exists 
an abnormal return of the portfolio that could not be captured by the common risk factors. 
The second aspect concerns the degree to which the European carbon market and the stock 
market interact with each other and is revealed by the EUA factor-added models. 
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4.4.1 Effects of EU ETS on the stock market performance of regulated firms 
Table 4.3 summarises the main results of interest from the first analysis of this chapter. 
The extended regression results are detailed in Tables 4.4–4.6. The main results include the 
alpha coefficient of the portfolio of EU ETS regulated firms, which can be defined as the 
portfolio’s abnormal performance vis-à-vis the benchmark and the standard control factors 
(e.g., SMB and HML). They also comprise of the coefficients on the concurrent and lagged 
EUA variables, which indicate the relationship between current and lagged emissions 
allowances prices and the stock price performance of the EU ETS regulated firms. The 
alpha coefficient is available for all sample periods while the EUA coefficients are 
unavailable for the pre-EU ETS phase. 
 
Table 4.3 Summary of Portfolio(ETS)’s alpha and coefficients of EUA price factor 
Portfolio(ETS) 
 
2001–
2004 
 
2001–
2011 
 
2005–
2011 
 
2005–
2007 
 
2008–
2011 
 
Portfolio performance 
(annualised alpha) 
-30.7%*** -7.9%*** -0.77% 3.67% -4.43% 
EUA   -0.001 0.003 -0.001*** 
EUA(-1)   0 -0.002 0.001** 
Portfolio performance is estimated by the constant in the Eq (4-1) and annualised into the per 
annum rate. The per annum rate is the aggregate alpha from weekly estimations (𝛼 ∗ 52). The link 
to EUA is estimated by the coefficients of EUA and EUA(-1) in Eq (4-2) and Eq (4-3). ***, ** and * 
represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The first stimulating result displayed in Table 4.3 shows that the firms eventually regulated 
by the EU ETS experience a statistically and economically significant underperformance 
during the pre-EU ETS period. This signals that the stock market appears to account for 
the expected costs of internalising carbon emissions of firms through the EU ETS and 
down-values their stocks before the EU ETS started. This is in line with the results found 
by Hughes (2000) and Kahn and Knittle (2003) for the US SO2 market and Chapple et al. 
(2013) for the announcements of a proposed Australian ETS. Barth and McNichols (1994) 
also find a similar forward-looking behaviour of stock markets in the context of accounting 
for potential environmental liabilities of firms. This result thus implies that the EU ETS 
acted as a meaningful signal towards the internalisation of carbon emissions in stock 
markets during the pre-EU ETS estimation period. 
Chapter 4 The stock price performance of EU’s emission trading-exposed firms 
107 
 
However, the EU ETS regulated firms do, as an aggregated subject, not perform 
statistically differently from the benchmark during the entire EU ETS period studied in this 
chapter or the separate first and second phase sample period. This indicates that no further 
performance penalty could be found as the result of being regulated by the EU ETS after 
the initial underperformance during the pre-EU ETS period. This result of no impact of the 
EU ETS on the stock market performance of the average regulated firm appears in line 
with the small sample studies of Oberndorfer (2009) and Veith et al. (2009), but does not 
fit Mo et al.’s (2012) finding of underperformance in a sample of 12 firms. However, none 
of these three papers studies the pre-EU ETS period and hence none displays the more 
detailed finding that this chapter does, which indicates that the expectation of being subject 
to ETS regulation leads to a substantial underperformance of participating firms while the 
operations of the EU ETS after its launch does not lead to any further underperformance. 
 
Tables 4.3–4.6 also present another interesting result with respect to the coefficients that 
indicate the relation between the (lagged) emissions allowances price and the stock market 
performance of Portfolio(ETS). As seen in the previous literature, a positive coefficient 
between the contemporaneous carbon emissions price and the portfolio stocks return is 
identified, although the coefficient is not of statistical significance in contrast to most of 
the previous small sample studies (Oberndorfer, 2009; Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012; 
Veith et al., 2009). Like Mo et al. (2012), this chapter finds that this contemporaneous 
relationship turns around entirely in Phase 2 when the allowances price changes are 
accompanied by a reaction in the opposite direction in the stock market performance of 
regulated firms. However, the analysis in this chapter adds an additional level of 
complexity to the interpretation of the relationship between emissions allowance prices and 
the stock market performance of the regulated firms, as it is also revealed that the lagged 
emissions allowance price coefficient is highly significant at a commonly accepted 
statistical level during Phase 2 (2008-2011) only, with the opposite sign of the 
contemporaneous relationship coefficient in Phase 1 and Phase 2 sample periods.   
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Table 4.4 Estimation Results Portfolio(ETS) for total trading period (2005–2011) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(ETS) 
Model specs Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample 
period 
12/1/2001 
31/12/2004 
12/1/2001 
6/1/2012 
7/1/2005 
6/1/2012 
18/3/2005 
6/1/2012 
25/3/2005 
6/1/2012 
Alpha -0.006  
(-7.15)*** 
-0.002  
(-2.66)*** 
-0.0003  
(-0.58) 
-0.0005  
(-0.79) 
-0.000  
(-0.74) 
RM 0.817 
(54.81)*** 
0.928 
(58.76)*** 
0.974 
(64.82)*** 
0.974 
(65.05)*** 
0.974 
(64.78)*** 
SMB 0.379 
(14.06)*** 
0.453 
(16.67)*** 
0.448 
(11.94)*** 
0.448 
(11.93)*** 
0.448 
(11.88)*** 
HML 0.204 
(4.08)*** 
0.241 
(6.92)*** 
0.115  
(2.05)* 
0.100  
(1.79)* 
0.103  
(1.84)* 
MOM 0.196  
(5.7)*** 
0.237 
(8.75)*** 
0.162  
(3.9)*** 
0.149 
(3.60)*** 
0.152 
(3.66)*** 
EUA    -0.001  
(-0.67) 
-0.000  
(-0.64) 
EUA(-1)    
 
-4E-05  
(-0.08) 
Observations 208 574 366 356 355 
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 
P-value  
(F-statistic) 
0 0 0 0 0 
This table reports the full regression results of estimating Portfolio(ETS)’s performance with the 
Fama–French model under OLS with a Newey–West estimator for four sample periods. RS is the 
risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of the risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML control for the investors inclined towards size and book-to-market value of firms; EUA is the 
logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowances return of the 
previous observation. Columns (1) to (3) report the result from the four-factor model Eq (45-1); 
column (4) reports the results from the estimation model Eq (45-2) with an added allowances price 
factor; column (5) presents the results from estimation model Eq (45-3) with two added factors 
testing the allowances price-related risk. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.5 Estimation Results Portfolio(ETS) Phase 1 (2005–2007) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(ETS) 
Model specs Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample 
period 
31/12/2004 28/12/2007 18/03/2005 28/12/2007 25/03/2005 28/12/2007 
Alpha -0.000 (-0.39) -0.001 (-0.92) -0.001 (-0.81) 
RM 0.949 (37.0)
*** 0.939 (36.1)*** 0.942 (37.4)*** 
SMB 0.354 (9.36)*** 0.356 (9.51)*** 0.361 (9.35)*** 
HML 0.047 (0.53) -0.002 (-0.03) 0.010 (0.13) 
MOM 0.347 (5.85)*** 0.316 (5.24)*** 0.317 (5.02)*** 
EUA  0.002 (1.11) 0.003 (1.38) 
EUA(-1)   -0.002 (-1.24) 
Observations 157 146 145 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 
P-value  
(F-statistics) 
0 0 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating Portfolio(ETS)’s performance with the 
Fama–French model under OLS with a Newey–West estimator for 2005–2007, the pilot phase of 
EU ETS. RM is the risk premium measured by the sector index logged return in excess of the risk-
free rate; SMB and HML control for the investors inclined towards size and book-to-market value 
of firms; EUA is the logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the 
allowances returns of the previous observation. Column (1) reports the result from the four-factor 
model Eq (45-1); column (2) reports the result from the estimation model Eq (45-2) with an added 
allowances price factor; and column (3) presents the results from estimation model Eq (45-3) with 
two added factors testing the allowances price-related risk. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 4.6 Estimation Results Portfolio(ETS) Phase 2 (2008–2011) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(ETS) 
Model specs Eq (4-1) 
(1) 
Eq (4-2) 
(2) 
Eq (4-3) 
(3) 
Sample 
period 
04/01/2008 30/12/2011 04/01/2008 30/12/2011 04/01/2008 30/12/2011 
Constant -0.001 (-1.58) -0.001 (-1.50) -0.001 (-1.52) 
RM 0.982 (59.9)*** 0.982 (59.8)*** 0.983 (59.8)*** 
SMB 0.462 (10.3)*** 0.465 (10.3)*** 0.466 (10.3)*** 
HML 0.090 (1.50) 0.090 (1.49) 0.088 (1.45) 
MOM 0.113 (2.50)** 0.111 (2.44)** 0.110 (2.41)** 
EUA  -0.001 (-2.34)** -0.001 (-2.37)** 
EUA(-1)   0.001 (2.12)** 
Observations 209 209 209 
Adjusted R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 
P-value 
(F-statistics) 
0 0 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating Portfolio(ETS)’s performance with Carhart 
four factor-based models under OLS with Newey-West estimator for 2008-2010, the first years of 
EU ETS phase 2. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-
free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value 
of firms; EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance 
return of the previous observation. Column 1 reports the result from 4-factor model Eq(45-1); 
column 2 report the result from the estimation model Eq(45-2) with added allowance price factor; 
and column3 presents the results from estimation model Eq(45-3) with two added factors testing 
the allowance price related risk. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
respectively.
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The significantly negative coefficients for lagged EUA prices indicate that the rising 
(falling) allowance prices are related to falling (rising) share prices of ETS-exposed firms, 
which can reasonably be explained by the gradual maturity of the European carbon market, 
a perspective shared by Mo et al. (2012). In other words, investors have slowly 
incorporated the allowance prices into the stock valuation process for ETS-exposed firms 
with the progress of the trading scheme as information becomes clearer and more 
available, which reduces the uncertainties surrounding the actual demand-supply of the 
emission allowances. The results also imply that the relationship is more complex than 
currently acknowledged and a separation of specific firm characteristics within the EU 
ETS regulated firms might be needed, which is also done in this chapter by investigating 
those firms that emit over their designated cap and those that under-emit. 
 
4.4.2 EU ETS effect on share prices for firms with different emissions status 
After examining the estimation results of the performance the Portfolio(ETS), which 
represents the ETS-exposed firms collectively, the analysis is taken a step further to 
investigate whether EU ETS has different impacts on share prices of firms with different 
net allowances positions at the end of each compliance cycle. The estimated alpha 
coefficients and coefficients of allowances price controls of both over-cap and under-cap 
portfolios are summarised in Table 4.7, and the full results are presented in Tables 4.8– 
4.10. 
 
The first finding to be noticed is the stark difference in the stock market performance of 
the two portfolios. Through all three estimation periods, the over-cap portfolio, which 
consists of firms with an allowances deficit, sees a constant significant underperformance 
against the market benchmark while the under-cap portfolio, which consists of firms with a 
surplus of allowances at the end of each compliance cycle sees a positive estimated alpha, 
though the latter is not at any commonly accepted significance level. The 
underperformance of the over-emitting firms over the longer estimation period (2005–
2010) that covers both Phase 1 and Phase 2 is merely at the 10% level, but it appears in 
Phase 1, and over-emitting firms are adversely hit on their share prices even after 
controlling for the allowances price.  
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Table 4.7 Summary of the estimation results for emissions status-based portfolios 
(a) Portfolio(over-cap) 2005–2010 2005–2007 2008–2010 
Portfolio performance (alpha) -12.34%* p.a. -20.22%*** p.a. -13.44%** p.a. 
EUA -0.001 0.005* -0.001** 
EUA(-1) 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
(b) Portfolio(under-cap) 2005–2010 2005–2007 2008–2010 
Portfolio performance (alpha) 3.96% p.a. 1.64% p.a. 0.79% p.a. 
EUA -0.001 0.003 -0.001* 
EUA(-1) 0.000 -0.005*** 0.001*** 
(c) Paired Different T-test (on 
alpha) 
0.122*** (6.224) 
(d) Portfolio(L-S) 16.31%*** 21.91%
** 13.88%** 
This table summarises the estimations results from testing the emissions status-based portfolios. (a) 
and (b) present the performance of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap), respectively. The 
performance is estimated by the constant in Eq (45-1) and converted into a per annum rate. The per 
annum rate is calculated by the formula: constant*52. The estimated coefficients of EUA and 
EUA(-1) from Eq (45-2) and Eq (45-3) indicate the relationship between the variation of portfolio 
performance and EUA prices. (c) shows the mean difference (t-stat) from a paired difference t-test 
on the performance of the over-cap and under-cap portfolios, which intends to test whether the 
difference in the performances of the two portfolios is at any statistically significant level. (d) 
shows the estimated alpha of Portfolio(L-S), which is a arbitraging-mimicking portfolio with a long 
position in Portfolio(under-cap) and a short position in Portfolio(over-cap). This is intended as a 
second test on the difference in the performance of Portfolio(under-cap) and Portfolio(over-cap). 
***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 
This is interesting, for two reasons. First, the cap was commonly regarded as being too 
generous for Phase 1 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; 
Anderson and Di Maria, 2011), and thus it is reasonable to assume that the excessive 
emissions are due to rather high production outputs, which should be a signal of a sound 
business operation. Second, the coefficients of the EUA price factors, both contemporary 
and lagged, are positive but insignificant at a statistically meaningful level. Despite being 
somehow counterintuitive in the context of over-cap portfolio, the positive link is 
consistent with Oberndorfer (2009), Veith et al. (2009), and Mo et al. (2012), given that 
their selection of sample firms contains exclusively electricity firms, which are 
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predominantly short in allowances. It appears that the cost impacts of ETS regulation are 
not influencing investors’ valuations of the exposed firms with allowancs shortage in 
general, as the EUA price appreciation is accompanied by an equity price appreciation. 
The explanation for this counterintuitive result provided by Veith et al. (2009) is that the 
extremely cheap allowances, particularly in the second half of Phase 1 provides the firms 
with fairly inexpensive compliance costs. In Phase 2, the over-cap portfolio still 
experiences a statistically significance underperformance of 13% per year relative to the 
market benchmark, which is slightly less severe than in Phase 1. 
 
The findings are generally conceptually similar to those of Chapple et al. (2013), who 
shows that firms with higher levels of carbon intensity among their sample experience a 
significant reduction in their shareholder value. The results of performance estimation in 
this section also imply that the overall shareholder value impact of EU ETS regulation on 
exposed firms does depend considerably on their emissions state (i.e., allowances surplus 
vs. allowances deficit), and the impacts are substantially more adversely severe for the 
over-cap firms. 
 
No abnormal returns in relation to the market benchmark are identified for any under-cap 
portfolios in all three estimation periods. Although there is a clear directional indication 
that the allowance deficit and allowances surplus might affect performance as indicated by 
the signs of the coefficients, some further tests are done to verify the magnitude of this 
effect to be statistically significant. Two additional tests make it more assuring that the 
differences between the performance of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) are 
of statistical significance. The first test, as presented in Table 5.7 part (c), indicates that the 
performance of the under-cap portfolio is on average 12.2% higher than the over-cap 
portfolio, and the difference is of a 1% significance level. This outcome supports the initial 
proposition that it is likely that the ETS-exposed firms are priced differently due to their 
emissions compliance status. The second test further explores the pricing differentiation 
through constructing a portfolio that reflects the arbitraging strategy of holding a long 
position of under-cap firms and a short position of over-cap firms. This approach is applied 
in the empirical socially responsible investment literature, such as Kempf and Osthoff 
(2007). The significantly positive estimated alpha indicates this long–short portfolio has an 
outperformance, which is also in line with the expectation that the portfolios formed based 
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on different allowances holding positions would perform differently. Results from these 
two tests jointly verify that the stock market seems able to differentiate the over-emitting 
ones from the under-emitting ones among the ETS-exposed firms when the firms are 
examined collectively. 
 
The performance of the under-cap portfolio tested here does not seem entirely consistent 
with the value relevance of allowance theory of Johnston et al. (2008). Further estimations 
of the EUA price-related factors also indicate that the value relevance of the emissions 
allowances hardly holds in the EU ETS context. If the proposed value relevance theory 
holds, a negative coefficient of EUA factor would be a reasonable outcome for firms short 
in allowances, while a positive coefficient is a reasonably expected outcome for firms with 
an allowances surplus, if any statistical significance level is found. A negative coefficient 
indicates that the valuation process of equity and that of carbon allowance move in the 
opposite directions, and thus a rise in allowances price is accompanied by a fall in equity 
price, which is identified only in the estimation for the over-cap portfolio in Phase 2. 
 
While the study by Johnston et al. (2008) provides a very rare empirical analysis on the 
subject of emission rights and their value relevance, its design relies largely on accounting 
measures, with the dependent variable being the scaled market value of the firm. It also 
seems only to takes into account firms with an allowance surplus, as the number of 
allowances held by each firm (scaled by their sale) is used as one of the explanatory 
variables. This chapter approaches the research question regarding the potential value 
relevance of emission allowances by utilising the price series that are generated directly 
from the markets and extensively tested equity pricing models, which allows a clear 
interpretation of the results. 
 
When looking at the results for the EUA coefficients of the under-emitting portfolios, two 
aspects appear of interest. First, the sign of the coefficients of the EUA price-related 
factors has completely reversed from Phase 1 to Phase 2, which is also seen for the over-
cap portfolio. The EUA price factor that indicates the contemporary relationship changes 
from positive to negative, and the coefficient indicating the association of the one-period-
lagged EUA price factor with the portfolio return changes from negative to positive. The 
opposite moving direction of the EUA price factor and the under-emitting firms in Phase 1 
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is not fully in line with the initial expectation, as an appreciation of the allowances is 
expected to be also accompanied by an appreciation in the share prices for firms with an 
allowances surplus. However, this could likely be attributed to the low value of the 
allowances, especially through the last two years of Phase 1 due to the over-allocation of 
allowances and their disrupted inter-phase compatibility.  
 
The change for the lagged EUA price factor appears sensible and of at least 10% 
significance level in Phase 1 and 1% level in Phase 2. This positive coefficient in the 
second phase agrees with the value relevance of the allowances as high emission prices 
should benefit firms with allowances surpluses, and given that the cap is considerably 
tightened in Phase 2. Second, the strongly significant EUA coefficients for the under-
emitting portfolio are not the contemporaneous coefficients but the lagged ones. This not 
only justifies the inclusion of a lagged EUA variable as also done by Mo et al. (2012) but 
also implies that markets might be reacting quicker to emissions allowance price changes 
when assessing firms with allowances deficits than those with allowances surpluses. 
 
In brief summary, the second part of the analysis in this chapter reveals how ETS-exposed 
firms with different emission compliance statuses are priced. The over-cap portfolio is 
constantly valued down by the stock market through the EU ETS trading period. The long–
short strategy shows that at a statistically acceptable level, the under-cap portfolio is 
regarded as outperforming the over-cap portfolio. The estimated coefficients of EUA 
price-related factors indicate that the relationship between the allowances prices and firms’ 
stock prices appears to be differentiated by time, as the signs of the coefficient change 
entirely from Phase 1 to Phase 2, which also shows consistency with Mo et al. (2012), who 
also find that the level of sensitivity of corporations’ value development differs from Phase 
1 to Phase 2. An explanation provided by Mo et al. (2012) for this change is the adjustment 
of the allocation policy and the fact that the cap became more stringent in Phase 2, which 
also appears to apply in the context of this chapter. Nevertheless, the ETS-exposed firms 
do not seem significantly sensitive to the variation in the allowance prices. The results are 
not entirely surprising, as the uncertainties surrounding the scheme and over-supplied 
allowances may have suppressed the significance of the value relevance of emissions 
allowances within EU ETS.
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Table 4.8 Estimation results of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) for full sample period (2005–2010)  
Dependent 
Variable Rp(over-cap) Rp(under-cap) 
Model 
specifications 
Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 18/03/2005 25/03/2005 07/01/2005 18/03/2005 25/03/2005 
24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 
Constant 
-0.002 (-1.77)* -0.002 (-1.93)* -0.002 (-1.93)* 0.001 (1.48) 0.001 (1.23) 0.001 (1.30) 
RM 0.917 (28.3)*** 0.916 (28.0)*** 0.916 (27.9)*** 1.003 (70.9)*** 1.003 (71.5)*** 1.003 (71.3)*** 
SMB 
0.221 (4.44)*** 0.220 (4.37)*** 0.220 (4.36)*** 0.538 (11.8)*** 0.537 (11.9)*** 0.537 (11.8)*** 
HML 0.054 (0.63) 0.048 (0.54) 0.048 (0.54) 0.114 (1.75) 0.100 (1.52) 0.104 (1.57) 
MOM 
0.358 (3.41)*** 0.355 (3.28)*** 0.355 (3.27)*** 0.153 (2.90)*** 0.140 (2.63)*** 0.144 (2.69)*** 
EUA  -0.000 (-0.40) -0.000 (-0.40)  -0.000 (-0.39) -0.000 (-0.36) 
EUA(-1)   0.000 (0.09)   -0.000 (-0.17) 
Observation 312 302 301 312 302 301 
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.97 
P-value (F-
statistics) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating the performance of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) with Carhart four-factor models 
using OLS and a Newey–West estimator for 2005–2010. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of the risk-free rate; 
SMB and HML control for the investors inclined towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum factor. EUA is the 
logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(–1) represents the allowances return of the previous observation. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.9 Estimation results of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) for Phase 1 (2005–2007)  
Dependent 
variable Rp(over-cap) Rp(under-cap) 
Model 
specifications Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 18/03/2005 25/03/2005 07/01/2005 18/03/2005 25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 28/12/2007 28/12/2007 28/12/2007 28/12/2007 28/12/2007 
Constant 
-0.003 (-1.88)
 *
 -0.004 (-2.72)
 ***
 -0.004 (-2.67)
 ***
 0.001 (0.58) 0.000 (0.09) 0.0003 (0.23) 
RM 
0.881 (25.7)
***
 0.861 (26.7)
 ***
 0.859 (25.1)
 ***
 0.981 (31.5)
 ***
 0.970 (30.5)
 ***
 0.975 (31.7)
 ***
 
SMB 
0.246 (3.59)
 ***
 0.243 (3.53)
 ***
 0.239 (3.38)
 ***
 0.405 (10.9)
 ***
 0.405 (11.0)
 ***
 0.416 (10.9)
 ***
 
HML 
0.101 (0.78) 0.108 (0.78) 0.112 (0.80) 0.024 (0.24) -0.018 (-0.18) -0.008 (-0.08) 
MOM 
0.459 (5.02)
 ***
 0.479 (4.68)
 ***
 0.488 (4.66)
 ***
 0.328 (4.85)
 ***
 0.301 (4.35)
 ***
 0.292 (3.94)
 ***
 
EUA  0.005 (1.79)
 *
 0.004 (1.58)  0.002 (0.89) 0.003 (1.22) 
EUA(-1) 
  0.001 (0.41)   -0.004 (-1.84)
 *
 
Observation 
156 146 145 156 146 145 
Adjusted R2 
0.87 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.93 
P-value  
(F-statistics) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating the performance of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) with Carhart 4-factor models 
using OLS and Newey-West estimator for 2005-2007. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum factor. EUA is logged weekly 
return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance return of the previous observation. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. 
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Table 4.10 Estimation results of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) EU ETS Phase 2 (2008–2010) 
Dependent 
variable Rp(over-cap) Rp(under-cap) 
Model 
specifications Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) Eq (4-1) Eq (4-2) Eq (4-3) 
Sample period 04/01/2008 04/01/2008 04/01/2008 04/01/2008 04/01/2008 04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 24/12/2010 
Constant 
-0.003 (-2.04)
 **
 -0.003 (-1.98)
 **
 -0.003 (-1.98)
 *
 0.000 (0.12) 0.000 (0.18) 0.000 (0.13) 
RM 
0.930 (25.24)
 ***
 0.931 (25.2)
 ***
 0.931 (25.1)
 ***
 1.013 (66.6)
 ***
 1.014 (66.7)
 ***
 1.014 (66.5)
 ***
 
SMB 
0.201 (3.07)
 ***
 0.204 (3.07)
 ***
 0.204 (3.06)
 ***
 0.578 (11.5)
 ***
 0.580 (11.5)
 ***
 0.582 (11.6)
 ***
 
HML 
-0.004 (-0.04) -0.005 (-0.04) -0.006 (-0.05) 0.091 (1.25) 0.090 (1.24) 0.086 (1.18) 
MOM 
0.150 (2.12)
 **
 0.298 (2.10)
 **
 0.297 (2.09)
 **
 0.097 (1.74)
 *
 0.095 (1.70)
 *
 0.093 (1.66) 
EUA  -0.001 (-1.66)
 ***
 -0.001 (-1.66)
 *
  -0.001 (-1.62) -0.001 (-1.65) 
EUA(-1)   0.000 (0.38)   0.001 (3.62)
 ***
 
Observation 
157 157 157 157 157 157 
Adjusted R2 
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.98 
P-value (F-
statistics) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating the performance of Portfolio(over-cap) and Portfolio(under-cap) with Carhart 4-factor models 
using OLS and Newey-West estimator for 2008-2010. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum factor. EUA is logged weekly 
return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance return of the previous observation. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels respectively. 
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Table 4.11 Estimation results of Portfolio(Long-Short) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Lunder-cap-Sover-cap) 
Model specs Eq (4-3) 
(1) 
Eq (4-3) 
(2) 
Eq (4-3) 
(3) 
Sample 
period 
3/25/2005  
12/24/2010 
3/25/2005  
12/28/2007 
12/28/2007 12/24/2010 
Constant 0.003 (2.84)*** 0.004 (2.49)** 0.003 (2.23)** 
RM 0.087 (2.79)*** 0.117 (2.68)*** 0.084 (2.16)** 
SMB 0.317 (7.71)*** 0.177 (2.50)** 0.378 (7.26)*** 
HML 0.056 (0.53) -0.120 (-0.72) 0.092 (0.64) 
MOM -0.106 (-1.72)* -0.098 (-1.54) -0.102 (-1.29) 
EUA 6E-05 (0.10) -0.002 (-0.50) 0.000 (0.35) 
EUA(-1) -0.000 (-0.19) -0.005 (-1.27) 0.001 (1.88)* 
Observation 301 145 157 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.07 0.25 
P-value  
(F-statistic) 
0 0.01 0 
This table reports the regression results of estimating the arbitraging Portfolio(L-S)’s performance 
with Carhart four-factor -based model Eq (45-3) under OLS with Newey–West estimator. RM is the 
risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; EUA is logged 
weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance return of the previous 
observation. Column (1) reports the result of the full sample period 2005–2010; column (2) reports 
the results from the first sub-sample period 2005–2007, the first phase of EU ETS; and column (3) 
presents the results from the second sub-sample period 2008–2010, the second phase of EU ETS. 
***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically examined the effect the planning and implementation of the EU 
ETS may have on stock market performance of exposed firms. In the past, the amount of 
CO2 and other GHG emissions produced by most installations was not subject to any 
mandatory restriction, and the costs associated with these emissions were externalised on 
society. Since 2005, a mandatory emissions cap has been imposed on the firms who own 
the installations subject to the EU’s Emissions Trading Directive, which means that the 
right to emit more than their designated cap needs to be purchased at extra cost. In other 
words, the firms are forced to internalise these emissions-associated costs. Hence, it is 
expected that the EU ETS would have a negative effect on the stock market performance 
of regulated firms, as it makes the firms pay, directly or indirectly, for their emissions 
(Baumert et al., 2003; Burtraw et al., 2001; Chapple et al., 2013). 
 
Previous empirical studies of the effect of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of 
regulated firms have only utilised small samples comprising a limited number of listed 
firms participating in the scheme (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; Knight, 2011; Mo 
et al., 2012). The findings from the previous literature also appear inconclusive, as some 
identify the negative impacts from the ETS on firms’ equity prices (Mo et al., 2012; Diltz, 
2002) while others find that the ETS regulation-induced performance disadvantages are 
inconsequential (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009). The analyses in this chapter 
advance previous studies by utilising a more comprehensive dataset of 153 European listed 
firms covering more than a single sector.  
 
The analysis is designed to specifically examine the effect of the planning and 
implementation of the EU ETS on stock market performance of exposed firms and whether 
the impact on share prices is differentiated by a criterion directly associated with the EU 
ETS. The first part of the analysis examines the share price performance of the ETS-
exposed firms by constructing an ETS portfolio and estimating its performance with the 
extended Carhart model. This is followed by examining whether the participating firms’ 
emissions status (i.e., whether a firm emits CO2 higher or lower than its allocated 
allowances) is a factor distinguishing the share price performance of these firms. This 
analysis is an original attempt to utilise the verified emissions data reported to the EU ETS 
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EUTL as a screening process and explicitly testing the extent to which it is associated with 
pricing the EU ETS-exposed firms. 
 
The estimation results of the first part of the chapter show that the ETS-exposed firms see 
a significant underperformance at 1% significance level in the sample period 2001–2004 
during which the EU ETS was proposed and going through the negotiation and legislative 
process before its launch in 2005 (Ellerman et al., 2010; EC, 2003a). This original finding 
is the first piece of empirical evidence concerning the ex-ante performance impact caused 
by reduced investor expectations in the EU ETS context. Once the EU ETS officially 
started in 2005, regulated firms did not experience any subsequent negative effects on their 
stock market performance. This chapter therefore concludes that no significant negative 
contemporaneous impact of the EU ETS on stock market performance can be identified, 
but a significantly negative ex ante impact of the EU ETS on the stock market performance 
of emissions intensive firms seems clear. This finding casts doubt on whether firms and 
eventually their shareholders are internalising sufficient costs to contribute in a meaningful 
way to the proposed climate change mitigation. It appears that the irony of the forward-
looking nature of the financial market is while firms might have internalised sufficient cost 
during the period before the EU ETS (2001–2004), they have not done so during the EU 
ETS operational period based on the estimated outcomes of this chapter. Since meaningful 
climate change mitigation requires consistent effort, it seems fair to argue that firms are 
currently not internalising sufficient costs associated with their emissions (EC, 2009a; 
Stern, 2006, 2008). 
 
The results of the second part of the chapter tell a distinctly different story concerning 
stock market performance with regard to the firm’s emissions status. The over-cap 
portfolio underperforms significantly in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 but the under-emitting 
firms do not seem to be rewarded in terms of significant outperformance. These results 
highlight that the corporate management of carbon emissions could have material and 
adverse impacts on a firm’s stock market performance, which generally indicates that a 
business case for corporate environmental responsibility should be of concern for the ETS-
regulated firms as better emissions performance leads to improved stock price 
performance.  
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As the analysis conducted in this chapter is intended to be straightforward and thus relies 
on the fundamental asset pricing framework, it is inevitably susceptible to certain 
limitations. The future research opportunities include further refining the design of the 
framework that captures other potential risk factors associated with the pricing process in 
order to more specifically pinpoint whether the impacts can be largely attributed to ETS. 
Future research could also investigate whether the relationships studied in this chapter are 
homogeneous across sectors, which is made feasible with the multi-sector dataset utilised 
in this thesis, and conducted in next chapter.
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5 The differentiation of EU’s emission trading effect on share prices: a sector-level 
analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, ETS-regulated firms were examined as one aggregate subject and the impacts 
of the emergence and existence of the EU ETS on share price performance were explored. 
Having ETS-regulated firms as one subject is then adjusted to further examine whether the 
impact on share prices is dependent on the firms’ emissions status. However, the fact that 
firms with distinct business models and activities operate in different sectors and hence are 
likely to experience different levels of impacts from the EU ETS has not been widely 
explored so far. The sectoral carbon emissions statistics given in Chapter 3 show that some 
sectors produced more emissions than their allocated allowances while others had more 
allowances than they emitted. Having emissions rights should represent a potential 
economic value following Johnston et al. (2008), and consequently lacking them should 
represent potential costs. 
 
The sector differentiation aspect in the European context is further elaborated by Hourcade 
et al. (2007), who suggest that the carbon emissions-related characteristics of a sector, 
which essentially determine the sector’s exposure to the EU ETS, depend on their (i) 
energy intensity, (ii) ability to pass costs through to consumers and (iii) carbon abatement 
opportunities. While they do not analyse each industry separately on these characteristics, 
they make simple predictions that the health care and consumer discretionary sectors are 
less energy intensive than the energy, utilities, and materials sectors and hence should be 
less affected by the EU ETS. Among the three more affected sectors, they consider that the 
utilities sector is in a better position due to its improved opportunity to pass the costs 
associated with the emissions restriction through to the consumers given its relatively low 
international competition compared with the materials sector. Lund (2007) further argues 
that the EU ETS’ cost impact on the materials sector would be 3–4 times higher than its 
impact on the energy sector and hence the materials-related industries should be heavily 
affected by the EU ETS. However, neither of these two papers investigated the relationship 
between the carbon characteristics of these participating sectors and stock market returns. 
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After studying the effects of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of the entire 
universe of regulated firms in Chapter 5, and finding a significant difference in the carbon 
emissions characteristics of sectors in Chapter 4, it appears sensible to extend the 
investigation by further exploring the effects of the EU ETS on stock market performance 
at the sectoral level. Hence, this chapter takes a substantial step further than Chapter 5 by 
empirically examining whether the EU ETS imposes different effects on the stock market 
performance of firms in different regulated sectors. 
 
The previous literature has often studied solely the utilities sector, with sample sizes of 12–
22 firms and focused more on the effects of emissions prices on the stock prices of 
participating firms than on the potentially differentiated effects of the EU ETS on different 
sectors (Oberndorfer, 2009; Knight, 2011; Mo et al. 2012; Veith et al, 2009). Kahn and 
Knittle (2003) studied the utilities and coal mining sectors in the context of the major 
impact on firms that results from the decision to launch the US SO2 market. They found 
that the coal mining sector experienced significantly negative stock returns while the 
utilities sector was not affected, explained by the better ability of the utilities sector to pass 
the additional costs through to the consumer. 
 
The only empirical analysis of EU ETS-related effects on the stock market returns of 
different industries has been published by Bushnell et al. (2013). They focus on one 
specific event, the carbon price crash on 25 April 2006, and investigate the responses of 
various industries. They find, somewhat counterintuitively, that carbon or electricity 
intensive industries are hurt most in their share price performance due to the carbon price 
crash. They explain their finding by the predominantly grandfathered emissions in the 
‘trial’ Phase 1 and the fact that the asset value of these emissions allowances held in large 
quantities by the carbon and electricity intense firms crashed on 25 April 2006. In other 
words, they believed that investors were more concerned with the potential revenue 
reduction than the cost reduction of carbon or electricity intensive industries, which was 
reflected in the share prices of the firms. This finding is contrary to the carbon emissions 
mitigating intentions of the EU ETS policy makers. Hence, it seems very worthwhile to 
study, if this effect also holds beyond the specific event for the full first phase and 
extended trading periods. 
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To investigate the effects of the EU ETS on stock market returns at sector level, this 
chapter utilises a Carhart model with additional controls for current and lagged carbon 
emissions prices. The model achieves the adjusted R-squared values between 71% and 
94% for each of the seven sectors studied (Energy, Materials, Utilities, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Industrials), which signals a high degree of 
explanatory power of the models. The robustness of the models is further confirmed by the 
fact that the coefficients estimated remained fairly stable across different specifications. As 
predicted by Hourcade et al. (2007), EU ETS-regulated firms in the consumer 
discretionary sector are not negatively affected by the EU ETS. In fact, their estimated 
alpha is even significantly positive, which strongly suggests that the EU ETS does not 
harm them in the slightest way. However, the EU ETS-exposed firms in the Consumer 
Staples and Health Care sectors underperform during the first and second phases.  
 
Contrary to Hourcade et al. (2007), regulated firms in the Utilities sector are not better off 
but worse off than the Energy and Materials sectors. While all three sectors significantly 
underperform in the pre-EU ETS period, only the firms in the utilities sector significantly 
underperform subsequently during both EU ETS periods. The significant 
underperformance of EU ETS-regulated firms in the Utilities sector could be due to the 
sector being the only one that is, as a whole, consistently producing more verified 
emissions than their given allowances. Hence, this sector should experience the greatest 
cost burden of the EU ETS (Johnston et al., 2008). Such an explanation based on the 
emissions status of the overall sector appears to explain this chapter’s results considerably 
better than the reasoning of Hourcade et al. (2007) and Lund (2007), since the firms in the 
materials sector, which was a constantly under-emitting sector, did significantly 
outperform the market benchmark regardless of the firms’ actual emissions status. An 
explanation based on emissions status and the value of having emissions rights following 
Johnston et al. (2008) could also explain why the regulated firms in the energy sector had a 
positive alpha coefficient during the first phase when they emitted below their allowances 
on average and a negative alpha coefficient in the second phase when they emitted more 
than their allowances, although both coefficients were statistically insignificant at common 
levels. 
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These results are also not really consistent with Bushnell et al.’s (2013) carbon price crash 
event-based finding, which demonstrated that polluting industries were hurt more than 
cleaner ones. Beyond this finding, Bushnell et al. (2013) also investigated the emissions 
status of sectors and its relevance to share price valuation. In this case, they found results 
in line with carbon mitigating intentions. They observed that the carbon price crash 
affected industries differently depending on their emissions status. In industries that had an 
allowances deficit, the cleanest firms were penalised the most in terms of stock prices as a 
result of the crash. In contrast, in industries with an allowances surplus, the firms that had 
been granted the most free allowances through grandfathering, and so the originally dirtier 
firms, are hurt the most in their shareholder value by the crash.  
 
However, since this finding refers only to one specific event, it appears an exciting 
opportunity to study what the relationship between emissions status and stock price 
performance is at the sectoral level in a long-term perspective. Bushnell et al. (2013) point 
out in their concluding section that their data does not allow them to investigate the 
emissions status of firms within the sector, i.e. under-emitting vs. over-emitting firms 
within a certain sector. This chapter extends the previous literature by empirically 
examining the verified net allowances holding effect on the stock prices of the regulated 
firms, as the company database acquired from Carbon Market Data contains firm-level 
emissions data until 2010. This enables the analysis of the stock market effects of EU ETS 
regulation on firms with different emissions status (i.e. over-emitting or under-emitting) in 
the larger sectors, which include a sufficient number of firms (i.e. the Energy, Materials, 
and Utilities sectors). This is the first attempt to explore with real market data the asset 
value of allowances within the EU ETS context to date. 
 
The main findings in this chapter reveal first, as also demonstrated in Chapter 3, that the 
utilities sector has been net short of emissions in both phases while the materials sector has 
been net long during both phases, and the differences are statistically significant. The 
energy sector has been net long during the first phase but net short during the second 
phase. Hence, following Johnston et al. (2008), one would expect underperformance of the 
over-emitting firms in the Utilities sector in both phases and in the energy sector in the 
second phase. Similarly, an outperformance of under-emitting firms in the Materials sector 
and the first phase of the energy sector can be expected. If the results turn out similar to 
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Bushnell et al. (2013), one would see under-emitting firms in over-emitting sectors (i.e., 
the Utilities) underperform and being positively affected by carbon price changes. 
Interestingly, the results of this chapter indicate that both perspectives depend on the 
sector. The under-emitting energy firms significantly outperform their benchmark in the 
second phase, which is directly in line with expectations when the Johnston et al. (2008) 
perspective is applied. Similarly, the over-emitting firms in the materials sector 
underperform, which provides supporting evidence for the view of the asset value of 
emissions allowances. Even the result that the under-emitting energy firms also 
significantly outperform in the first phase can be broadly related to this perspective, which 
subsequently describes the Energy and Materials sectors well. 
 
However, the Utilities sector seems to behave more in line with Bushnell et al.’s (2013) 
findings. The portfolio consisting of under-emitting Utilities firms significantly 
underperformed during both phases while the over-emitting Utilities portfolio significantly 
outperformed during the first phase. In the first phase, the relationship between the 
emissions allowances prices and return of under-emitting portfolio was positive, and thus 
the carbon price crash seem to have taken away the financial appeal of these firms for 
possessing excessive emissions allowances. Equivalently, the over-emitting portfolio is 
negatively influenced by the emissions allowances prices, which is also in line with 
Bushnell et al. (2013), indicating that the price crash lifted these polluting firms’ 
performances. Consequently, the European Union probably needs to avoid such carbon 
price crashes if it wants to establish the Johnston et al. (2008) view that carbon emissions 
rights possess a positive asset value from the financial market perspective. 
 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on EU ETS-related share price impacts 
in three aspects. First, it provides evidence that among the ETS-exposed firms, the effect of 
the trading scheme on share price can be differentiated at the sectoral level. Second, it 
reveals that the differences in the share price performance of the ETS and non-ETS- 
exposed firms can be identified in certain sectors, such as Energy and Materials, while the 
two types of firms seem to be priced similarly in the other sectors, namely Utilities, 
Industrials, and Health Care. Third, the sector-based investigation of the association 
between the emissions status of firms within the respective sector and their share 
performance presents an original contribution in the EU ETS literature context, as 
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emissions data have rarely been utilised at this specific level. The findings suggest that the 
stock market has not yet been able to fully take into account the disaggregated emissions 
data in the valuation process. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 56.2 provides the 
background to the analyses proposed, which includes a review of relevant literature and 
establishing the research questions. Methods, model specifications, and data are presented 
in Section 56.3. A discussion of the major findings and relevant implications, from 
investors’ and policy makers’ points of view, follows in Section 56.4. The final Section 
56.5 concludes and discusses the limitations of the analysis in this chapter, which is 
followed by proposing future research opportunities. 
 
5.2 Background and research questions 
The following section provides the information background of this chapter, which consists 
of three parts. The first part discusses the underlying conceptual foundation of the research 
questions proposed, and is followed by a review of the relevant literature. The last part 
poses the research questions of this chapter. 
 
5.2.1 Differences in carbon emission-related sectoral characteristics 
In Hourcade et al. (2007), it is explicitly noted that sectors should expect to experience 
different economic impacts from the EU ETS. The reason lies in the fact that the intrinsic 
potential exposures of a sector to the emissions reduction regulation, i.e. EU ETS, which 
determine the level of impacts, depend on each sector’s (i) energy intensity, (ii) ability to 
pass costs associated with compliance on to consumers and (iii) carbon abatement 
opportunities. They illustrate an analytical prediction of the EU ETS’ economic impacts by 
sampling a range of affected sectors and drawing up simple metrics and indicators on the 
basis of cost pass-through ability. To construct the illustrative matrix and indices, they 
define net value at stake (NVAS) as the net impact of the EU ETS on sectors in terms of 
costs over the sector’s value-added, which is used to represent the magnitude of the 
economic impacts of the EU ETS for each sector. They further designate two scenarios, 
which represent two extreme levels of free allowances allocation to sectors (from zero to 
business-as-usual (BAU) equivalent) as the lower and upper end of each sector’s NVAS. 
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The resulting illustrative matrix shows varying degrees of economic impacts on sectors; 
the health care and consumer discretionary sectors are less exposed to the direct costs due 
to their less energy intensive business models. The impacts on the energy and materials 
sectors appear more volatile according to the level of free allowances as well as to 
electricity prices. Among the three more affected sectors, the utilities sector is considered 
to be in a better position due to its better opportunity to pass costs through to the 
consumers, including other regulated industrial sectors, given its relative lack of 
international competition compared with other industries, such as the cement, iron, and 
steel industries in the materials sector. 
 
Lund (2007) also raises the differentiated ETS effects on industries from the overall cost 
impact perspective. He starts the analytical process from the micro-economic valuation of 
the costs from the ETS, which is determined by aggregating the direct and indirect costs. 
The direct cost of a regulated industry is calculated by the product of the emissions 
reduction target factor, the marginal cost of reduction (the price of EUA), and the CO2 
emissions intensity. The indirect cost would depend on the potential increase in electricity 
prices due to the cost pass-through behaviour of the utilities sector. Lund relies on a series 
of industry-level studies (Bode, 2006; Gadalla et al., 2006; Szabó et al., 2006; EUROFER, 
2000), which specifically focus on different sectors and their characteristics in order to 
obtain sector specific emission intensity information, which is then used to estimate the 
direct cost of each sector. It is concluded from the final estimation that the industrial 
sectors are affected by different levels of impact from the ETS. It is shown that the 
materials sector would experience impacts several times higher than the energy sector and 
hence the materials industry should be affected most by the EU ETS. 
 
The two studies reviewed above are inspiring in terms of their conceptual grounds for 
sectoral differentiation. However, it should be noted that neither of these papers 
investigated the relationship between the carbon characteristics of these participating 
industries and stock market returns. The empirical studies with EU ETS company-level 
data are still relatively limited to date, as reviewed in Chapter 5, and it is necessary to rely 
largely on the economic, conceptual, and theoretical-based literature to build the 
foundations of the sectoral differentiation assumptions in this chapter. A review of a 
number of sector-specific studies regarding the economic impact of the EU ETS should 
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further enhance the assumption of the heterogeneity of the EU ETS effect across regulated 
sectors. It is noticeable that a body of literature exploring in particular the economic 
impacts of the EU ETS at an industry-specific level has emerged (Reinaud, 2004; Smale et 
al., 2006; Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008; Baron in Ellerman et al., 2010: 193–234). 
 
Prior to the official launch of the EU ETS, Reinaud (2004) conducted a full ex ante 
assessment that shed light on the potential impact of the emissions trading scheme on the 
covered sectors. The short-to-medium term effects of emissions trading on industrial 
competitiveness are the main focus of investigation in this study. The main conclusion is 
that the trading scheme is not likely to impose any substantially negative impacts on 
industrial competitiveness in the near term. Certainly, one should interpret these results 
with caution due to their underlying assumptions, such as the ability of certain industries to 
pass the CO2 emissions-related costs through to end consumers, the interaction between the 
power market and other sectors, the allocation method, as well as the visibility of the 
policy framework. 
 
An ex post examination of industrial competitiveness within the EU ETS-regulated sectors, 
which is conducted in a similar manner to Reinaud (2004) in Ellerman et al. (2010: 193–
234), suggests that certain industries may be expected to experience a higher degree of 
effects on their competitiveness due to the nature of their operating activities. 
Theoretically, sectors that are more electricity intensive and heavily trade-exposed, such as 
the aluminium, iron, and steel industries, are profoundly more vulnerable under the carbon 
emissions restriction imposed by the regulations. On the basis of industry-level 
characteristics and data, the overall profit projections and economic impact analysis shows 
that each sector examined experiences the minimal level of impact from the EU ETS 
during the first trading period. 
 
Smale et al. (2006) investigate the economic impacts of the EU ETS on five UK energy 
intensive industries. They rely on a modelling approach that simulates an oligopoly market 
for five energy intensive sectors – cement, newsprint, steel, aluminium, and petroleum – 
and input the empirical data to obtain results under three projected emissions allowance 
prices scenarios. Their analyses aim to reveal the effects of the EU ETS on three 
dimensions: the profits, production output, and emissions of the affected sectors. Their 
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results suggest that four out of the five sectors examined, including cement, newsprint, 
petroleum, and steel, could potentially benefit from the trading scheme from the profit 
point of view. The earnings are even higher under tougher scenarios with higher 
allowances prices. To look more closely, the magnitude of the impact on profits from the 
simulation results also varies considerably among sectors; while the profit impact on 
cement and steel is significant, the impact on petroleum appears more marginal. However, 
their discussion section also notes that the metal sectors, including iron and aluminium, 
could face a certain degree of harmful effects, from a modest loss of market share to entire 
closure. 
 
Demailly and Quirion (2006, 2008) provide two sets of sector-specific economic 
modelling analyses with regard to the industrial competitiveness issue arose due to the EU 
ETS. Their analyses also rely on economic modelling, which projects the outcomes under 
different scenarios and examines how the costs of emissions allowances affect industrial 
competitiveness. In their 2006 study, they investigate how the competitiveness of the 
cement industry was affected by different allocations approach by applying a self-modified 
trade model49 to project a series of competitiveness measures, including the profits, 
production costs, prices, and output, as well as the emissions, for the cement industry for 
2008–2012. 
 
It is shown that the profits of the cement sector would only be negatively affected when the 
rate of free allowances allocation was under 50%. In their 2008 paper, they shift the 
interest of competitiveness impact to the iron and steel sector with a modified industry 
model, a similar approach used in Demailly and Quirion (2006). Again, multiple 
dimensions of competitiveness measured by the profitability and production are projected 
for the sector with their own modelling assumption, which specifies the allowances prices 
and allocation methods. It is shown that the profitability of the iron and steel sector 
depends on the amount of free allowances allocated, which certainly, as pointed out by the 
authors in the concluding section, is highly sensitive to assumptions. Results from both 
studies (Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008) seem to suggest that from the competitiveness 
and profitability perspectives, the cement, iron, and steel sectors appear indifferent to the 
                                            
49 CEMSIM-GEO is a modified model of the authors that links the trade model of homogeneous product with high transportation cots 
(GEO) (Demailly and Quirion, 2006) and a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM) (Szabo et al., 2006). 
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emissions regulation as these sectors are all unlikely to experience any substantial adverse 
impacts on their profitability given the current EU ETS context. It is interesting to reflect 
these estimations in the analyses in this chapter, which will reveal the ETS impacts on the 
affected sector from the stock market investors’ perspective. 
 
To briefly sum up, the assumption that a certain environmental regulation imposes 
different levels of effects on different sectors appears sound, as studies including Reinaud 
(2004), Smale et al. (2006), and Ellerman et al. (2010) suggest from the economic and 
profit impact perspective. Although sector-specific studies by Demailly and Quirion (2006, 
2008) imply that under the current setting of the EU ETS, some sectors, such as the 
cement, and the iron/steel sectors, are likely to benefit from the trading scheme, the 
magnitude of the impact experienced by different sectors is not likely to be at the same 
level. As the stock markets reflect investors’ expectations of firms’ profit (Kahn and 
Knittle, 2003; Hughes, 2000; Bushnell et al., 2013), this body of economic impact 
literature forges an important links between the ETS regulation impact and the stock 
market. 
 
5.2.2 Previous studies of ETS effect on stock market returns at the sector level 
The previous literature with empirical analyses has focused predominantly on the utilities 
sector, with sample sizes of 12–22 firms. The objectives of these studies have also focused 
more on the effects of emissions allowances prices on the stock market performance of 
participating firms than on the effect of the ETS regulation on the sector. For instance, four 
studies which are reviewed in detail in Chapter 4 share a similar focus on the effect of the 
allowances price variation on the stock price changes of utility firms (Oberndorfer, 2009; 
Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012; Veith et al., 2009). 
 
The only study that empirically examines EU ETS-related effects on stock returns of 
different industries has been published by Bushnell et al. (2013), in which the concept of 
different industries showing various levels of exposure toward ETS regulation is also 
recognised. Their argument stems from the volatility of the regulatory costs to which 
regulated firms are exposed under the ETS. They suggest that changes in allowances prices 
could alter the overall input costs, output revenues, and the asset value of the allowances, 
which will eventually affect the regulated firms’ profits. This particular profit effect could 
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vary across industries and firms given different levels of abatement costs, output price 
sensitivity, and allowances allocation methods. The conceptual foundation raised shares 
very similar ground with Lund (2007), Hourcade et al. (2007) and Johnston et al. (2008). 
 
Bushnell et al. (2013) rely on the event study approach and choose to focus on a significant 
event, the 25 April 2006 carbon price crash during the pilot phase, and investigate the 
responses of firms from various sectors, including the mining, utilities, and consumer-
related sectors. They study how much the event impacted the expectations of stock market 
investors on firms’ profits with a sample size of 90 stocks in the carbon intensive industries 
by examining the variation in stock prices of the sample firms during the event window 
with regard to the carbon price collapse. They find, interestingly, that firms producing 
electricity with relatively low emissions output experience the severest drop in their share 
price due to the crash. This is explained by the predominantly grandfathered, free 
allowances in the trial period and the fact that the asset value of the allowances held in 
large quantities by the carbon and electricity intensive firms crashed on 25 April 2006. In 
other words, they believe that the revenue impact is more pronounced than the cost 
reduction of carbon or electricity intensive industries from the investors’ perspective. This 
finding is contrary to the intention of the climate change mitigation target set by the EU 
ETS policy makers that ETS regulation should internalise the costs of emissions for the 
heavy emitters. Hence, it offers a promising research opportunity to explore if this revenue 
effect also holds beyond the specific event in the first phase, and if it appears equivalent in 
Phase 2 for all the EU ETS-regulated firms in the sample in this chapter. 
 
Bushnell et al. (2013) conduct further analysis by taking into consideration the emissions 
status of the industries in order to disentangle the effect of the value relevance of such 
allowances. They examine whether the abnormal returns of the estimated firms can be 
explained by their allowances holdings and emissions. They project that firms with a net 
long position of allowances will experience a bigger loss in profits, which should be 
reflected in the share prices given the sharp decline in the allowances prices. However, the 
net holding position does not appear significant in explaining the abnormal returns in all 
three specifications of estimation, with or without industry fixed effects. They attribute this 
insignificance to the lack of accessible market information in terms of allowances trading 
available for the investors. In fact, the official verified emissions data at the installation 
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level is made available only at the end of May each year. The estimation results with 
industry fixed effects do distinguish between the power sectors and the others. They 
observe that in the sector that is net short of allowances, namely the power sector, the 
cleanest firms (in relation to more emissions intensive power firms) are penalised the most 
as result of the carbon price crash. In contrast, in sectors that are net long of emissions 
allowances, firms that receive the most free allowances through grandfathering are hurt 
most in their shareholder value by the carbon price crash. The fact that dirtier firms in the 
net-long sectors see a worse decline in their share prices is consistent with their initial 
projection, as these firms suffer a greater loss in the aggregate asset value of the 
allowances. 
 
However, since Bushnell et al.’s results refer only to one specific although substantial 
event, it appears worthwhile to study how the relationship between emissions status and 
stock price performance at the sectoral level appears in the full EU ETS trading period. In 
fact, the authors point out explicitly that their data do not allow them to investigate in more 
detail the net holdings effect which could result from the emissions status of firms within 
the sector – i.e., under-emitting vs. over-emitting firms. They believe that this net holding 
effect could be related to the stock market’s response toward the carbon price fluctuation. 
As the Carbon Market Data’s EU ETS company database provides annually updated 
emissions data for regulated firms available until 2010, this particular net allowances 
holdings effect could be empirically examined. By studying the stock market effects of 
portfolios of under-emitting and over-emitting firms within the larger sectors with 
sufficient observations, this chapter extends the previous literature in terms of the depth of 
the subject investigated and provides empirical evidence on the asset value of allowances 
in the EU ETS context. 
 
By providing empirical evidence of the differentiated regulation effects on industries 
outside the EU ETS, Kahn and Knittel (2003) show that the US SO2 emissions trading 
system imposes different impacts on the equity prices of the utility generating and coal 
mining sectors. Similarly by utilising a typical event study, Kahn and Knittle (2003) 
examine the stock market reaction to several major announcements regarding the launch of 
the US SO2 market. They suggest that the new information about future environmental 
regulation should be reflected in the change in firms’ expected profits from the stock 
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market perspective. The differentiated effects across sectors are investigated by examining 
the abnormal returns of 35 firms with regulated electric utility plants and 12 firms in the 
coal mining sector in the event windows spanning from 24 August, 1988 to 4 August 1989, 
roughly one year before the official passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) 
that aimed to reduce SO2 emissions. Their results provide affirmative support for their 
prior expectation that the two sectors experience largely different impacts from the 
proposed environmental regulations. Firms in the Coal Mining sector display significantly 
negative stock returns while the Utilities sector is not adversely affected at any statistical 
significance level. Only one out of 35 electric companies has a statistically significant 
response to the events surrounding the passage of the CAAA, and the response is positive 
instead of the expected negative response. This finding is explained by the better ability of 
the Utilities sector to pass the additional costs through to consumers. On the other hand, 
more than 80% of firms in the coal mining sector analysed respond negatively to the same 
events of legislation-relevance, and three cases are at statistically significant levels. In 
addition to the cost pass-through opportunity, the authors also attribute the larger impacts 
on the coal mining sector to the differences in demand elasticity for different products, in 
this case the electricity and high sulphur coal. As the results suggest, the differentiated 
effects of environmental regulation on the share prices of the regulated sectors appear 
prominent in the case of the US SO2 regulation. 
 
To briefly sum up, the main assumption that inspires the analysis in this chapter lies in the 
existence of heterogeneity of EU ETS effects on regulated firms’ share prices across 
different sectors. This fundamental notion originates from the speculation that different 
sectors are subject to different levels of intrinsic exposure to the emissions restriction, as 
expressed in Hourcade et al. (2007) and Lund (2007). It is suggested that this exposure 
could be determined predominantly by factors such as the nature of operating activities, 
which is related to energy demand and the cost pass-through capability (Hourcade et al. 
2007; Bushnell et al., 2013), and the differences in the level of exposure are likely to 
drives the sectoral differentiation of EU ETS effects. Thus, the assumption specifying that 
the impact of ETS regulation in terms of equity valuation is not homogeneous across 
sectors appears sound. 
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5.2.3 Research question  
Based on the literature reviewed above, it appears rather likely that the EU ETS effect can 
be differentiated at the sector level, although views and findings differ substantially as to 
the sectors and types of firms that are impacted more beneficially or detrimentally than 
others. Similarly, it also seems likely that firms in a given sector are impacted by the EU 
ETS depending on their emissions status (Bushnell et al., 2013; Hourcade et al., 2009; 
Johnston et al., 2008; Lund, 2007). 
 
As both possibilities have been discussed but have so far only been empirically tested in 
Bushnell et al.’s (2013) event study, whose results are informative for the carbon price 
crash of 25 April 2006, but are not necessarily generally applicable especially outside the 
first phase of the EU ETS, this chapter conducts an econometric analysis to answer the 
following research questions: 
 
(1). Can the effect of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of regulated firms be 
differentiated at the sector level? 
 
(2). Are the stock market performances of EU ETS-exposed firms and non-ETS-exposed 
firms significantly different at the sector level? 
 
(3). Does the effect on the stock market performance of EU ETS-regulated firms depend 
on their emissions status (i.e., over-emitting vs under-emitting) at sector-level? If yes, the 
following questions will be further investigated:  
(3-a). Is the effect on the stock market performance differentiated by the overall sectoral 
emissions status? That is to say, are sectors with different emission statuses (over-emitting 
sectors vs. under-emitting sectors) valued significantly differently? (3-b). Is the effect on 
stock market performance differentiated by the emissions status at firm level within the 
same sector? 
 
5.3 Data and method 
The portfolio approach appears the most suitable method for this analysis as the subject of 
the examination shares the fundamental characteristics with Chapter 4 and consists of 
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firms with the same features. Specifically, the subject of examination in this chapter also 
lends itself to the creation and comparison of hypothetical investment portfolios of a group 
of firms that share certain characteristics (i.e., regulated by the EU ETS). The sampling 
and portfolio formation process for the two analyses planned in this chapter are described 
in this section. The first part presents the preparation for the sectoral analysis, which 
examines the performance of ETS-exposed firms at sectoral level and is unique in this area 
of research. It is followed by the preparation process for the second analysis, that tests the 
emissions status effect within specific sector. The model applied, which is an extended 
Carhart model with contemporaneous and lagged carbon emissions price controls, is 
presented in the final part of this section. 
 
5.3.1 Sectoral analysis 
The first objective of the analyses in this chapter is to discover whether firms from 
different sectors experience different levels of impact on their share prices within the same 
environmental regulation scheme. This part of the analysis is complemented by an 
investigation of the performance of firms that are not covered by the EU ETS (hereafter, 
Non-ETS firms). The Non-ETS firms are selected through a sampling process that ensures 
comparability between the two sample datasets.  
 
 
5.3.1 (a) A sectoral analysis of ETS-exposed firms: the sampling process 
The main sample dataset formed in Chapter 5 is also used here and two sets of sub-sample 
datasets are constructed out of the principal one for the analyses in this chapter. The first 
set of sub-samples is designed to investigate the EU ETS effect on stock prices at the 
sector level. 153 listed firms from the principal dataset need to be classified and assigned 
an appropriate sector. A universal industry classification standard that applies to all the 
sample companies is required to ensure a certain degree of homogeneity in the portfolio 
construction. As the European Union does not have its own industry classification standard 
as North America or the UK (i.e. (NASIC, UKSIC), the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) developed by the MSCI50 and Standard & Poor’s appears to be the most 
suitable option, following Chapple et al. (2013), for the sector classification process. 
                                            
50 www.msci.com/products/indices/sector/gics/. 
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Table 5.1 Distribution of firms and allowances allocations in each sector 
Sector 
(1) 
Number 
of firms 
(2) 
2005—2007 
(3) 
% of 
total 
(4) 
2008–2010 
(5) 
% of total 
(6) 
10 Energy 29 533,143,289 7.41% 576,435,870 8.91% 
15 Materials 64 931,814,499 12.96% 996,010,189 15.39% 
20 Industrials 10 31,793,516 0.44% 37,493,112 0.58% 
25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
7 5,598,370 0.08% 4,883,909 0.08% 
30 Consumer Staples 10 10,299,356 0.14% 8,775,572 0.14% 
35 Health Care 5 7,565,900 0.11% 7,291,035 0.11% 
55 Utilities 28 2,331,080,893 32.41% 1,825,445,301 28.21% 
Total 153 3,851,295,823 53.55% 3,456,334,988 53.41% 
This table shows the result of sector classification and presents the percentage of the allowances 
allocated to each sector in each trading period. Column (1) lists the sector in which the sample 
firms operate, column (2) shows the number of firms classified into the respective sector, and fifth 
columns (3) and (5) show the number of allowances receive by each sector and the allowances in 
units of EUA, and columns (4) and (6) show the percentage of the allowances each sector accounts 
for in relation to the total allowances within the entire EU ETS Database. 
 
An additional advantage of employing GICS as the classification standard is that the MSCI 
provides a wide range of equity indices that could suitably serve as the market benchmark 
for the analyses planned in this chapter. Among the sample companies, 11151 are in the 
MSCI World index, which allows a straightforward classification. 42 firms remain 
unclassified as a result of their exclusion from the MSCI World index, so they could not be 
directly assigned the correct GICS-based sector. These firms are categorised in the author’s 
discretion by cross-checking their main activities defined in the EU transaction log 
(EUTL) with the sample firms that are in the MSCI World index. The 153 companies in 
the sample operate across seven sectors based on GICS, and the result of classification is 
presented in Table 6.1, which shows the number of firms in the respective sector and, 
additionally, shows how many allowances each sector accounts for. 
 
                                            
51 The number was correct at the time the data sample process was carried out. The market index constituents are updated periodically.  
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5.3.1 (b). Non-ETS-exposed firms: the sampling process 
To further verify whether the performance of the ETS-exposed firms can be attributed to 
the emissions restriction, if any significant abnormal return is observed, a supplementary 
analysis is planned to test the performance of a peered control group. The group will 
consist of firms from the same universe, in this case, the MSCI Europe Index, but not 
subject to the emissions cap. Ideally, the firms should be picked directly from the index 
constituents, however the access to the complete MSCI constituents’ lists is beyond the 
author’s capacity. Therefore, an alternative source which is freely accessible is utilised to 
compile the peered group. First, the holdings lists of iShare’s52 MSCI Europe Exchange-
Traded Fund (ETF) from 2007 to 2011 are obtained, which also covers the full sample 
period of the original dataset of ETS-exposed firms. The iShares MSCI Europe ETF aims 
to approximate the performance of the MSCI Europe Index and thus its stock holdings 
makes the best alternative to the MSCI index constituents. After excluding the ETS-
exposed firms and firms outside the seven sectors identified in Section 6.3.1 (a), 240 firms 
remain and are assigned a sector accordingly. The distribution of the number of firms in 
each sector is detailed in Table 6.2. 
 
 
5.3.1 (c) Portfolio formation for the sectoral analysis 
The portfolio is constructed with firms from each sector identified in the first step 
described in Section 5.3.1(a) and 5.3.1(b), which results in seven ETS-exposed portfolios 
and seven Non-ETS-exposed portfolios. The performance is measured by the average 
logged return of Portfolio(sectori) calculated on the weekly, equal-weighted basis for the 
time period 2001–end of 2011. The number of firms in each sector-based portfolio and the 
main operating activities of each sector are shown in Table 5.2. 
  
                                            
52 Managed by BlackRock. All information can be accessed on its website www.ishares.com. 
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Table 5.2 Number of firms and main operating activity within the sector-based portfolio 
Sector ETS-
exposed 
Non- 
ETS-
exposed 
Main Activity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
10 Energy 29 13 Oil and gas 
15 Materials 64 22 
Cement and lime, iron and steel, 
pulp and papers, chemicals 
20 Industrials 10 80 Glass, iron and steel 
25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
7 63 Motor industry 
30 Consumer Staples 10 27 Food and drink 
35 Health Care 5 19 Pharmaceuticals, chemicals 
55 Utilities 28 16 Power and heat 
Total 153 240  
This table presents the information on the sector-based portfolio regarding the constituent firms. 
Column (1) lists the sector, column (2) shows the number of EU ETS-exposed firms used in 
constructing each sector-based portfolio, column (3) gives the number of the firms used in 
constructing each sector-based portfolio with no ETS exposure, and column (4) shows the main 
operating activities of each sector according to the original data points. 
 
5.3.2 Analysis of the emissions status effect by sector 
The second focus of this chapter now switches to exploring whether stock market investors 
value the ETS-regulated firms differently on the basis of their allowances holding 
positions. This part of the analysis examines whether the effect of the EU ETS on stock               
prices is differentiated by the different emissions compliance status of firms at the end of 
the EU ETS compliance cycle within the same sector. More specifically, this analysis 
intends to find out whether the share price performances of firms differ by the annual 
verified emissions-to-cap status of firms within the specific sector. To start with, the major 
sectors, in terms of allowances received and the number of firms regulated, are identified. 
The main reason to concentrate on the major sectors is to obtain a sufficient numbers of 
observations and maintain the representativeness of the sub-sample sets. According to 
Table 5.1, which shows essentially the size of each sector after the classification process, it 
can be clearly seen that the energy, materials and utilities sectors are the largest sectors 
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among the seven sectors in terms of allowances allocation as well as the number of firms 
included. 
 
Table 5.3 The number of firms distribution in Portfolio(Sectori)emission status 
Portfolio 
Energy Materials Utilities 
Over-Cap Under-
Cap 
Over-Cap Under-
Cap 
Over-Cap Under-
Cap 
2005 6 22 11 53 15 13 
2006 10 18 9 55 18 10 
2007 10 18 12 52 19 9 
2008 16 12 7 56 20 8 
2009 8 20 2 61 17 11 
2010 9 19 6 57 17 11 
This table shows the number of firms that constitute the over-cap/under-cap portfolios within the 
Energy, Materials, and Utilities sectors. Emissions status is determined by the reported verified 
emissions of each firm relative to its cap, which is made available annually, thus the portfolio 
constituents are also updated annually. 
 
 
The second analysis is conducted by examining the share price performances of firms 
within the same sector with different emissions-to-cap status. The firms of each sector are 
therefore grouped into two portfolios: firms that emit over their caps form 
Portfolio(Sectori)over-cap and firms that emit under their given caps form 
Portfolio(Sectori)under-cap; i denotes each major sector included in this analysis: Energy, 
Materials, and Utilities. Returns of the portfolios are calculated on a weekly, equal-
weighted basis, components of each portfolio are updated annually according to published 
verified emissions data. Table 5.3 shows the changes in the number of constituents in each 
portfolio throughout the total sample period. Essentially, the result indicates whether the 
stock market investors are able to pick out the firms with lower (higher) ETS-related costs 
and price accordingly. 
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5.3.3 Model specification 
For estimating the performance of equity-based portfolios, the Carhart four-factor model 
makes an appropriate baseline model, as it has been extensively applied and takes into 
account the most common risk factors associated with the variation in equity prices. An 
additional factor of the EUA spot price return is introduced to the model for the purpose of 
examining the links between the carbon market and the financial market. Four sets of 
regression analyses are conducted in this chapter in order to obtain a clear picture of how 
EU ETS effects on financial performances differ among sectors during different time 
periods. First, performances of sector-based portfolios are estimated using the basic three-
factor model for the estimation period 2001–2004, which coincides with the EU ETS 
proposed and negotiating period. This ex post analysis is intended to provide results that 
show how the capital market value the prospects of the upcoming emissions regulation. 
The first estimation equation, Eq (56-1), can be written as follows: 
 
Eq (5-1) 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖) − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
where Rp,t(sectori) denotes the return of Portfolio(sectori) in excess of the risk-free rate and 
RMt represents the return of the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate. The risk-
free rate used in all the analyses is the manually converted weekly rate based on the 
EURIBOR three-month rate obtained from DataStream. SMB controls the factor of size, 
which is calculated by the differences between the MSCI Europe small cap return index 
and average large cap return index. HML controls for the book-to-market value for the 
firm, which is calculated as the difference between the average rate of logarithm return of 
MSCI Europe value stocks and growth stocks. The final term is a random error process. 
 
Following the empirical design of Chapter 5, additional factors that control for the 
variation of the emissions allowances price are added into the estimation model, which 
enables the examination of the existence of the carbon market–financial market link. This 
is somewhat more advanced but broadly in line with the previous time-series literature 
(Oberndorfer, 2009; Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012; Veith et al., 2009). The two estimation 
models, Eq (5-2) and (5-3), can be written as follows: 
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Eq (5-2) 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖) − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡  
 
Eq (5-3) 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖) − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐸𝑈𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
EUA is the logged return of the EUA spot settlement price quoted from European Energy 
Exchange, which offers the longest possible dataset starting in late March 2005, while 
EUAt-1 is the lagged observation of EUA return, in this case being the observation of the 
previous week. Three sets of regression analyses are conducted in this chapter in order to 
obtain a clear picture of how EU ETS-related effects on share price performances differ 
among sectors during different time periods. First, the performances of sector-based 
portfolios are estimated using the basic four-factor model for the estimation period of 
2001–2004, which coincided with the EU ETS proposed and negotiating period. This ex 
ante analysis is intended to reveal how the stock market investors valued the prospects of 
the upcoming emissions regulation. Second, using all three estimation models, the 
performance of all seven sector-based portfolios is studied for the full EU ETS sample 
period and the two sub-sample periods, respectively. Third, the performance of the over- 
and under-emitting portfolios in the three large sectors is investigated during the full period 
and the two sub-sample periods. These portfolios with different allowances holding 
positions are estimated under the same models for the sample period that covers the total 
EU ETS trading period from 2005 to 2010, given the best data availability. 
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5.4 Results and discussion 
This section presents and discusses the results of the regressions conducted with each of 
the specified models and methods described in Section 6.3, which reveal two major aspects 
of interest. The results first show whether the sectors that are subject to the same 
regulatory framework experience different levels of impact on their value reflected in the 
stock market. This responds to the first research question by showing the performance of 
each sector-based portfolio indicated by the estimated constants. Furthermore, the results 
of second set of analysis illustrate whether the ETS-regulated firms’ stock price 
performance within each of the major sector is differentiated by its allowances holding 
position. 
 
5.4.1 EU ETS effect on stock prices - sector-level 
To start with, Table 6.4 provides a summary of each portfolio’s performance. The 
differentiation of the performance can be observed at a statistically significant level, as in 
the four estimation periods tested the sector-based portfolios display contrary 
performances in their returns. The suggested differentiation of the ETS effect is supported 
by two aspects from the results obtained, with different levels of effects and interactions 
between portfolio performance and allowances market observed across sectors. At the end 
of this section, the full regression results for each sector-based portfolio (ETS, Non-ETS. 
and long–short) using the standard Carhart four-factor model Eq (56-1) for the Pre-ETS 
and continuous ETS estimation periods are presented in Tables 56.6–56.9. Tables 56.10 
and 56.11 present the results for the ETS portfolios for the full sample period (2005–2011) 
with additional EUA price factors while Tables 56.12 and 56.13 show the results from the 
estimation period spanning the Pre-ETS and ETS period (2001–2011). 
 
Six out of the seven sector-based ETS portfolios see significant underperformance against 
the market benchmark during the Pre-ETS period (2001–2004) except for the Consumer 
Discretionary sector, which by contrast sees outperformance against the benchmark. The 
underperformance of the portfolio indicates that these sectors are valued negatively by the 
stock market, with investors perceiving that future environmental liabilities could pose 
adverse effects on the sector’s performance. This finding is interesting and in line with 
Kahn and Knittel (2003), who find the US SO2 regulation has had a significantly negative  
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Table 5.4 Summary of the estimated alpha of the sector-based portfolios 
Portfolio 2001–2004 
(1) 
2005–2011 
(2) 
2005–2007 
(3) 
2008–2011 
(4) 
2001–2011 
(5) 
EnergyETS -0.009*** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
MaterialsETS -0.002* 0.003*** 0.004** 0.001 0.002** 
IndustrialsETS -0.003* 0.004*** 0.004 0.002** 0.002*** 
Consumer DiscretionaryETS 0.010** 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 
Consumer StaplesETS -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.011*** 
Health CareETS -0.006** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
UtilitiesETS -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
EnergyNon-ETS 0.012** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
MaterialsNon-ETS 0.000 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
IndustrialsNon-ETS 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
Consumer DiscretionaryNon-ETS 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.003** 0.004*** 
Consumer StaplesNon-ETS -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.008*** 
Health CareNon-ETS 0.003 -0.005*** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
UtilitiesNon-ETS -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
EnergyLong-Short 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
MaterialsLong-Short 0.002 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
IndustrialsLong-Short 0.010*** 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.003*** 
Consumer DiscretionaryLong-
Short 
-0.001 -0.005** -0.0004 -0.004** -0.003** 
Consumer StaplesLong-Short 0.003* 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.003*** 
Health CareLong-Short 0.008** 0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.003** 
UtilitiesLong-Short -0.0004 -0.002* 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
This table provides a summary of the portfolio performance of the ETS, Non-ETS-exposed sector-
based portfolios, and the long–short portfolio of each sector in a different estimation period. The 
long–short portfolio reflects the investment strategy of buying the Non-ETS portfolio and short 
selling the ETS portfolio. The performance is measured by the alpha of the estimation model Eq 
(56-1), which represents the abnormal return of the portfolio which is not explained by market, 
size, book-to-market, and momentum facotrs. Column (1) lists the sector portfolio estimated. 
Columns (2)–(5) show the estimated alphas of the respective sector-based portfolio for the Pre-
ETS, the full sample period, Phase 1, and Phase 2. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical 
significance level, respectively. 
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impact on coal mining firms’ share prices. Similar results and concluding remarks can also 
be seen in Chapple et al. (2013), who find that a market value penalty applies for the firms 
which are potentially subject to future environmental liabilities. 
 
Table 5.5 Summary of estimated coefficients of the allowances price-related factors 
 2005–2011 2005–2007 2008–2011 
 EUA EUA(-1) EUA EUA(-1) EUA EUA(-1) 
EnergyETS ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 
MaterialsETS ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 +++ 
IndustrialsETS ⊖⊖ ~ 0 ~ 0 - ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 
Consumer DiscretionaryETS ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ 
Consumer StaplesETS ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 ~ 0 +++ ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ 
Health CareETS ⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ +++ 
UtilitiesETS ~ 0 ~ 0 +++ ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 
This table provides a summary of the estimated coefficients of the allowances price factor, which 
indicates the exposure of the sector to the risk associated with the allowances price variation. The 
first column lists the sector portfolio estimated. The second to the fifth columns show the estimated 
alphas of respective sector-based portfolio for the Pre-ETS, the full sample period, Phase 1 and 
Phase 2. ⊖ indicates a negative estimated coefficient and the stock return and the allowances 
return move in the opposite direction while + indicates a positive estimated coefficient and the 
stock return and the allowances return move in the same direction. ⊖ or + represents the 10%, ⊖⊖ 
or ++ represents 5%, and ⊖⊖⊖ or +++ represents 1% significance levels and ~ 0 is not statistically 
significant. 
 
The results of testing the Non-ETS-exposed portfolios add interesting insights and at first 
glance seem to contradict what the research questions of this chapter suggest. First, the 
results for the Pre-EU ETS period (2001–2004) show that the Non-ETS portfolios overall 
appear better off except for the Utilities. The firms were presumably prone to speculation 
regarding the extent to which they would be affected by the EU ETS when the emissions 
cap was imposed. The Utilities sector is naturally the largest emitter and expected to face 
potentially the highest ETS-related costs when the trading scheme was in place. Thus, the 
results are not beyond expectations as the performance of the ETS and Non-ETS portfolios 
demonstrate a certain degree of difference.  
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The estimation results for the EU ETS operating period (2005–2011) reveal a quite 
different story as the differences in the ETS and Non-ETS portfolio performance seem to 
have lessened but remain observable. Two ETS portfolios (Materials and Industrials) 
rebound from the underperforming to outperforming status, three sectors retain their 
underperforming status, and the energy sector seems indifferent to the market benchmark. 
The performance of the Non-ETS portfolios remains nearly the same with the exceptions 
of Materials, which shows outperformance from an insignificant alpha, and Health Care, 
which shows underperformance. As indicated by the summarised results, sectors are priced 
rather differently, with Energy, Materials, and Industrials outperforming, and the Non-ETS 
portfolios seeing a better performance than the ETS firms during the continuous estimation 
period covering Phase 1 and 2 of EU ETS. In stark contrast, Consumer Staples, Health 
Care, and Utilities experience underperformance and, surprisingly, the Non-ETS Utilities 
Portfolio suffers more underperformance than the ETS Utilities portfolio. 
 
The changes in estimated portfolio performance for the Pre-ETS estimation period and the 
Phase 1 period are particularly interesting, as four out of seven sectors with ETS-exposed 
firms, namely Energy, Materials, Industrials, and Consumer Discretionary, see a 
substantial re-evaluation of their stock price by the market. It appears that stock market 
investors did not consider the ETS regulation costly for these sectors during the first 
trading period. The Materials sector, the largest sector in terms of companies included, was 
even expected to make gains during the first trading period. Three sectors remain 
underperforming the market benchmark, which indicates that the market considers that 
ETS regulation still shows considerable impacts on them, which could be caused by an 
increase in abatement costs or a reduction in operational earnings (Chapple et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, the Non-ETS portfolios do not see drastic changes in their performance 
transiting into the EU ETS period except for the Health Care sector, which sees a 
significant underperformance. This finding suggests that the impact from the EU ETS on 
the non-exposed firms is minimal, which can reasonably be expected. 
 
As the results from the two sets of regressions for the ETS and Non-ETS portfolios do 
seem slightly puzzling and inconclusive, a third set of regressions was run to examine the 
long–short portfolio of each sector, constructed by taking the long position of the Non-ETS 
portfolio and short selling the ETS portfolio. This test further disentangles whether the EU 
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ETS is essentially a deciding factor for pricing the firms in the respective sector. The 
results show that the ETS and Non-ETS-exposed firms in the Energy, Materials, and 
Consumer Staples sectors perform significantly differently during the EU ETS trading 
periods. However, the ETS and Non-ETS firms in the Utilities, Health Care, and Consumer 
Discretionary sectors are considered indifferently by stock market investors during the 
same periods. This is particularly interesting as a similar investigation has only been made 
in Hughes (2000) in the US electric utility industry context, but not in the EU ETS context 
so far. The underperformance identified in the ETS-exposed firms in the Utilities and 
Health Care sectors is a reasonable outcome, which is in line with the assumption of 
concern over future environmental liability. However, the Non-ETS-exposed firms in the 
same sectors also experience a significant underperformance, which is a counterintuitive 
finding, and can only be explained by either the lack of market information regarding the 
ETS, or other sector-specific unidentified factors that drive the market to down-value these 
sectors. Tables 5.14–5.18 present all the estimation results for the long-short portfolio of 
each sector in different sample periods. 
 
The differences in the performances among ETS portfolios during the operating period of 
the EU ETS are evident, as three sectors, including Materials, Industrials, and Consumer 
Discretionary, appear to outperform the benchmark while Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
and Utilities underperform. The results remain unchanged under different model 
specifications, and thus could provide a positive answer to the first research question, that 
an EU ETS effect on stock market performance can be differentiated at sector level for the 
exposed firms. The estimations are also done for two separate sample periods, which cover 
the first and part of the second trading phases of the EU ETS, respectively. This helps to 
see whether EU ETS effects on stock market performance vary across two separate trading 
periods. Tables 5.19–5.27 present the full estimation results for each sector-based 
portfolio, both ETS and Non ETS-exposed, for two separate sample periods (2005–2007 
and 2008–2011). 
 
The portfolio performance outcomes change slightly as the ETS transits from the first to 
the second trading period, with Industrials and Consumer Discretionary sectors showing 
outperformance against the benchmark. The Consumer Staples, Health cCare, and Utilities 
remained the most affected sectors in the second trading period from the investors’ 
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perspectives. The persistent underperformance of the Utilities sector found in this analysis 
appears to contradict the rates of passing-through the CO2 emissions trading-related costs 
by electricity firms proposed and examined in some studies, such as Sijm et al. (2006b) 
and Hourcade et al. (2007), who suggest that the Utility sector is even likely to gain from 
the trading scheme for the free allowances received and essentially being able to pass 
through the costs incurred due to the ETS. Nevertheless, the results in this analysis do not 
completely eliminate the existence of the cost pass-through as the CO2 cost pass-through is 
also likely to be asymmetric (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008). The results are 
meant to purely suggest from empirically tested findings that the stock market has 
constantly valued the ETS-regulated firms in the Utilities sector negatively, and one of the 
possible causes could be the emissions status and the allowances holding position, one 
aspect specified in the second proposed research question in this chapter. 
 
To sum up, the EU ETS still appeared costly at the sectoral level from financial market 
investors’ perspectives as they suffered significant underperformance in their equity prices 
during the Pre-ETS period (2001–2004) when the emissions trading legislation was 
proposed and negotiated. On the other hand, three Non-ETS portfolios (Energy, 
Industrials, and Consumer Discretionary) show an outperformance during the same period; 
two (Materials and Health Care) have no significantly abnormal returns but the Utilities 
and Consumer Staples do also experience an underperformance. The results from the long–
short portfolios’ estimation suggest that EU ETS is the differentiating factor in terms of 
pricing the firms in certain sectors, in particular Energy, Materials, and Consumer Staples. 
On the contrary, the long–short portfolio estimation suggests that ETS participation does 
not lead to a substantially different valuation for firms in the Utilities, Health Care, and 
Consumer Discretionary sectors. 
 
The finding of significant underperformance in the Pre-ETS period is in line with Hughes 
(2000) and Chapple et el. (2013), who find that future environmental liabilities could be 
value-destructive for firm value. Furthermore, the results provide a certain degree of 
positive answer to the first research question proposed, that the EU ETS effect on share 
prices can be differentiated at sector level, as distinct differences in the performance of the 
respective sector-based portfolios can be observed in the full and separate sub-sample 
periods, and between the ETS and Non-ETS portfolios. The sectoral differentiation of the 
Chapter 5 The differentiation of EU’s emission trading effect on share prices – a sector-
level analysis 
150 
ETS regulation effects appears consistent with Hourcade et al. (2007), who suggest that 
differentiated effects come from the inherent exposure of the sector to emissions 
restriction. However, based on the tests of the Non ETS-exposed portfolios, the stock 
market might not able to fully integrate EU ETS-related information into its pricing 
process. 
 
Another aspect revealed by the estimation results is the interaction between the stock 
market and the European carbon market, which measures how sensitive the ETS-exposed 
firms are to the variation in allowances prices. Overall, the interaction between the stock 
returns and the allowances price returns varies not only across sectors but also across 
different trading periods. Most of the sectors react negatively to the allowances price 
variation, which appears consistent with the original intention of the emissions trading 
regulation, which is to internalise the costs of CO2 emissions, as the rise in allowances 
prices would increase the costs of firms, provided the firms needed to purchase additional 
emissions allowances for compliance. Table 5.5 provides an overview of the estimated 
coefficients of the allowances price factor in different estimation periods for seven ETS 
portfolios tested, and the extended regression results can be seen in Tables 5.19–5.25. 
 
One very interesting finding is the positive coefficient estimated for the Utilities sector 
among the mostly negative, though insignificant, coefficients. This is somehow 
counterintuitive though it appears in line with Oberndorfer (2009), who also finds that the 
stock returns of EU ETS-regulated electricity companies are positively related to the 
changes in allowances prices during 2005–2007. One possible explanation is the large 
amount and high proportion of free allowances received by the electricity firms within the 
trading scheme, with investors perceiving that the holding of allowances could be value-
relevant. This aspect is further explored and empirically tested in the second set of 
analysis, which is presented in Section 5.4.3. 
 
The trading period differentiation applies to the investigation of the link between the stock 
market and the carbon market. The results show that the stock market–carbon market link 
was strengthened substantially in the second trading period of the EU ETS (2008–2011) 
compared with Phase 1 (2005–2007), with stock returns in five out of seven sectors 
showing sensitivity to allowances price returns. It appears a reasonable progress with the 
Chapter 5 The differentiation of EU’s emission trading effect on share prices – a sector-
level analysis 
151 
maturity of the carbon market, which is indicative of a more active market relative to that 
in Phase 1 (Bredin and Muckley, 2011; Mo et al., 2012); the information associated with 
carbon prices becomes more incorporated into the decision making process of stock market 
investors. The change in the sensitivity to allowances prices from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is 
also seen in Mo et al. (2012), who find the relation of the stock returns and allowance price 
changes moving from positive to negative from Phase 1 to Phase 2. They attribute this 
change to the adjustment of the allowances allocation policy in the second phase, during 
which allocations became more stringent. 
 
Both aspects of interest in this chapter –portfolio performance and the estimated 
coefficients of the allowances price factor – provide supporting evidence for the proposed 
differentiation of the EU ETS effect at sectoral level. Despite the existence of the 
conceptual development of the sectoral differentiation by Hourcade et al. (2007) and the 
numerical cost impact analyses (Reinaud, 2004; Lund, 2007), it is not yet clear what 
empirically could be the factors associated with this differentiated effect on stock market 
performance, as indicated in the results above. The second research question in this chapter 
proposes that the emissions status of the ETS-regulated firms could be the potential 
deciding factor in driving this sectoral differentiation of the EU ETS’ effect on stock 
market performance. The results of the empirical analysis of the emission status effect are 
presented in the following sections.
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Table 5.6 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)ETS for the sample period of Pre-EU ETS years (2001–2004) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)ETS Rp(Materials)ETS Rp(Industrials)ETS Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)ETS 
Rp(Utilities)ETS 
Sample period 12/1/2001 31/12/2004 
Constant -0.009 (-5.94)*** -0.002 (-1.91)* -0.003 (-1.78)* 0.010 (2.35)** -0.014 (-7.01)*** -0.006 (-2.08)** -0.012 (-6.23)*** 
RM 0.711 (20.54)
*** 0.899 (36.46)*** 0.881 (25.34)*** 1.199 (13.13)*** 0.639 (15.12)*** 0.844 (14.14)*** 0.660 (16.22)*** 
SMB 0.148 (2.13)** 0.639 (17.88)*** 0.528 (7.82)*** 0.482 (4.20)*** 0.024 (0.35) -0.430 (-4.47)*** 0.222 (4.08)*** 
HML 0.166 (1.52) 0.302 (4.07)*** 0.230 (1.82)* 0.324 (1.31) -0.034 (-0.34) -0.177 (-1.03) 0.141 (1.82)* 
MOM 0.224 (2.43)** 0.019 (0.40) 0.012 (0.12) 0.233 (0.97) 0.729 (7.49)*** 0.551 (3.96)*** 0.355 (5.04)*** 
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.87 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.74 
P-value (F-stat.) 0 (126.4)  0 (360.9) 0 (100.1) 0 (93.42) 0 (85.67) 0 (106.2) 0 (148.9) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)ETS performance using the Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with a Newey–
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of the risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML control for the investors incline towards the size and book-to-market value of firms, respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to 
eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, and Utilities 
companies-based portfolios, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level, respectively
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Table 5.7 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Non-ETS for the sample period of Pre-EU ETS years (2001–2004) 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)Non-ETS Rp(Materials)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Industrials)No
n-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)Non
-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)Non-ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)Non-ETS 
Rp(Utilities) Non-
ETS 
Sample period 12/1/2001 31/12/2004 
Constant 0.012 (2.17)** -3.6E-05 (-0.02) 0.008 (6.68)*** 0.009 (4.70)*** -0.011 (-5.71)*** 0.003 (1.06) -0.013 (-4.47)*** 
RM 1.321 (9.12)*** 0.921 (24.56)*** 1.155 (49.01)*** 1.164 (25.50)*** 0.697 (17.40)*** 1.043 (16.89)*** 0.670 (10.36)*** 
SMB 0.898 (4.58)*** 0.559 (9.44)*** 0.664 (16.66)*** 0.549 (10.56)*** 0.009 (0.17) 0.507 (4.85)*** 0.140 (2.06)** 
HML 0.968 (3.72)*** 0.063 (0.56) 0.151 (1.72)* -0.078 (-0.63) 0.172 (2.09)** 0.116 (0.94) 0.145 (1.21) 
MOM 0.343 (1.32) 0.213 (2.35)** 0.027 (0.42) -0.063 (-0.83) 0.659 (9.21)*** 0.300 (2.74)*** 0.082 (0.70) 
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.73 0.93 0.89 0.74 0.74 0.63 
P-value (F-stat.) 0 (70.84) 0 (143.97) 0 (703.82) 0 (433.43) 0 (149.57) 0 (145.83) 0 (90.32) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Non-ETS performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.
 154 
Table 5.8 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)ETS for the continuous sample period 2005–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
ETS Rp(Materials)
ETS Rp(Industrials)
ETS Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)ETS 
Rp(Utilities)
ETS 
Sample period 31/12/2004 30/12/2011 
Constant -0.001 (-0.45) 0.003 (2.78)*** 0.004 (4.02)*** 0.007 (3.72)*** -0.009 (-6.20)*** -0.006 (-4.64)*** -0.006 (-4.85)*** 
RM 0.969 (26.9)*** 1.065 (46.79)*** 1.065 (51.77)*** 1.206 (25.90)*** 0.727 (20.93)*** 0.814 (30.74)*** 0.806 (22.74)*** 
SMB 0.316 (4.09)*** 0.756 (9.66)*** 0.794 (10.25)*** 0.705 (5.47)*** 0.046 (0.47) -0.657 (-5.25)*** 0.060 (0.91) 
HML 0.213 (2.13)** 0.142 (1.50) -0.006 (-0.06) 0.217 (0.78) -0.170 (-1.27) -0.304 (-2.13)** 0.150 (1.77)* 
MOM 0.449 (4.51)*** 0.086 (1.25) -0.098 (-1.35) -0.231 (-1.05) 0.090 (0.61) 0.305 (1.96)* 0.251 (3.26)*** 
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.94 0.90 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.86 
P-value (F-
stats.) 
0 (461.9) 0 (1496) 0 (827.2) 0 (342.3) 0 (202.7) 0 (247.2) 0 (578.3) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)ETS using Carhart four-factor model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-West 
estimator for the estimation period of 2005 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in 
excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the 
momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.9 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Non-ETS for the continuous sample period 2005–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
Non-ETS Rp(Materials)
Non-
ETS 
Rp(Industrials)
Non-
ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)Non-ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)Non-ETS 
Rp(Utilities)
 Non-ETS 
Sample period 31/12/2004 06/01/2012 
Constant 0.019 (4.89)*** 0.012 (4.65)*** 0.005 (4.37)*** 0.002 (2.10)** -0.005 (-4.73)*** -0.005 (-4.17)*** -0.008 (-5.72)*** 
RM 1.441 (13.75)*** 1.296 (20.40)*** 1.108 (45.77)*** 1.052 (37.91)*** 0.823 (26.53)*** 0.839 (30.84)*** 0.749 (21.90)*** 
SMB 0.834 (3.43)*** 0.654 (3.44)*** 0.643 (8.26)*** 0.693 (7.86)*** 0.064 (1.10) 0.140 (1.90)* -0.121 (-1.31) 
HML 0.244 (0.91) -0.295 (-1.42) -0.083 (-0.91) 0.113 (0.89) -0.293 (-3.06)*** -0.143 (-1.21) -0.076 (-0.60) 
MOM 0.616 (2.12)** 0.296 (1.35) -0.008 (-0.10) -0.089 (-0.59) 0.127 (1.10) 0.193 (1.50) 0.386 (3.37)*** 
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.79 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.79 0.77 
P-value (F-
stats.) 
0 (239.4) 0 (349.56) 0 (1600.23) 0 (724.27) 0 (510.03) 0 (350.64) 0 (308.61) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)Non-ETS using Carhart 4-factor model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-West 
estimator for the estimation period of 2005 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in 
excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the 
momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.
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Table 5.10 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)ETS for the continuous sample period 2005–2011 with allowances price control 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
ETS Rp(Materials)
ETS Rp(Industrials)
ETS Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)ETS 
Rp(Health Care)
ETS Rp(Utilities)
ETS 
Sample period 18/3/2005 30/12/2011 
Constant -0.001 (-0.67) 0.003 (2.68)*** 0.003 (3.80)*** 0.007 (3.72)*** -0.009 (-6.14)*** -0.006 (-4.76)*** -0.006 (-4.85)*** 
RM 0.968 (26.9)*** 1.066 (47.04)*** 1.067 (51.60)*** 1.209 (25.79)*** 0.730 (20.96)*** 0.815 (30.48)*** 0.806 (22.54)*** 
SMB 0.315 (4.02)*** 0.754 (9.59)*** 0.791 (10.16)*** 0.712 (5.47)*** 0.050 (0.50) -0.653 (-5.17)*** 0.059 (0.88) 
HML 0.205 (2.03)** 0.127 (1.33) -0.026 (-0.28) 0.197 (0.69) -0.194 (-1.39) -0.305 (-2.08)** 0.136 (1.58) 
MOM 0.441 (4.33)*** 0.073 (1.05) -0.116 (-1.60) -0.252 (-1.11) 0.066 (0.44) 0.305 (1.91)* 0.241 (3.05)*** 
EUA 0.001 (0.64) 0.001 (0.82) -0.002 (-2.55)** -0.004 (-4.68)*** -0.005 (-4.23)*** -0.002 (-1.93)* -0.001 (-0.45) 
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.86 
P-value (F-
stats.) 
0 (1496) 0 (1172) 0 (675.8) 0 (267.3) 0 (159.1) 0 (192.3) 0 (451.2) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)ETS using Carhart 4-factor based model with added EUA price factor Eq (56-2) 
under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark 
(MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors’ incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; 
MOM controls for the momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels 
respectively. 
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Table 5.11 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)ETS for the continuous sample period 2005–2011 with allowances price controls 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
ETS Rp(Materials)
ETS Rp(Industrials)
ETS Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)ETS 
Rp(Health Care)
ETS Rp(Utilities)
ETS 
Sample period 25/3/2005 30/12/2011 
Constant -0.001 (-0.63) 0.003 (2.72)*** 0.003 (3.80)*** 0.007 (3.78)*** -0.009 (-6.14)*** -0.006 (-4.76)*** -0.006 (-4.83)*** 
RM 0.968 (26.8)*** 1.065 (46.91)*** 1.067 (51.57)*** 1.208 (25.91)*** 0.731 (20.91)*** 0.814 (30.30)*** 0.806 (22.48)*** 
SMB 0.316 (4.01)*** 0.755 (9.56)*** 0.790 (10.10)*** 0.709 (5.43)*** 0.049 (0.49) -0.651 (-5.15)*** 0.059 (0.88) 
HML 0.210 (2.06)** 0.130 (1.35) -0.024 (-0.26) 0.213 (0.74) -0.194 (-1.39) -0.308 (-2.09)** 0.138 (1.60) 
MOM 0.445 (4.38)*** 0.076 (1.09) -0.116 (-1.59) -0.243 (-1.07) 0.065 (0.43) 0.305 (1.90)* 0.243 (3.06)*** 
EUA 0.001 (0.64) 0.001 (0.80) -0.002 (-2.55)*** -0.004 (-4.06)*** -0.005 (-4.34)*** -0.003 (-1.98)** -0.001 (-0.44) 
EUA(-1) 0.001 (0.64) 0.001 (0.44) -0.002 (-1.53) -0.007 (-4.89)*** -0.001 (-0.23) 0.003 (2.49)** -0.000 (-0.38) 
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.86 
P-value (F-
stats.) 
0 (308.7) 0 (980.9) 0 (561.7) 0 (225.6) 0 (132) 0 (160.3) 0 (374.3) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)ETS using Carhart 4-factor model with EUA price factor added Eq (56-3) under 
OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI 
Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM 
controls for the momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.12 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)ETS for the sample period 2001–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
ETS Rp(Materials)
ETS Rp(Industrials)
ETS Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)ETS 
Rp(Health Care)
ETS Rp(Utilities)
ETS 
Sample period 12/01/2001 06/01/2012 
Constant -0.002 (-1.62) 0.002 (2.29)** 0.002 (2.59)*** 0.007 (4.58)*** -0.011 (-9.41)*** -0.006 (-5.47)*** -0.008 (-6.40)*** 
RM 0.911 (29.45)*** 1.020 (54.14)*** 1.014 (50.86)*** 1.187 (31.24)*** 0.679 (25.39)*** 0.804 (31.63)*** 0.757 (23.20)*** 
SMB 0.285 (5.72)*** 0.739 (15.45)*** 0.718 (11.74)*** 0.625 (6.81)*** 0.077 (1.25) -0.55 (-6.69)*** 0.17 (3.84)*** 
HML 0.257 (4.21)*** 0.260 (4.08)*** 0.165 (2.41)** 0.377 (2.38)** 0.115 (1.47) -0.166 (-1.48) 0.298 (4.56)*** 
MOM 0.420 (5.99)*** 0.127 (2.82)*** 0.027 (0.46) -0.026 (-0.18) 0.412 (4.29)*** 0.4 (4.18)*** 0.353 (6.47)*** 
Observations 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.66 0.70 0.84 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (595.26) 0 (1811.4) 0 (776.93) 0 (431.53) 0 (280.83) 0 (356.18) 0 (725.38) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)ETS performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-West 
estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.13 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Non-ETS for the full sample period 2001–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
Non-ETS Rp(Materials)
Non-
ETS 
Rp(Industrials)
Non-
ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)Non-ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)Non-ETS 
Rp(Utilities)
 Non-
ETS 
Sample period 12/1/2001 06/01/2012 
Constant 0.017 (5.94)*** 0.010 (4.87)*** 0.005 (6.14)*** 0.004 (4.19)*** -0.008 (-7.25)*** -0.004 (-3.94)*** -0.009 (-7.12)*** 
RM 1.398 (19.37)*** 1.185 (25.18)*** 1.109 (58.72)*** 1.089 (43.26)*** 0.758 (28.01)*** 0.870 (37.16)*** 0.725 (24.45)*** 
SMB 0.889 (5.92)*** 0.694 (6.33)*** 0.648 (14.35)*** 0.603 (10.69)*** 0.089 (2.35)** 0.275 (4.23)*** 0.008 (0.12) 
HML 0.488 (2.46)** 0.026 (0.20) -0.002 (-0.03) -0.028 (-0.33) 0.097 (1.40) -0.065 (-0.77) -0.004 (-0.06) 
MOM 0.639 (3.61)*** 0.428 (3.57)*** 0.025 (0.45) -0.150* (-1.69) 0.458 (6.10)*** 0.231 (2.78)*** 0.328 (4.10)*** 
Observations 574 574 574 574 574 574 574 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.77 0.94 0.89 0.81 0.77 0.73 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (319.41) 0 (488.74) 0 (2319.97) 0 (1128.01) 0 (617.63) 0(472.4) 0 (394.85) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Non-ETS performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.
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Table 5.14 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Long-Short for the sample period 2001–2004 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy) Long-
Short 
Rp(Materials) Long-
Short 
Rp(Industrials) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples) Long-Short 
Rp(Health Care) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Utilities) Long-
Short 
Sample period 12/01/2001 31/12/2004 
Constant 0.021 (3.94)*** 0.002 (1.34) 0.010 (4.86)*** -0.001 (-0.34) 0.003 (1.93)* 0.008 (2.46)** -0.000 (-0.28) 
RM 0.610 (4.70)*** 0.022 (0.59) 0.274 (6.12)*** -0.034 (-0.54) 0.058 (1.85)* 0.199 (2.57)** 0.010 (0.27) 
SMB 0.750 (4.55)*** -0.080 (-1.29) 0.136 (1.71)* 0.067 (0.60) -0.015 (-0.27) 0.937 (7.15)*** -0.083 (-1.08) 
HML 0.802 (3.01)*** -0.239 (-2.44)** -0.079 (-0.61) -0.402 (-1.87)* 0.205 (2.10)** 0.293 (1.61) 0.005 (0.05) 
MOM 0.060 (0.46) 0.097 (2.28)** 0.007 (0.14) -0.148 (-1.18) -0.035 (-0.70) -0.126 (-1.67)* -0.136 (-2.83)*** 
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.27 0.10 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (18.91) 0.012 (2.45) 0 (9.14) 0.002 (3.10) 0.090 (2.68) 0 (20.36) 0 (6.62) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)Long-Short performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Table 5.15 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori) Long-Short for the full sample period 2005–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy) Long-
Short 
Rp(Materials) Long-
Short 
Rp(Industrials) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples) Long-Short 
Rp(Health Care) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Utilities) Long-
Short 
Sample period 31/12/2004 30/12/2011 
Constant 0.019 (6.26)*** 0.010 (4.55)*** 0.001 (0.85) -0.005 (-2.57)** 0.003 (3.15)*** 0.001 (0.76) -0.002 (-1.68)* 
RM 0.471 (5.74)*** 0.228 (4.48)*** 0.042 (1.69)* -0.154 (-3.40)*** 0.096 (3.51)*** 0.024 (0.98) -0.057 (-2.51)** 
SMB 0.517 (2.70)*** -0.103 (-0.79) -0.152 (-2.38)** -0.012 (-0.10) 0.018 (0.27) 0.797 (8.16)*** -0.180 (-2.92)*** 
HML 0.037 (0.17) -0.424 (-2.83)*** -0.076 (-0.72) -0.102 (-0.46) -0.124 (-1.26) 0.162 (1.37) -0.229 (-2.39)** 
MOM 0.084 (0.74) 0.106 (1.13) 0.045 (0.99) 0.072 (0.73) 0.019 (0.45) -0.056 (-1.17) 0.067 (1.21) 
Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 366 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.26 0.13 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (34.29) 0 (15.93) 0.054 (3.25) 0 (8.44) 0.005 (4.88) 0 (32.92) 0 (15.08) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Long-Short performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.16 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori) Long-Short for the sample period 2005–2007 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy) Long-
Short 
Rp(Materials) Long-
Short 
Rp(Industrials) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples) Long-Short 
Rp(Health Care) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Utilities) Long-
Short 
Sample period 18/3/2005 28/12/2007 
Constant 0.010 (2.94)*** 0.010 (3.87)*** 0.005 (1.70)* -0.000 (-0.12) 0.006 (2.93)*** 0.002 (0.74) 0.003 (1.62) 
RM 0.173 (2.36)** 0.217 (3.45)*** 0.164 (2.71)*** -0.024 (-0.30) 0.128 (2.82)*** 0.009 (0.16) 0.085 (1.90)* 
SMB 0.371 (1.95)* -0.159 (-1.50) -0.149 (-1.70)* 0.153 (0.99) -0.153 (-1.72)* 0.398 (2.22)** -0.076 (-0.78) 
HML 0.305 (0.87) -0.397 (-1.44) -0.354 (-1.66)* -0.022 (-0.09) -0.083 (-0.40) 0.259 (0.90) -0.175 (-0.94) 
MOM 0.699 (5.98)*** 0.413 (4.72)*** 0.086 (1.25) 0.052 (0.53) 0.078 (1.19) 0.190 (1.90)* -0.106 (-1.26) 
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.33 0.08 -0.002 0.04 0.14 0.02 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (19.0) 0 (15.0) 0.001 (3.64) 0.14 (0.94) 0.015 (2.23) 0 (5.59) 0.22 (1.47) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(sectori)Long-Short performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.17 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori) Long-Short for the full sample period 2008–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy) Long-
Short 
Rp(Materials) Long-
Short 
Rp(Industrials) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples) Long-Short 
Rp(Health Care) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Utilities) Long-
Short 
Sample period 04/1/2008 30/12/2011 
Constant 0.019 (6.08)*** 0.009 (3.91)*** 0.001 (0.75) -0.004 (-2.06)** 0.003 (2.27)** -0.000 (-0.10) -0.001 (-1.17) 
RM 0.528 (5.81)*** 0.224 (3.95)*** 0.005 (0.19) -0.192 (-3.38)*** 0.096 (2.70)*** 0.043 (1.48) -0.086 (-3.29)*** 
SMB 0.457 (1.93)* -0.157 (-0.92) -0.175 (-2.09)** -0.084 (-0.54) 0.082 (0.91) 0.899 (8.18)*** -0.184 (-2.59)** 
HML -0.203 (-0.79) -0.498 (-2.59)** 0.004 (0.03) -0.057 (-0.21) -0.110 (-0.89) 0.076 (0.57) -0.153 (-1.40) 
MOM -0.078 (-0.61) 0.023 (0.20) 0.037 (0.66) 0.073 (0.63) 0.020 (0.38) -0.123 (-2.71)*** 0.112 (1.76)* 
Observation 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.35 0.22 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (18.68) 0 (6.37) 0.014 (1.56) 0 (5.33) 0.001 (2.66) 0 (23.02) 0 (12.85) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Long-Short performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively. 
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Table 5.18 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori) Long-Short for the full sample period 2001–2011 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Materials) Long-
Short 
Rp(Industrials) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples) Long-Short 
Rp(Health Care) 
Long-Short 
Rp(Utilities) Long-
Short 
Sample period 12/1/2001 30/12/2011 
Constant 0.019 (7.78)*** 0.008 (5.03)*** 0.003 (2.75)*** -0.003 (-2.17)** 0.003 (3.82)*** 0.003 (2.15)** -0.001 (-1.32) 
RM 0.485 (8.16)*** 0.164 (4.60)*** 0.096 (3.69)*** -0.096 (-3.07)*** 0.080 (3.93)*** 0.066 (2.33)** -0.032 (-1.65)* 
SMB 0.602 (4.79)*** -0.046 (-0.61) -0.067 (-1.21) -0.020 (-0.23) 0.013 (0.29) 0.823 (10.7)*** -0.161 (-3.08)*** 
HML 0.236 (1.29) -0.230 (-2.71)*** -0.175 (-2.38)** -0.413 (-3.71)*** -0.020 (-0.34) 0.097 (1.07) -0.303 (-5.16)*** 
MOM 0.109 (1.36) 0.150 (3.03)*** -0.000 (-0.01) -0.061 (-0.97) 0.023 (0.76) -0.101 (-2.54)** -0.013 (-0.35) 
Observations 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.08 
P-value (F-
stat) 
0 (50.51) 0 (17.33) 0 (8.17) 0 (8.89) 0.003 (5.42) 0 (50.67) 0 (14.1) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Long-Short performance using Carhart model Eq (56-1) under OLS with Newey-
West estimator. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; MOM controls for the momentum effect. the second to eighth columns 
show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based 
portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively.
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Table 5.19 Regression results of Portfolio(Energy)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable Rp(Energy)
ETS    
Model Specification Eq (56-1) Eq (56-2) Eq (56-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
27/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
27/12/2007 
30/12/2012 
27/12/2007 
30/12/2013 
Constant 0.001 (0.38) 0.000 (0.05) 0.000 (0.09) -0.002 (-1.29) -0.002 (-1.28) -0.002 (-1.28) 
RM 1.003 (15.44)*** 0.985 (14.53)*** 0.981 (14.77)*** 0.957 (23.27)*** 0.957 (23.24)*** 0.957 (23.22)*** 
SMB 0.247 (2.34)** 0.259 (2.28)** 0.250 (2.10)** 0.300 (2.91)*** 0.300 (2.88)*** 0.301 (2.88)*** 
HML -0.181 (-0.63) -0.185 (-0.61) -0.152 (-0.50) 0.239 (1.98)** 0.239 (1.97)* 0.237 (1.95)* 
MOM 0.689 (3.54)*** 0.663 (3.07)*** 0.700 (3.20)*** 0.372 (2.92)*** 0.372 (2.91)*** 0.371 (2.90)*** 
EUA  0.006 (0.95) 0.006 (0.89)  -0.000 (-0.23) -0.000 (-0.24) 
EUA(-1)   0.003 (0.34)   0.001 (1.20) 
Observations 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.89 0.89 0.89 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (71.44) 0 (53.37) 0 (45.15) 0 (425.5) 0 (338.7) 0 (281) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Energy)ETS under OLS with a Newey–West estimator in two separate sub-
sample periods, 2005–2007 and 2008–2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the sector index logged return in excess of the risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is the logged weekly 
return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowances price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the 
estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005–2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 
2008–2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.20 Regression results of Portfolio(Materials)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable Rp(Materials)
ETS    
Model Specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
Constant 0.004 (2.37)** 0.004 (2.02)** 0.004 (2.29)** 0.001 (1.38) 0.001 (1.35) 0.001 (1.30) 
RM 1.050 (26.21)*** 1.049 (25.49)*** 1.058 (26.51)*** 1.078 (39.20)*** 1.078 (39.31)*** 1.079 (38.98)*** 
SMB 0.505 (10.03)*** 0.511 (9.64)*** 0.531 (10.28)*** 0.816 (9.01)*** 0.813 (8.87)*** 0.817 (8.94)*** 
HML 0.143 (1.06) 0.078 (0.57) 0.089 (0.63) 0.095 (0.98) 0.096 (0.98) 0.086 (0.89) 
MOM 0.436 (5.29)*** 0.398 (4.56)*** 0.376 (4.01)*** 0.004 (0.06) 0.006 (0.08) 0.0003 (0.00) 
EUA  -0.001 (-0.33) -2E-05 (-0.01)  0.001 (1.28) 0.001 (1.24) 
EUA(-1)   -0.007 (-2.63)**   0.003 (7.33)*** 
Observations 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.96 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (338) 0 (243.7) 0 (218.2) 0 (1120) 0 (892.9) 0 (753.2) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Materials)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two separate sub-
sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of 
EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the estimated 
coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2008 to 
2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.21 Regression results of Portfolio(Industrials)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable 
Rp(Industrials)
ETS    
Model Specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
Constant 0.004 (1.64) 0.003 (1.07) 0.003 (1.15) 0.002 (2.44)** 0.003 (2.51)** 0.003 (2.50)** 
RM 1.010 (18.18)*** 0.992 (17.56)*** 1.003 (18.10)*** 1.095 (43.47)*** 1.096 (43.49)*** 1.096 (43.24)*** 
SMB 0.664 (7.14)*** 0.642 (7.21)*** 0.665 (7.09)*** 0.830 (8.72)*** 0.836 (8.73)*** 0.836 (8.68)*** 
HML 0.117 (0.66) 0.053 (0.28) 0.041 (0.22) -0.088 (-0.86) -0.089 (-0.87) -0.090 (-0.87) 
MOM 0.093 (0.73) 0.083 (0.60) 0.040 (0.28) -0.154 (-2.10)** -0.158 (-2.16)** -0.159 (-2.15)** 
EUA  -0.001 (-0.27) -0.000 (-0.09)  -0.002 (-4.01)*** -0.002 (-3.96)*** 
EUA(-1)   -0.008 (-1.79)*   0.000 (0.17) 
Observations 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.93 0.93 0.93 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (135) 0 (106) 0 (89.19) 0 (669.1) 0 (535.4) 0 (444) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Industrials)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two separate sub-
sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of 
EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the estimated 
coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2008 to 
2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
 168 
Table 5.22 Regression results of Portfolio(Consumer Discretionary)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable Rp(Consumer Discretionary)
ETS    
Model specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
28/12/2007 
30/12/2011 
Constant 0.001 (0.32) 0.000 (0.04) 0.000 (0.09) 0.007 (3.34)*** 0.007 (3.44)*** 0.007 (3.53)*** 
RM 1.028 (15.05)*** 1.020 (14.56)*** 1.019 (14.14)*** 1.258 (20.99)*** 1.260 (21.04)*** 1.256 (21.13)*** 
SMB 0.327 (1.95)* 0.313 (1.79)* 0.309 (1.75)* 0.880 (5.82)*** 0.892 (5.89)*** 0.883 (5.77)*** 
HML 0.340 (1.48) 0.214 (0.87) 0.241 (0.97) 0.197 (0.63) 0.195 (0.63) 0.217 (0.69) 
MOM -0.171 (-0.98) -0.220 (-1.15) -0.194 (-1.01) -0.172 (-0.67) -0.180 (-0.69) -0.167 (-0.65) 
EUA  -0.005 (-1.00) -0.004 (-0.94)  -0.004 (-4.56)*** -0.004 (-4.42)*** 
EUA(-1)   0.001 (0.22)   -0.007 (-4.03)*** 
Observations 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.81 0.81 0.81 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (71.92) 0 (51.74) 0 (43.45) 0 (226) 0 (180.9) 0 (152.5) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Consumer Discretionary)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two 
separate sub-sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; 
SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged 
weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the 
estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 
2008 to 2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Table 5.23 Regression results of Portfolio(Consumer Staples)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Dependent variable 
Rp(Consumer Staples)
ETS    
Model specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2011 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2012 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2013 
Constant -0.013 (-7.75)*** -0.014 (-8.05)*** -0.014 (-8.48)*** -0.007 (-4.37)*** -0.007 (-4.28)*** -0.007 (-4.22)*** 
RM 0.666 (17.54)*** 0.657 (17.17)*** 0.642 (17.01)*** 0.731 (16.32)*** 0.734 (16.42)*** 0.732 (16.25)*** 
SMB 0.351 (3.51)*** 0.343 (3.35)*** 0.312 (3.18)*** -0.026 (-0.21) -0.009 (-0.07) -0.013 (-0.10) 
HML -0.018 (-0.09) -0.120 (-0.61) -0.117 (-0.61) -0.161 (-1.01) -0.164 (-1.03) -0.153 (-0.96) 
MOM -0.296 (-1.96)* -0.371 (-2.36)** -0.323 (-2.11)** 0.186 (1.06) 0.175 (0.99) 0.181 (1.03) 
EUA  0.001 (0.39) 0.000 (0.05)  -0.006 (-8.13)*** -0.006 (-8.08)*** 
EUA(-1)   0.010 (2.30)**   -0.003 (-4.86)*** 
Observations 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.71 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (53.95) 0 (37.83) 0 (33.15) 0 (126.8) 0 (103.5) 0 (86.56) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Consumer Staples)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two separate 
sub-sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and 
HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly 
return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the estimated 
coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2008 to 
2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Table 5.24 Regression results of Portfolio(Health Care)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2  
Dependent variable 
Rp(Health Care)
ETS    
Model specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2011 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2012 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2013 
Constant -0.005 (-2.43)** -0.007 (-3.05)*** -0.007 (-3.02)*** -0.004 (-2.88)*** -0.004 (-2.79)*** -0.004 (-2.81)*** 
RM 0.889 (21.34)*** 0.869 (21.16)*** 0.873 (21.47)*** 0.786 (22.22)*** 0.787 (22.14)*** 0.788 (22.09)*** 
SMB -0.111 (-0.72) -0.111 (-0.70) -0.104 (-0.67) -0.773 (-5.59)*** -0.763 (-5.53)*** -0.761 (-5.48)*** 
HML -0.730 (-3.33)*** -0.842 (-3.82)*** -0.844 (-3.81)*** -0.127 (-0.92) -0.128 (-0.92) -0.133 (-0.95) 
MOM -0.689 (-3.96)*** -0.748 (-4.05)*** -0.760 (-4.18)*** 0.548 (3.25)*** 0.541 (3.20)*** 0.538 (3.16)*** 
EUA  0.001 (0.22) 0.001 (0.29)  -0.003 (-2.46)** -0.003 (-2.47)** 
EUA(-1)   -0.002 (-0.47)   0.001 (2.15)** 
Observation 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.77 0.77 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (70.66) 0 (50.4) 0 (41.5) 0 (173.8) 0 (139.4) 0 (115.8) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Health Care)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two separate sub-
sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of 
EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance price return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the estimated 
coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2008 to 
2011. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively  
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Table 5.25 Regression results of Portfolio(Utilities)ETS for sub-sample periods Phase 1 and Phase 2  
Dependent variable Rp(Utilities)
ETS    
Model specification Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) Eq (5-1)Eq (6-1) Eq (5-2)Eq (6-2) Eq (5-3)Eq (6-3) 
Sample period 31/12/2004 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2011 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2012 
04/01/2008 
30/12/2013 
Constant -0.008 (-4.45)*** -0.008 (-4.95)*** -0.008 (-4.88)*** -0.006 (-4.74)*** -0.006 (-4.66)*** -0.006 (-4.64)*** 
RM 0.757 (19.82)*** 0.738 (20.60)*** 0.737 (20.53)*** 0.813 (19.73)*** 0.814 (19.70)*** 0.814 (19.62)*** 
SMB 0.114 (1.36) 0.116 (1.42) 0.113 (1.40) 0.005 (0.06) 0.013 (0.14) 0.012 (0.13) 
HML 0.123 (0.76) 0.120 (0.70) 0.130 (0.76) 0.095 (0.96) 0.094 (0.95) 0.095 (0.95) 
MOM 0.479 (3.81)*** 0.475 (3.51)*** 0.487 (3.50)*** 0.169 (1.78) 0.164 (1.71) 0.164 (1.71) 
EUA  0.010 (3.75)*** 0.010 (3.78)***  -0.002 (-3.83)*** -0.002 (-3.84)*** 
EUA(-1)   0.001 (0.32)   -0.000 (-0.34) 
Observation 157 146 145 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.88 0.88 0.88 
P-value  
(F-statistics) 
0 (130.8) 0 (102.6) 0 (85.13) 0 (386.2) 0 (309.9) 0 (257.1) 
The table reports coefficients (t-stats) from the regression results of Portfolio(Utilities)ETS under OLS with Newey-West estimator in two separate sub-
sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML 
controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of 
EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance return of the previous observation. The second to fourth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-
stat) for the sample period 2005 to 2007. The fifth to seventh columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stat) for the sample period 2008 to 2011. ***, **, * 
represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.26 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Non-ETS for sub-sample period Phase 1 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Materials)No
n-ETS 
Rp(Industrials)N
on-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)N
on-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)Non-ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)Non-ETS 
Rp(Utilities) Non-
ETS 
Sample period 31/12/2004 28/12/2007 
Constant 0.011 (2.73)*** 0.014 (4.91)*** 0.008 (6.58)*** -0.000 (-0.30) -0.008 (-4.74)*** -0.005 (-2.49)** -0.005 (-2.75)*** 
RM 1.175 (12.26)*** 1.265 (18.75)*** 1.155 (45.60)*** 0.996 (31.25)*** 0.789 (18.61)*** 0.856 (17.07)*** 0.832 (17.28)*** 
SMB 0.620 (3.31)*** 0.33 (2.90)*** 0.493 (10.86)*** 0.459 (6.28)*** 0.182 (2.20)** 0.274 (2.91)*** 0.021 (0.20) 
HML -0.089 (-0.20) -0.345 (-1.42) -0.259 (-2.35)** 0.193 (1.57) -0.154 (-0.79) -0.386 (-1.81)* -0.081 (-0.41) 
MOM 1.945 (7.12)*** 1.184 (6.32)*** 0.258 (4.14)*** -0.099 (-1.17) -0.174 (-1.31) -0.181 (-1.02) 0.292 (1.51) 
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.82 0.95 0.91 0.77 0.72 0.66 
P-value 
(F-statistic) 
0 (87.95) 0 (181.17) 0 (667.59) 0 (383.05) 0 (133.07) 0 (99.32) 0 (75.43) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)
Non-ETS using Carhart 4-factor based model Eq (6-1) under OLS with 
Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2007. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI 
Europe index ) in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors’ incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively; 
MOM controls for the momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-stats) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care and Utilities companies-based portfolio, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance 
levels respectively. 
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Table 5.27 Extended regression results of Portfolio(sectori)Non-ETS for sub- sample period Phase 2 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Materials)Non-
ETS 
Rp(Industrials)No
n-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Discretionary)
Non-ETS 
Rp(Consumer 
Staples)Non-ETS 
Rp(Health 
Care)Non-ETS 
Rp(Utilities) Non-
ETS 
Sample period 28/12/2007 6/1/2012 
Constant 0.017 (4.63)*** 0.010 (3.78)*** 0.003 (3.08)*** 0.003 (2.30)** -0.004 (-3.25)*** -0.004 (-2.72)*** -0.007 (-4.73)*** 
RM 1.484 (13.16)*** 1.307 (18.21)*** 1.100 (39.79)*** 1.067 (29.77)*** 0.825 (21.61)*** 0.828 (22.23)*** 0.724 (15.97)*** 
SMB 0.756 (2.50)** 0.669 (2.78)*** 0.662 (6.40)*** 0.803 (7.34)*** 0.061 (0.88) 0.128 (1.41) -0.177 (-1.50) 
HML 0.032 (0.10) -0.419 (-1.77)* -0.086 (-0.87) 0.138 (0.91) -0.265 (-2.48)** -0.050 (-0.39) -0.051 (-0.33) 
MOM 0.217 (0.63) 0.042 (0.17) -0.085 (-0.86) -0.030 (-0.16) 0.223 (1.63) 0.301 (2.02)** 0.391 (2.90)*** 
Observations 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.80 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.80 
P-value  
(F-statisitcs) 
0 (161) 0 (206.65) 0 (961.63) 0 (404.74) 0 (323.13) 0 (213.99) 0 (204.9) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating sector-based Portfolio(Sectori)Non-ETS using the Carhart four-factor model under OLS with a Newey–
West estimator for the sample period 2008–2011. RM is the risk premium measured by the logged return of the market benchmark (MSCI Europe index ) in 
excess of the risk-free rate; SMB and HML control for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms, respectively; MOM controls for 
the momentum effect. The second to eighth columns show the estimated coefficients (t-statistics) of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Health Care, and Utilities companies-based portfolios, respectively. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels 
respectively. 
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5.4.2 Emissions-to-cap status analysis of the main sectors 
This section presents the result of a basic comparative and statistical analysis of sectoral 
emissions status and stock prices performance measured by the respective portfolio, which 
is intended to form the first step in empirically examining the second proposed research 
question and enhancing the connection between the first and the second research questions. 
This extends the analysis conducted previously that focused solely on whether ETS effects 
on financial performances differed across individual sectors, and provides straightforward 
observations with statistical evidence regarding the association of the allowances holding 
position with the stock market performance at sector level. 
 
Table 5.28 reveals two major aspects. The first is the actual sectoral emissions-to-cap (E-
C) status with numerical data, and the second concerns the statistical perspective of the 
sectoral E-C ratio being significantly different from an ‘on par’ allowances holding 
position. At first glance, the Energy sector appeared to have a constant long position in 
allowances during Phase 1, with emissions below the cap by an average of 1.85% . The 
Materials sector had emissions below the cap by an average of 13.5%, and the Utilities 
sector had emissions above the cap by an average of 10.8%. The E-C ratios and the 
portfolio performance measured by the estimated alphas of the Materials and Utilities 
sectors appeared consistent with the value relevance of the allowances tested and proven in 
the US SO2 market context by Johnston et al. (2008), as the stock market valued the 
Materials sector with the positive allowances holdings positively and the Utilities sector 
with the negative allowances holdings negatively during Phase 1. 
 
However, the stock market appeared indifferent in valuing the Energy sector, which also 
had a positive allowances holding position in Phase 1. A one-sample t-test helps to explain 
this finding, as shown in Table 5.28. The Energy sector had a different emissions-to-cap 
status in Phase 1 and Phase 2 as indicated by the figures, however, the two-tailed one-
sample t-test applied could not reject the hypothesis that the observed E-C ratio is different 
from zero at commonly accepted statistical significance levels. Turning attention to the 
Utilities sector, which is short of allowances in both trading periods, produces a more 
convincing outcome. The t-test shows that the E-C ratios of the Utilities sectors are 
significantly different from zero in both estimation periods, which indicates that the level 
of over-emitting is considerably high and could not be omitted. The persistent 
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underperformance identified in the sector-based portfolio performance seems to respond 
coherently, as the market seems to penalise Utilities firms for emitting over their 
designated cap. The result of the Materials sector for Phase 1 indicates that the significant 
outperformance of the stock return is accompanied by the statistically verified under-
emitting, which enhances the supporting evidence for the value-relevance of the sectoral 
emissions status. 
 
Table 5.28 Emissions-to-cap status of the main sectors 
 Energy Sector Materials Sector Utilities Sector 
Year 
(1) 
E-C 
Ratio 
(2) 
T-Test 
(3) 
Alpha 
(4) 
E-C 
Ratio 
(5) 
T-Test 
(6) 
Alpha 
(7) 
E-C 
Ratio 
(8) 
T-Test 
(9) 
Alph
a 
(10) 
2005 -3.22%   -15.94%   8.56%   
2006 -1.23%   -13.19%   11.18
% 
  
2007 -1.11%   -11.33%   12.59
% 
  
Phase 1  -2.21 ~ 0  -8.22** +++  7.45** ⊖⊖⊖ 
2008 10.83
% 
  -14.49%   36.76
% 
  
2009 3.58%   -35.71%   24.43
% 
  
2010 0.88%   -27.71%   21.40
% 
  
Phase 2  1.40 ~ 0  -3.43* ~ 0  4.79** ⊖⊖⊖ 
This table reports the emissions status of the three main sectors, Energy, Materials, and Utilities, 
analysed. The emissions status is determined by the E-C ratio, which is the emissions-to-cap ratio 
calculated by the difference between the verified emissions and the cap (Verified Emissions minus 
Cap) in relation to its cap. Column (1) lists the year of the E-C ratio recorded, columns (2)–(4) 
show the E-C ratio, t-test, and estimated alpha from the previous analysis for the Energy sector, 
columns (5)–(7) and (8)–(10) show the same information for the Materials and Utilities sectors. 
The t-test conducted is a two-tail, one-sample t-test which shows whether the E-C ratio is different 
from zero from a statistical point of view. ***, ** and * represents 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
This brief statistical analysis provides supporting evidence for the assumption linked to the 
second research question by confirming that emissions status appears relevant in 
explaining the sectoral differentiation of the EU ETS effect on stock market performance. 
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More precisely, this analysis shows that stock market investors consider that emissions 
status on aggregate at the sector level is a relevant factor in the valuation process. The 
value relevance of the sectoral emissions status works in the expected direction as the 
market seems to reward the under-emitting Materials sector and to penalise the over-
emitting Utilities sector. Following this inspiring finding, the analysis is taken a step 
further by examining whether the value-relevance of the emissions status also applies at 
the firm level within the three main sectors in the EU ETS; the results are presented in 
Section 6.4.3. 
 
5.4.3 EU ETS effects on stock prices: emissions status effect within main sectors 
This section starts by presenting the summary of estimation results for the portfolio 
performance of the respective emissions status-based portfolios. The estimated alpha of the 
portfolio performance responds to the question asking whether firms within a specific 
sector would experience different levels of impact on their stock price performance 
depending on their emissions status. Table 5.29 provides a summary of the performance of 
respective portfolios in different estimation periods. In short, the differentiation of 
portfolio performance due to allowances holding position at the firm level could not be 
detected in nearly 90% of the examinations conducted. 
 
Tables 5.31–5.33 present the full regression results of emissions status-based portfolios 
within the Energy, Materials, and Utilities sectors in the full sample period 2005–2010 
with different model specifications. The performance estimation results of the regression 
conducted for the portfolios consisting of firms with different emissions status in the main 
sectors appear identical to the results of the sector portfolio performance estimation. 
Energy sector firms experience no abnormal returns regardless of their emissions status. 
Materials sector firms see a significant outperformance against the benchmark in the full 
sample period in both portfolios, which consist of over-emitting and under-emitting firms 
respectively, while Utilities sector firms experience the opposite, regardless of their 
emissions status. This finding appears to work against the positive value-relevance of 
allowances holding suggested in Johnston et al. (2008), as the under-emitting firms, which 
are supposed to be valued positively compared with the over-emitting firms, are in fact 
valued in the same manner by the stock market. 
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Table 5.29 Summary of estimation results of the Portfolio(sectori)
emission status performance 
Portfolio 
(1) 
2005–2010 
(2) 
2005–2007 
(3) 
2008–2010 
(4) 
Energy (Over-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 
Energy (Under-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 
Materials (Over-Cap) ++ +++ ++ 
Materials (Under-Cap) +++ +++ ~ 0 
Utilities (Over-Cap) ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ 
Utilities (Under-Cap) ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ ⊖⊖⊖ 
This table provides an overview of the portfolio performance of emissions status-based portfolios 
in different estimation periods. The performance is measured by the alpha of the estimation model, 
which represents the abnormal return of the portfolio that is not explained by the standard Fama–
French risk factors. Column (1) lists the portfolio estimated. (Over-cap) contains firms with a 
positive E-C ratio while (Under-cap) has firms with a negative E-C ratio. Columns (2)-(4) show the 
estimated alphas of respective sector-based portfolio for the Pre-ETS, the full sample period, 
Phase1, and Phase2. ⊖ indicates a negative estimated coefficient and a underperformance while + 
indicates a positive estimated coefficient and an outperformance of the portfolio. ⊖ or + represents 
the 10%, ⊖⊖ or ++ represents 5%, and ⊖⊖⊖ or +++ represents 1% significance levels and ~ 0 is 
not at statistically significant. 
 
 
Tables 5.34–5.39 provide full regression results for the emissions status-based portfolio 
performance estimation in separate sub-sample periods. The same situation persists for the 
separate sub-sample periods of the first and second trading periods of the EU ETS, which 
implies that the stock market has not yet been able to value firm-level emissions status 
specifically. This could be attributed to the general lack of reliable and easily accessible 
market information regarding accurate firm-level carbon emissions, and the actual 
positions of allowances holding, as such information is not made available by the EUTL, 
which records only installation-level data. A similar issue is also raised in Bushnell et al. 
(2013). 
 
The outcomes of the emissions status effect differentiation estimation shares one major 
finding with the results of the investigation of the permit holding’s asset value in Bushnell 
et al. (2013), who find that dirtier firms suffer milder underperformance than relatively 
cleaner firms in the sector that is overall short in allowances. The results shown in Tables 
6.36 and 6.39 reveal that Utilities firms which are short in allowances experience a lower 
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level of underperformance (–0.5% weekly rate in both estimation periods) than the firms 
with a net long position of allowance holding (–1.2% in the Phase 1 and –0.7% in the 
Phase 2 estimation periods). 
 
Table 5.30 summarises the estimated coefficients of the allowances price factor to provide 
an overview of the responsiveness of emissions status-based portfolios to allowances price 
returns. During the longer-term estimation period which spans both trading periods of the 
EU ETS, the allowances price return does not seem relevant during the valuation process 
as none of the portfolio is responsive to the factor, as shown in Tables 5.32 to 5.33. This 
can be interpreted as indicating that the price signal of the EU allowances has not been 
strong from investors’ perspectives during the 2005–2010 period. Mixed results are seen 
during the separate sub-sample periods of 2005–2007 and 2008–2010, as few cases of 
sensitivity to allowances price returns can be detected. The emission status-based 
portfolios in the Energy and Utilities sectors follow nearly identical patterns of allowances 
price exposure in the sector-based portfolios in both estimation periods. The change of 
allowances price effects across different trading periods are identified strongly in the 
Utilities sector, which appears consistent with the findings in Mo et al. (2012), with the 
portfolio returns responding positively to allowances price changes in 2005–2007 and 
negatively during the second trading period. 
 
An increase in allowances prices, which is expected to increase the compliance costs for 
over-emitting firms, would theoretically be associated with a drop in the share price 
performance, which can only be seen in one case, the Utilities sector, during the 2008– 
2010 period. The insignificant coefficients of allowances value found in most estimations 
could be reasonably interpreted by the fact that the allowances price is consistently below 
the level of pronounced impact on the overall earnings of affected firms (Veith et al., 
2009). Similar issues concerning the level of allowances prices during most of the trading 
periods of EU ETS being too low to create any significant cost impact are also raised in 
Rogge et al. (2011) and Egenhofer et al. (2011), as well as in government communications 
such as EC (2012) and the UK House of Commons’ standard note by Ares (2013). 
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Table 5.30 Summary of estimated coefficients of the allowances price factor for 
Portfolio(sectori)emission status 
Portfolio 2005-2010 2005-2007 2008-2010 
(1) 
EUA 
(2) 
EUA(-1) 
(3) 
EUA 
(4) 
EUA(-1) 
(5) 
EUA 
(6) 
EUA(-1) 
(7) 
Energy(Over-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 
Energy(Under-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖⊖ ~ 0 
Materials(Over-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 
Materials(Under-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ + +++ 
Utilities(Over-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 +++ ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 
Utilities(Under-Cap) ~ 0 ~ 0 + ~ 0 ⊖⊖⊖ ~ 0 
This table provides a summary of the estimated coefficients for the allowances price factor, which 
indicate the exposure of the sector to the risk associated with allowances price variation. Column 
(1) lists the portfolio estimated. (Over-cap) contains firms with the positive E-C ratio while (Under-
cap) has firms with the negative E-C ratio. Columns (2) to (7) show the estimated coefficients of 
allowance price factors for respective emission status-based portfolios for the full sample period, 
Phase 1, and Phase 2. ⊖ indicates a negative estimated coefficient and the stock return and the 
allowances return move in the opposite direction while + indicates a positive estimated coefficient 
and stock return and the allowances return move in the same direction. ⊖ or + represents the 10%, 
⊖⊖ or ++ represents 5%, and ⊖⊖⊖ or +++ represents 1% significance levels and ~ 0 is not 
statistically significant. 
 
The results of the positive coefficients of both allowances price factors imply that the 
value-relevance of allowances, as suggested and empirically tested in the US SO2 market 
context by Johnston et al. (2008), can be observed in the EU ETS context for two out of 
three Under-Cap portfolios in the Materials sector in Phase 2 and the Utilities sector in 
Phase 1. However, the case of the Utilities sector is not convincing as the stock returns of 
the over-emitting Utility firms also respond positively to the allowances price change in 
Phase 1. 
 
Based on the empirical findings presented and discussed in Sections 5.4.1–5.4.3, the 
conclusion can be drawn from two main aspects, which answer the two research questions 
raised in this chapter. It is indicated by the sector-based portfolio performance estimation 
and the sectoral emissions status analysis that the EU ETS effect on stock price 
performances is differentiated at the sectoral level. The second set of analysis, which 
focuses on examining the emissions status of firms within the main sector, reveals that the 
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emissions status effect on share prices appears to be differentiated at only the sectoral 
level, but not at the firm level. This can be interpreted as suggesting that stock market 
investors consider the emissions status and the net allowances holding positions of the 
sector relevant, and value stocks accordingly. However, investors have not yet been able to 
value specifically the net position at the firm level. This finding seems to share Bushnell et 
al.’s (2013) opinion, which points out that the lack of easily accessible firm-level 
allowances holdings and trading information with regard to the EU ETS might have caused 
difficulties in evaluating firms’ precise net allowances position holdings and consequently 
difficulties in valuing the firms’ share prices. 
 
While the overall positions of most sectors regulated by the EU ETS, and the overall 
trading scheme in aggregate, have been long in allowances, this does not apply to the 
utilities sector. The Utilities sector, which comprises mainly power generators, is 
constantly short in allowances throughout the entire ETS trading period. The compliance 
costs for certain sectors, such as materials and industrials, could be as low as nil due to the 
over-allocation/over-supply of allowances in Phase 1 particularly, which cannot be seen in 
the utilities sector (Kettner et al., 2011; Ellerman and Buchner, 2008). However, the costs 
of purchasing extra allowances for emissions cap compliance still seem inconsequential for 
utilities firms from the long-term perspective, as they are able to access low-cost 
allowances provided by other participants in the scheme.  
 
One estimated outcome throughout Chapter 4 and 5 that is somehow less intuitive and 
worth mentioning is the significantly positive coefficient of the SMB factor, which implies 
that the portfolios tested in this chapter demonstrate the feature of small-cap risk premium 
in terms of stock returns. As one might expect the firms covered by the trading scheme 
tend to be the larger firms, although it is not necessarily the case that this is also true of the 
sample dataset used in this thesis. The sample dataset contains 153 firms from seven 
sectors while the benchmark universe contains ten sectors. The Financials, Information 
Technology and Telecommunication are currently not directly exposed to the EU’s trading 
scheme, and thus are not included in the sample dataset. According to the Financial Times 
and PwC53 these three sectors in fact account for a considerable proportion of the 
companies of large market capitalisation globally (35%) and in Europe (36.8%). 
                                            
53 Pwc (2015) Global Top 100 Companies by market capitalization; Financial Times Europe Top 500 (2014)  
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Furthermore, the healthcare and consumer goods sectors also account for a considerable 
number of large-cap companies, while their exposure to EU ETS is very limited as these 
two sectors accounts for less than 15% of the sample composition. Hence, the nature of the 
sample dataset is reasonably reflected by the positive SMB coefficient as the actual 
components of the portfolios tested in both chapters are likely on the small-cap side in 
relation to the benchmark.  
 
In addition, the decision of constructing the portfolios with an equal weight to each 
component is intended to more closely represent the equal exposure to the same emission 
trading scheme, as the main purpose of this thesis has always been to understand the 
potential impacts of the EU ETS on the share prices of exposed firms. The value-weighted 
strategy has been considered but was not carried out due to the possibility that the portfolio 
performance can then be heavily influenced by the market capitalisation rather than the 
exposure to EU ETS. Nevertheless, it is recognised that the empirical analysis in both 
Chapter 45 and 56 could be examined by applying alternative portfolio construction 
methods. 
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Table 5.31 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Sectori)emission status for the sample period 2005–2010 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
over-cap Rp(Energy)
under-cap Rp(Materials)
over-cap Rp(Materials)
under-cap Rp(Utilities)
over-cap Rp(Utilities)
under-cap 
Sample period 07/01/2005 24/12/2010 
Constant -0.002 (-1.18) 0.001 (0.87) 0.007 (2.47)** 0.003 (3.16)*** -0.005 (-2.99)*** -0.009 (-5.26)*** 
RM 0.911 (19.45)
*** 1.027 (23.91)*** 1.135 (17.49)*** 1.061 (53.04)*** 0.849 (22.07)*** 0.745 (18.34)*** 
SMB 0.384 (3.80)*** 0.405 (5.13)*** 0.652 (3.44)*** 0.736 (9.37)*** -0.024 (-0.32) 0.163 (1.88)* 
HML 0.347 (2.40)** 0.091 (0.80) -0.115 (-0.59) 0.242 (2.52)** 0.016 (0.15) 0.077 (0.85) 
MOM 0.628 (3.86)*** 0.468 (4.01)*** -0.075 (-0.32) 0.165 (2.28)** 0.327 (2.81)*** 0.294 (3.41)*** 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 312 
Adj. R2 0.75 0.84 0.78 0.94 0.84 0.79 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (238.2) 0 (410.3) 0 (280.2) 0 (1235) 0 (406) 0 (292.5) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating emission status-based Portfolio(Sectori)emission status within three major sectors using Eq (56-1) under OLS 
with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by MSCI Europe sector index logged return in excess of 
risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively. MOM controls for the momentum 
effect. The second and third columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting energy firms; the fourth and fifth columns report coefficients 
(t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting materials firms, and the sixth and seventh columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting 
utilities firms. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level, respectively. 
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Table 5.32 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Sectori)emission status for the sample period 2005–2010 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
over-cap Rp(Energy)
under-cap Rp(Materials)
over-cap Rp(Materials)
under-cap Rp(Utilities)
over-cap Rp(Utilities)
under-cap 
Sample period 18/03/2005 24/12/2010 
Constant -0.003 (-1.45) 0.001 (0.59) 0.007 (2.41)** 0.003 (3.05)*** -0.005 (-3.01)*** -0.009 (-5.25)*** 
RM 0.908 (19.36)
*** 1.025 (23.81)*** 1.136 (17.38)*** 1.061 (53.55)*** 0.849 (21.75)*** 0.746 (18.27)*** 
SMB 0.379 (3.70)*** 0.405 (5.12)*** 0.656 (3.42)*** 0.734 (9.31)*** -0.023 (-0.31) 0.163 (1.85)* 
HML 0.349 (2.36)** 0.092 (0.80) -0.128 (-0.64) 0.228 (2.36)** 0.001 (0.01) 0.062 (0.67) 
MOM 0.634 (3.78)*** 0.468 (3.92)*** -0.087 (-0.36) 0.151 (2.07)** 0.317 (2.64)*** 0.285 (3.19)*** 
EUA 0.002 (1.48) 0.000 (0.09) -0.001 (-1.40) 0.001 (1.55) -0.001 (-0.84) -0.002 (-1.10) 
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 
Adj. R2 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.94 0.84 0.79 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (191.2) 0 (327.5) 0 (215.6) 0 (968.9) 0 (318.3) 0 (228.5) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating emission status-based Portfolio(Sectori)emission status within three major sectors analysed using Eq (56-2) 
under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by MSCI Europe sector index logged return in 
excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively, and MOM controls for 
the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EUA spot from European Energy Exchange(EEX). The second and third columns report coefficients (t-
stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting energy firms; the fourth and fifth columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting materials 
firms, and the sixth and seventh columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting utilities firms. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% 
statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.33 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Sectori)emission status for the sample period 2005–2010 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
over-cap Rp(Energy)
under-cap Rp(Materials)
over-cap Rp(Materials)
under-cap Rp(Utilities)
over-cap Rp(Utilities)
under-cap 
Sample period 25/03/2005 24/12/2010 
Const. -0.003 (-1.44) 0.001 (0.62) 0.007 (2.42)** 0.003 (3.09)*** -0.005 (-3.04)*** -0.009 (-5.18)*** 
RS 0.908 (19.29)*** 1.024 (23.69)*** 1.135 (17.34)*** 1.061 (53.32)*** 0.850 (21.78)*** 0.745 (18.12)*** 
SMB 0.380 (3.69)*** 0.405 (5.10)*** 0.656 (3.41)*** 0.734 (9.26)*** -0.024 (-0.31) 0.164 (1.86) 
HML 0.350 (2.35)** 0.096 (0.83) -0.123 (-0.61) 0.230 (2.38)** -0.003 (-0.02) 0.069 (0.75) 
MOM 0.635 (3.78)*** 0.472 (3.94)*** -0.083 (-0.34) 0.154 (2.11)** 0.313 (2.60)*** 0.293 (3.32)*** 
EUA 0.002 (1.46) 0.000 (0.10) -0.001 (-1.38) 0.001 (1.50) -0.001 (-0.85) -0.002 (-1.12) 
EUA(-1) 0.000 (0.23) 0.000 (0.35) -0.000 (-0.35) 0.000 (0.18) -0.000 (-0.21) 0.001 (0.69) 
Observations 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Adj. R2 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.94 0.84 0.79 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (158.3) 0 (272.3) 0 (178.8) 0 (807.8) 0 (264.8) 0 (193.1) 
This table reports full regression results of estimating emission status-based Portfolio(Sectori)emission status within three major sectors analysed using Eq (56-3) 
under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 2005 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by MSCI Europe sector index logged return in 
excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline towards size and book-to-market value of firms respectively. MOM controls for the 
momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) represents the allowance return of the previous observation. The second and 
third columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting energy firms; the fourth and fifth columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting 
and under-emitting materials firms, and the sixth and seventh columns report coefficients (t-stat) of over-emitting and under-emitting utilities firms. ***, **, * 
represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.
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Table 5.34 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Energy)emission status for the sample period 2005–2007 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
over-cap Rp(Energy)
under-cap 
 Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
Constant -0.002 (-0.56) -0.004 (-0.93) -0.004 (-0.92) 0.003 (0.90) 0.002 (0.42) 0.002 (0.44) 
RM 0.891 (10.68)*** 0.863 (10.03)*** 0.859 (9.39)*** 1.044 (14.91)*** 1.014 (14.51)*** 1.006 (14.76)*** 
SMB 0.358 (2.93)*** 0.352 (2.77)*** 0.345 (2.67)*** 0.314 (2.82)*** 0.313 (2.65)*** 0.296 (2.38)** 
HML -0.012 (-0.04) 0.011 (0.03) 0.018 (0.05) -0.216 (-0.71) -0.141 (-0.44) -0.112 (-0.35) 
MOM 0.679 (3.32)*** 0.706 (3.03)*** 0.722 (3.09)*** 0.739 (3.57)*** 0.781 (3.44)*** 0.826 (3.54)*** 
EUA  0.008 (1.17) 0.007 (1.00)  0.008 (1.17) 0.007 (1.05) 
EUA(-1)   0.002 (0.21)   0.005 (0.73) 
Observation 156 146 145 156 146 145 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.66 
P-value 0 (40.12) 0 (30.55) 0 (25.13) 0 (73.7) 0 (55.68) 0 (46.71) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based energy firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 
2005 to 2007. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap energy) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the energy sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap energy) 
which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the energy sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively  
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Table 5.35 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Materials)emission status for the sub-sample period 2005–2007 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Materials)
over-cap Rp(Materials)
under-cap 
 Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
Constant 0.006 (2.65)*** 0.005 (2.28)** 0.006 (2.37)** 0.003 (1.86)* 0.003 (1.61) 0.003 (1.85)* 
RS 1.113 (20.45)*** 1.103 (20.26)*** 1.107 (20.34)*** 1.035 (24.70)*** 1.034 (24.00)*** 1.047 (24.98)*** 
SMB 0.630 (7.61)*** 0.631 (6.87)*** 0.638 (6.80)*** 0.458 (7.55)*** 0.466 (7.44)*** 0.493 (8.37)*** 
HML 0.194 (0.98) 0.146 (0.75) 0.161 (0.81) 0.145 (0.99) 0.092 (0.61) 0.095 (0.62) 
MOM 0.151 (1.29) 0.157 (1.22) 0.156 (1.18) 0.527 (5.33)*** 0.484 (4.69)*** 0.446 (4.12)*** 
EUA  -0.006 (-1.91)* -0.006 (-1.73)*  0.001 (0.19) 0.002 (0.58) 
EUA(-1)   -0.003 (-0.92)   -0.009 (-2.90)*** 
Observations 156 146 145 156 146 145 
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (212) 0 (155) 0 (131.1) 0 (256.9) 0 (186.1) 0 (165.3) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based materials firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period 
of 2005 to 2007. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap materials) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the materials sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap 
materials) which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the materials sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5.36 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Utilities)emission status for the sub-sample period 2005–2007 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Utilities)
over-cap Rp(Utilities)
under-cap 
 Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
07/01/2005 
28/12/2007 
18/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
25/03/2005 
28/12/2007 
Constant -0.006 (-3.49)*** -0.007 (-4.15)*** -0.007 (-4.26)*** -0.012 (-4.71)*** -0.012 (-4.74)*** -0.012 (-4.67)*** 
RS 0.784 (18.06)*** 0.761 (18.81)*** 0.758 (18.72)*** 0.683 (14.23)*** 0.667 (14.06)*** 0.658 (13.42)*** 
SMB -0.036 (-0.37) -0.038 (-0.41) -0.043 (-0.46) 0.402 (4.59)*** 0.400 (4.76)*** 0.380 (4.60)*** 
HML 0.140 (0.74) 0.165 (0.80) 0.155 (0.74) 0.107 (0.58) 0.084 (0.46) 0.126 (0.70) 
MOM 0.628 (3.89)*** 0.648 (3.76)*** 0.649 (3.64)*** 0.094 (0.80) 0.072 (0.58) 0.132 (1.01) 
EUA  0.010 (3.74)*** 0.010 (3.48)***  0.009 (1.82)* 0.009 (1.77)* 
EUA(-1)   0.002 (0.63)   0.006 (1.54) 
Observation 156 146 145 156 146 145 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.61 0.60 0.62 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (104.4) 0 (83.39) 0 (69.08) 0 (60.58) 0 (45.15) 0 (40.4) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based utilities firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period 
of 2005 to 2007. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap utilities) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the utilities sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap 
utilities) which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the utilities sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively. 
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Table 5.37 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Energy)emission status for the sub-sample period 2008–2010 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Energy)
over-cap Rp(Energy)
under-cap 
 Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
Constant -0.003 (-1.63) -0.003 (-1.65) -0.003 (-1.64) -0.000 (-0.16) -0.000 (-0.12) -0.000 (-0.13) 
RM 0.911 (17.14)*** 0.911 (17.13)*** 0.911 (17.09)*** 1.022 (20.10)*** 1.022 (20.02)*** 1.023 (19.92)*** 
SMB 0.385 (2.81)*** 0.382 (2.75)*** 0.383 (2.74)*** 0.399 (4.06)*** 0.402 (4.07)*** 0.403 (4.04)*** 
HML 0.381 (2.09)** 0.382 (2.08)** 0.381 (2.06)** 0.085 (0.61) 0.084 (0.60) 0.083 (0.59) 
MOM 0.597 (2.73)*** 0.599 (2.73)*** 0.598 (2.71)*** 0.351 (2.44)** 0.349 (2.42)** 0.348 (2.40)** 
EUA  0.001 (1.18) 0.001 (1.17)  -0.001 (-1.97)* -0.001 (-1.97)* 
EUA(-1)   0.000 (0.41)   0.000 (0.34) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (203.8) 0 (162.1) 0 (134.2) 0 (378.1) 0 (300.9) 0 (249.1) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based energy firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 
2008 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap energy) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the energy sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap energy) 
which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the energy sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively. 
 189 
Table 5.38 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Materials)emission status for the sub-sample period 2008–2010 
Dependent 
variable 
Rp(Materials)
over-cap Rp(Materials)
under-cap 
 Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
Constant 0.007 (2.08)** 0.007 (2.09)** 0.007 (2.06)** 0.002 (1.58) 0.002 (1.51) 0.001 (1.48) 
RM 1.147 (14.77)*** 1.147 (14.76)*** 1.147 (14.75)*** 1.075 (46.20)*** 1.075 (46.30)*** 1.077 (45.56) 
SMB 0.641 (2.41)** 0.642 (2.39)** 0.643 (2.38)** 0.822 (9.71)*** 0.817 (9.54)*** 0.827 (9.84) 
HML -0.219 (-0.97) -0.219 (-0.97) -0.221 (-0.97) 0.196 (1.94)* 0.197 (1.95)* 0.185 (1.83) 
MOM -0.167 (-0.55) -0.168 (-0.55) -0.169 (-0.55) 0.055 (0.77) 0.058 (0.80) 0.049 (0.68) 
EUA  -0.000 (-0.37) -0.0004 (-0.37)  0.001 (1.79)* 0.001 (1.77)* 
EUA(-1)   0.0004 (0.44)   0.003 (8.21)*** 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.96 0.96 0.96 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (126.8) 0 (100.8) 0 (83.44) 0 (995.1) 0 (795.5) 0 (673.8) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based materials firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period 
of 2008 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap materials) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the materials sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap 
materials) which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the materials sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance levels respectively.  
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Table 5.39 Extended regression results of Portfolio(Utilities)emission status for the sub-sample period 2008–2010 
Dependent variable Rp(Utilities)
over-cap Rp(Utilities)
under-cap 
Model Specification Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) Eq (5-1) Eq (5-2) Eq (5-3) 
Sample period 04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
04/01/2008 
24/12/2010 
Constant -0.005 (-2.96)*** -0.005 (-2.86)*** -0.005 (-2.85)*** -0.008 (-4.45)*** -0.008 (-4.36)*** -0.007 (-4.33)*** 
RM 0.869 (20.42)*** 0.870 (20.36)*** 0.870 (20.28)*** 0.756 (15.70)*** 0.758 (15.68)*** 0.758 (15.62)*** 
SMB -0.051 (-0.46) -0.042 (-0.37) -0.042 (-0.37) 0.077 (0.69) 0.087 (0.76) 0.087 (0.75) 
HML -0.096 (-0.71) -0.098 (-0.72) -0.099 (-0.72) 0.062 (0.60) 0.060 (0.58) 0.061 (0.59) 
MOM 0.194 (1.34) 0.188 (1.29) 0.188 (1.28) 0.341 (3.08)*** 0.335 (2.98)*** 0.335 (2.98)*** 
EUA  -0.003 (-5.30)*** -0.003 (-5.28)***  -0.003 (-6.23)*** -0.003 (-6.17)*** 
EUA(-1)   9E-05 (0.10)   -0.000 (-0.32) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.83 
P-value (F-stats.) 0 (251.3) 0 (202.1) 0 (167.3) 0 (192.2) 0 (154.9) 0 (128.2) 
The table reports the full regression results for emission status-based utilities firms’ portfolios under OLS with Newey-West estimator for the sample period of 
2008 to 2010. RM is the risk premium measured by sector index logged return in excess of risk-free rate; SMB and HML controls for the investors incline 
towards size and book-to-market value of firms; MOM controls for the momentum effect. EUA is logged weekly return of EEX EUA spot while EUA(-1) 
represents the allowance return of previous observation . The second to fourth columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (over-cap utilities) which 
consists of firms with allowance shortage in the utilities sector, and the fifth to seventh columns report the coefficients (t-stat) for Portfolio (under-cap utilities) 
which consists of firms with allowance surplus in the utilities sector. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 10% statistical significance level respectively. 
 
Chapter 5 The differentiation of EU’s emission trading effect on share prices – a sector-
level analysis 
191 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter responds to two research questions. First, it explores whether the EU ETS has 
an impact on share prices and the extent to which this impact can be differentiated at the 
sectoral level. This is done by comparing the performances of sector-based portfolios 
consisting of ETS and Non-ETS-exposed firms, respectively, with the standard and 
extended market models. Second, the effect of the emissions status on the share prices of 
ETS-regulated firms is further examined at the sectoral level and firm level within the 
Energy, Materials, and Utilities sectors, respectively. The three main sectors are identified 
based on their shares of allowances allocation in the entire trading scheme and their 
inclusion in the number of companies. This is intended to find out whether stock market 
investors consider the emissions status relevant in the valuation process. The result of this 
test signals how much the emission-related information is taken into consideration by stock 
market investors during the valuation process. 
 
The analyses comprise three parts. The first part uses regressions with multi-factor market 
models to evaluate the performance of sector-based portfolios, which are constructed by 
ETS-regulated firms and Non-ETS firms that operate in the same sector. The second part 
contains the comparative and statistical analysis of the sectoral emissions status and stock 
price performance measured by the respective portfolios. The third and final part takes the 
investigation of the emissions status effect differentiation a step further by utilising the 
same econometric method and forming portfolios that consist of firms with the same 
emissions status within each sector. 
 
The results of the first set of analyses reveal that six out of seven sector-based portfolios 
with ETS-exposed firms significantly underperformed the market benchmark during the 
Pre-ETS period of 2001–2004. Among these six sectors, the Energy sector has been valued 
indifferently by the stock market since the official launch of the EU ETS in 2005. During 
the continuous EU ETS trading period, the Utilities, Health Care, and Consumer Staples 
sectors consistently experience underperformance while the Materials, Industrials, and 
Consumer Discretionary sectors see an outperformance against the market benchmark. 
This indicates that the impact of the EU ETS on stock prices does differ across sectors 
among ETS-exposed firms. On the other hand, the Non ETS-exposed portfolios show less 
sensitivity toward the transition from the Pre-ETS period into the ETS period. 
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Interestingly, the performance of the three major sectors (Energy, Materials, and Utilities) 
is found to be closely related to sectoral emissions status, with the significantly over-
emitting sector Utilities underperforming and the significantly under-emitting sector 
Materials outperforming the market benchmark. Moreover, the performance estimation 
results of the regression done for the portfolios consisting of firms with different emissions 
status in the main sectors appear fairly similar to the results of the sector-based portfolio 
performance estimation. Energy sector firms experience no abnormal returns regardless of 
their emissions status. Materials sector firms see a significant outperformance against the 
benchmark in the full sample period in both portfolios, which consist of over-emitting and 
under-emitting firms, respectively, while Utilities sector firms experience consistent 
underperformance regardless of emissions status. 
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The first confirms that the stock 
return performance of ETS-regulated firms can be differentiated at sectoral level to a 
certain degree, as different levels of abnormal portfolio returns are observed. Second, it 
appears that performance can also be differentiated by emissions status at sectoral level as 
the under-emitting sector sees a reward in share value while the over-emitting sector 
experiences a value penalty. The third aspect concerns the finding that the stock return 
performances differentiated by emissions status cannot be seen at the firm level within 
sectors. These results are interpreted as implying that investors considering the net 
allowances holdings positions of the sector relevant for the valuation of stocks. However, 
stock market investors have not yet been able to specifically value the net allowances 
holdings positions of firms, as indicated by the portfolio performance estimations of the 
emission status-based portfolios within sectors. In contrast, it seems relatively viable for 
investors to gain information or a general sense of emissions status at the aggregate level, 
such as at the sectoral level. In terms of policy implications, this chapter highlights the 
relevance of any government or NGO initiatives aiming to ensure the reliability and 
accessibility of firm-level carbon emissions data. Equivalently, this chapter signals a need 
for business processes that ensure the reliability of reported carbon data – for instance, 
through independent audits or verifications – so that the shareholder value of the firms can 
be more precisely reflected.
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6 Determinants of firm-level emissions performance ratio in EU’s emission trading 
6.1 Introduction 
The research focus of this chapter lies in firm-level emissions across different countries 
and industrial sectors within the EU ETS context. More specifically, the interest lies in 
identifying the factors that are associated with the emissions level of each firm during the 
period 2005–2010. Firm emissions regulated by the EU ETS are relevant for the European 
Union’s efforts to achieve their emissions reduction target, as they account for more than 
45% of the total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the entire European Union. 
Understanding what contributes to GHG emissions at the corporate level can thus provide 
useful insights into a potentially more effective emissions reduction. Furthermore, this 
chapter is also planned with the purpose of further enhancing the practicability of the 
empirical methods applied in the previous two chapters by providing a suitable proxy for 
the emission status with a series of tested factors. 
 
Empirically-based studies that focus on this particular subject are still relatively limited, 
which is presumably due to the lack of availability of relevant and reliable firm-level 
emissions data. This lack of factual data might be related to the fact that regulations 
concerning standardised emissions reporting are far from complete. As documented in the 
Data Chapter, the majority of currently existing carbon emissions reporting/disclosure 
schemes are on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, the reporting and verification standards are 
not unified, which results in an inconsistency in the data quality gathered by voluntary 
schemes (Cho and Patten, 2007; Liesen et al., 2013; Matsumura et al., 2013). 
 
Existing studies have limited their empirical examinations of the emissions determinants of 
firms to a single country (Cole et al., 2005, 2012) or a single industrial sector (Apergis et 
al., 2013; Gray and Shadbegian, 2007; Shadbegian and Gray, 2003). To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, no empirical analysis has so far explicitly identified firm-level 
emissions determinants within a multi-nation, multi-sector context, and under a 
compulsory emissions cap. The analysis in this chapter is the first attempt to identify the 
drivers of firm-level emissions under the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS), within 
which the regulated firms have obligations to manage their emissions levels under the 
given cap. 
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The reason for focusing on the EU ETS is mainly to address the data unavailability 
drawbacks mentioned above. The mandatory scheme provides a consistent legislative 
background and requirements for verifying and reporting carbon emissions for each 
company. Furthermore, the emissions produced by each firm can be benchmarked against 
its respective allocated allowances, which provide a more accurately scaled dependent 
variable and indicates the performance of each company in maintaining its emissions 
compliance levels under the same regulatory scheme (EC, 2003b). The focus of this 
analysis is to empirically investigate and explain firm-level emissions performance within 
a mandatory scheme, the EU ETS. It is expected that the results will provide insights into 
how firm-level emission behaviour might be influenced by a mandatory emissions 
restriction scheme. 
 
The research question can be posed as follows: which factors systematically explain the 
carbon emissions performance, measured by the verified emission-to-cap ratio, at firm 
level within the EU ETS? The research question is explored from two perspectives: first, 
what are the main determinants of the firm’s emissions compliance performance? Second, 
the firms subject to the EU ETS in the first two trading periods generally operate in 
emissions intensive sectors,54 such as the utilities, materials, and energy sectors. Among 
these emissions intensive firms, how far is the firm’s emissions performance ratio related 
to the sector in which it operates? Furthermore, will any factor have a greater influence on 
the firm’s performance ratio in specific sectors? The analysis in this chapter aims to extend 
previous research by exploring the determinants of emissions compliance performance 
within a relatively new regulatory context, while the study by Cole et al. (2012), which 
also focused on firm-level emissions, examined the emissions of firms that are not subject 
to mandatory emissions restriction. This chapter is also expected to benefit from the 
improved quality of firm-level emissions data, as the data reported within the EU ETS is 
now subject to standardised procedures and required verifications (EC, 2007b). A set of 
potential determinants of firm-level emissions performance are tested using a panel 
dataset, composed of an exclusive company database of EU ETS, the world’s largest 
mandatory ETS. The analysis in this chapter is the first attempt to date to utilise EU ETS-
                                            
54 The EU ETS targets bigger emitters, in particular during the first and second trading period. The threshold for inclusion in the ETS is 
defined in Directive 2003/87/EC (EC, 2003a).  
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regulated firm-level data to empirically examine the association of emissions performance 
with firm characteristics.  
 
The investigation into the proposed research question aims to make a contribution to the 
current literature in four major aspects. First, the investigation examines factors that have 
previously been tested in other geographic locations in the EU ETS context, to reveal 
whether determinants of firm emission intensity apply in different geographic settings. 
Second, unlike previous studies, the investigation concentrates on firms within a 
mandatory environmental regulation regime. The results of the investigation are expected 
to reveal whether firms that are subject to explicit environmental regulation react 
differently in their emissions behaviour since results from previous research, such as the 
study by Cole et al. (2012), indicate that self-constructed regulation proxies do not show a 
significant impact on firm-level emissions intensity. Third, the investigation explores the 
potential sectoral differentiation of emissions determinants, as the dataset employed in the 
empirical analysis consists of firms that operate across seven industrial sectors. Fourth, the 
investigation empirically tests the effects of early preparation by EU member states for the 
implementation of the EU ETS, as well as the effects of technology adoption by firms. 
This is also the first attempt to include such factors. 
 
In addition to the contribution to academic literature, this chapter is also expected to 
complement the previous two chapters by demonstrating how to incorporate emission 
status data ex-ante into the investment decision-making process and adding practicability 
to the thesis. The hypothetical portfolios with specific emission status in the two previous 
chapters are constructed ex-post as emission data is only accessible after it had been 
recorded and published, and hence the analysis and results from the previous two chapters 
provide empirical evidence with regard to how ETS-exposed firms having specific 
emission status performed historically. This chapter is designed to create a model that can 
explains the determinants of a firm’s emissions performance ratio with explanatory factors 
that can be used to estimate the firm’s future or contemporary emission status, provided the 
explanatory factors are either known and can also be properly estimated. As the proposed 
explanatory factors are mostly firm-specific operational and accounting measures, they can 
be more easily obtained than emissions data. The application of the estimation process 
enables the use of emission status information before the actual data are published and 
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accessible, as the proximate emission performance ratio of a specific firm can be obtained 
by inputting the firm’s operational data into the estimation model used in this chapter. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents a review of two streams of 
literature that inspired the empirical investigation and provided the estimation framework 
empirically tested in this chapter. Section 6.3 first describes the dataset used in the 
analysis, from which the research methods and model specifications follow. The last part 
of Section 6.3 details the model and regression specification used in the analysis. Section 
6.4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and discusses the implications of the main 
findings; Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Literature review 
Two streams of literature motivated and helped to build the main framework of the 
empirical estimation model in this chapter, and are reviewed in this section in the 
following order. At first, inspiration was drawn from studies that focus on empirically 
examining the determinants of emissions, as this stream of literature explores a similar 
subject, either GHG or carbon emissions, to that in this chapter. Although the main 
research subject in this chapter is firm-level emissions, studies that investigate emissions in 
aggregate, such as industry- or country-level emissions, are also reviewed, for two reasons. 
First, aggregate-level emissions provide a foundation for the estimation model that drills 
down to the firm-level emissions, as the aggregate-level data are ultimately inclusive of 
disaggregate-level data. For instance, overall industrial-level emissions consist of 
individual plant-/firm-level emissions. Second, studies that concentrate on firm-level 
emissions are relatively limited in number, presumably due to data availability. The second 
stream of literature investigates the factors that can influence corporate environmental 
performance and also provides a motivation for establishing the foundation of the 
empirical model for firm-level carbon emissions by associating the emissions level with 
indicators of corporate environmental performance. 
 
6.2.1 Emission determinants 
Cole et al. (2012) investigate emissions per output unit at firm level by utilising an 
extensive dataset that comprises emission data of 1961 manufacturing firms for 2006 with 
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a cross-sectional regressions technique. The authors model the emissions output as a 
function of the supply–demand fundamentals of environmental services, which is an 
essential element in determining a firm’s production function, as also applied in Cole et al. 
(2005) and Pargal and Wheeler (1996). The model is built upon reaching the equilibrium 
of utilisation of environmental services, which is reflected by the demand of the firm 
interacting with the supply provided by society or mandatory environmental regulations. 
Control variables are then identified and grouped into firm characteristics, which 
potentially affect the demand side, and regulatory characteristics, which represent the 
supply-side influences. Their results show that several firm characteristics significantly 
influence emissions intensity in varying degrees and directions. While the capital–labour 
ratio and wage rate are positively related to CO2 emissions intensity, firm size,  
innovation expenditure, export share, and foreign affiliation appear to be negative 
functions of unit emissions intensity. 
 
Apergis et al. (2013) apply an autoregressive model to examine the effect of research and 
development (R&D) expenditure on emissions at firm level with manufacturing sector data 
in three European countries where the mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) takes place. Their findings reveal that R&D expenditure 
increases emissions abatement, i.e. a reduction in total emissions, of firms during post-
IFRS adoption. This study is interesting as its setting within the mandatory reporting 
context is similar to the empirical design of this chapter. The introduction of EU ETS, 
which coincides partially with their estimation sample period, also provides valuable 
insights for this chapter. The results demonstrate the anticipated direction of influences, 
though at this stage without statistical significance. 
 
More disaggregate plant-level emissions data have also been examined. Such studies are 
set largely within the US context by utilising the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), particularly its plant-level toxic release inventory (TRI) data. Evidence is provided 
that local manufacturing activities are strongly linked with local pollution levels. 
Spillovers of cross-regional pollution are also identified (Kahn, 1999). Determinants of the 
environmental performance of paper mills, which is measured by pollution emissions per 
unit of output, have been empirically examined by Shadbegian and Gray (2003). Financial 
resources of plants used for abatement expenditure and productivity efficiency are 
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significant factors that drive plants’ emissions levels. An interesting finding in the study is 
that plants located in regions that failed to comply with ambient air quality standards that 
had been previously implemented,55 thus facing higher local regulation pressure, show 
significantly lower emissions in the analysis. Plant- and firm-specific characteristics 
including size, profitability, and technology level are again confirmed as factors that drive 
the differences in environmental management, measured by Gray and Shadbegian (2007) 
for pollution emissions of manufacturing plants. They intend to explore the spatial 
correlations of plants’ different types of pollution emissions further, and suggest that plant-
specific characteristics still provide a large amount of explanatory power for the models 
inspected.  
 
In addition to studying firm-level subjects, research at a more aggregate level was also 
reviewed for inspiration. Hamit-Haggar (2012) investigates the long-term equilibrium 
between GHG emissions, energy consumption, and economic growth at the industrial level 
in Canada. He also tests whether a causal relationship between these variables exists. The 
use of industry-level data is intended to reduce the conflicting results provided by 
aggregate-level data as done in previous country-level studies. The dataset comprises 21 
industrial sectors in Canada with annual emissions from 1990 to 2007. The findings 
confirm a strong long-term relationship between energy consumption and GHG emissions. 
The empirical design and findings based on the use of industrial-level data support the 
relevance of the research question and the use of firm-level data proposed in this chapter.  
From a similar industrial level perspective, Cole et al. (2005) investigate emissions 
intensity using UK industry-level data, which encompass six sources of emissions, 
including CO2, across 22 industries from 1990 to 1998. They focus on exploring how 
industrial characteristics and environmental regulation has shaped industrial emissions 
intensity, which also forms the fundamental framework for the firm-level study by Cole et 
al. (2012). Their results reveal a positive link between energy use and physical as well as 
human capital intensity and emissions intensity. On the other hand, industrial emissions 
intensity appears to be negatively associated with the average value-added of firms, and 
the productivity and expenditure on technology innovation within the industry. 
 
                                            
55 The authors use the ambient air quality standards for particulates and SO
2
 in 1985. 
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The relationship between GHG emissions, energy consumption, and economic growth 
(income) at country level has been largely studied on the basis of the Environmental 
Kuznet Curve (EKC) hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that the relationship between 
pollutant sources, which form the proxies of environmental pressure faced by countries, 
and economic conditions, which are usually measured by per capita income, follows an 
inverted U-shaped function. That is to say, the environmental pressure facing a country 
rises with the growth of national income up to a certain level, and decreases subsequently 
(Dinda, 2004; Kijima et al., 2010). 
 
A number of studies focus on exploring the causal relationships between GHG emissions, 
economic conditions, and energy consumption on the basis of the EKC hypothesis; 
however the results tend to be mixed and inconclusive, particularly under different scales 
of economy setting (Shafik, 1994; Coondoo and Dinda, 2002; Friedl and Getzner, 2003; 
Dinda and Coondoo, 2006; Ang, 2007; Soytas et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the logic used to 
explain the EKC hypothesis and its associated effects has helped to develop the theoretical 
framework for potential drivers of different forms of environmental performance, 
including emissions, through several aspects. For instance, the technology effect is one 
explanation for a positive link between economic growth and environmental quality after 
the turning point. A nation/society with more wealth can better afford the costs of 
technological innovation, which can replace obsolete, energy inefficient technologies, thus 
eventually improving overall environmental quality (Komen et al., 1997). 
 
Apergis et al. (2010) further extend previous studies by introducing different mixtures of 
energy sources and present evidence that such sources can moderate the level of emissions 
in different ways. A similar investigation is also seen in Marrero (2010), who applies a 
dynamic panel data of 27 EU countries to examine the extended EKC hypothesis. The 
results do not support the assumption of EKC, when the energy and emissions convergence 
factors are taken into consideration in addition to economic growth. 
 
Country-level studies with aggregate-level subjects shed light on the fundamental 
assumption about the factors associated with emissions at the aggregate country level, such 
as economic conditions, energy consumption, and energy mix; however these factors 
cannot directly differentiate among more disaggregated entities, such as industries or firms 
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within a country. Adjustments are required to better proxy for factors potentially associated 
with firm-level emissions. 
 
6.2.2 Corporate environmental performance drivers 
The literature that studies the determinants of factors driving firm-level environmental 
performance is also reviewed, to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the 
environmental behaviour of firms. As suggested by Ilinitch et al. (1998) and Delmas and 
Blass (2010) conceptually, the measures of corporate environmental performance are often 
inclusive of emissions behaviour. 
 
A number of studies provide empirical evidence on the linkage between firm 
environmental performance and firm characteristics in various performance measures and 
geographical contexts. An empirical study by Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) aimed to 
identify the factors that explicitly influenced firms’ responsiveness towards environmental 
issues in Canadian industries. Their results revealed that industries differed in their 
response in engaging in the process of becoming environmentally responsive. Internal and 
external pressures from various groups, including shareholders, management, and 
customers, also showed various levels of influence. It was further shown that the firm’s 
sales-to-assets ratio negatively affected the possibility of forming active environmental 
plans. Extending the Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) study by explicitly fixing the variable 
of research interest on the actual environmental performance, Doonan et al. (2005) sought 
to learn the determinants of the specific environmental performances of firms. The 
environmental performance defined in their study encompassed a series of events including 
emissions in a single industry. Their results remained partially consistent with previous 
studies indicating that external pressures, such as government and community pressures, 
are the main drivers of firms’ environmental performance. The involvement of a higher 
management level, including a consideration of the firm’s financial resources, also plays a 
significant part in moderating the environmental performances of firms. A similar subject 
has been studied in Japanese industries, and firm size, profitability (measured by return on 
assets or ROA), the debts-to-assets ratio as well as technology innovation investment are 
among the factors that determine organisational commitment towards overall 
environmental performance and specific environmental issue management, such as CO2 
emissions management (Nakamura et al., 2001; Cole et al., 2006). Using TRI data as the 
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measure of environmental performance of S&P 500 firms, Anton et al. (2004) empirically 
tested the effects of a firm’s adoption of comprehensive environmental management 
systems on their environmental performance, as measured by TRI. Their results suggested 
that the adoption of a more extensive environmental management strategy had a significant 
impact on reducing emissions. Firm-specific characteristics, such as the sale-to-assets ratio 
and technology innovation investment, also showed some degree of direct or indirect effect 
on firm environmental performance. Examining the related subject of the determinants of 
firms’ decisions to adopt a proactive environmental management strategy, Clarkson et al. 
(2011) provide empirical evidence that the firm’s financial resources, proxied by ROA, 
liquidity, and leverage (the debt–asset ratio), are crucial factors affecting its environmental 
performance. 
 
Some other studies have employed a broader perspective by examining and testing 
empirically overall environmental, social, and governance performance drivers. While the 
attempt might be made to explain overall corporate social responsibility primarily by 
institutional factors, a set of industry and firm effects are also selected and controlled for. 
Empirically tested firm characteristics, such firm performance/profitability and size, show 
significant impacts on three dimensions of corporate social responsibility which 
encompass the environmental performance of firms (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). 
 
Another study that focuses on corporate environmental performance is that by de Villiers 
et al. (2011), who primarily investigate the effects of corporate board characteristics on 
firm environmental performance. In addition to their principal test variables, which are a 
set of board features motivated by agency theory and resource dependence theory, the 
authors also employ a set of firm characteristics which are potentially linked to corporate 
environmental performance as control variables. Their results indicate that firm size, age, 
profitability measured by ROA, slack, and equipment age are significantly related to firm 
environmental performance. The analysis in this chapter benefits from this research design 
as the results provide strong empirical evidence on the factors associated with 
environmental performance, and thus potentially associated with the emission behaviour of 
firms. 
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To briefly summarise, the theoretical foundations of investigation planned in this chapter is 
informed by two streams of literature building. First, studies with empirical evidence on 
disaggregated emission determinants have shown that factors driving the demand–supply 
fundamentals of the environmental services, emissions output in our case, are significantly 
associated with the emissions level. Among these factors, capital intensity shows a strong 
influence on emissions levels at both firm and industrial level (Cole et al., 2005, 2012). 
Furthermore, studies that empirically examined the EKC hypothesis inform us about the 
impact of technology effects associated with economic conditions on environmental 
quality. Second, the literature that empirically examines the factors that systematically 
explain corporate environmental performance provides support for the theoretical basis of 
firm characteristics-driven environmental performance. These firm characteristics are 
presumed to be linked with the emissions behaviour of firms, with the emissions level 
serving as a proxy for environmental performance (Delmas and Blass, 2010). 
 
6.3 Data and method 
This section consists of two parts: the first describes the sample dataset used for the 
analysis, including its source and scope. The second starts by explaining the rationale 
behind the proposed effects, which are expected to be related to firm-level emissions and 
form the framework of the estimation model. This part continues with the description of 
the model construction process, followed by the detailed model specification. 
 
6.3.1 Data 
The primary purpose of the analyses in this chapter is to reveal the factors that are related 
to the firms’ emissions performance, measured by the emissions-to-allowances ratio. To 
construct the variable under investigation, emissions data and allowances allocated to each 
firm are extracted from the Carbon Market Data ETS Company Database. As described in 
Chapter 3, Carbon Market Data provides users with the regulated firm population within 
the EU ETS and annual firm-level verified emissions. It is thus the most appropriate 
provider of data for the research subject. 
 
The full database provided by Carbon Market Data contains 887 firms that are regulated by 
the EU ETS, and include public and private companies. Due to the inaccessibility of data 
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regarding private companies underlying several independent variables (i.e,  production, 
use of renewable energy), the sample in this analysis contains only the 201 publicly listed 
firms. As the information on location of each individual installation owned by the 
respective firm is lacking, spatial factors could not be precisely addressed as in Cole et al. 
(2012). Firms with headquarters outside the European territory are excluded from this 
analysis, leaving a final sample of 140 firms of data spanning 2005–201056. Firm financial 
data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The sample distribution, correlation 
matrix, and basic descriptive statistics of the sample dataset are produced to provide the 
basic information and understanding of the data used in the analysis. None of the 
correlations between proposed independent variables exceeds 0.4, which ensures minimum 
interference among independent variables that could lead to erratic estimated coefficients 
caused by multicollinearity. Increasing ROA, and the capital–labour ratio see an ascending 
trend in the emissions-to-allowances ratio, which is consistent with the hypotheses 
proposed. 
 
6.3.2 Method and model specification 
a). Dependent variable 
The main subject of investigation in this chapter is the emissions performance of each 
company within the EU ETS. The performance measure is constructed by calculating the 
verified emissions-to-allowances ratio. This approach is mainly inspired by Cole et al. 
(2012, 2005) and Pargal and Wheeler (1996), in which the dependent variables serve as the 
proxy for firms’ pollution levels, and these studies provide an empirically tested reference 
to reflect upon. These studies have been the best available proxy for the analysis proposed 
to answer the research question in this chapter. 
 
It is noteworthy that the dependent variable adopted in this chapter differs in distinct ways 
from the studies mentioned above. While the firm’s production output is used as the 
denominator to scale the absolute emissions in Cole et al. (2012), it is not the most ideal 
scaling unit for this analysis. To construct a clean and accurate dependent variable, in the 
Cole et al. (2012) case, both figures presumably represent the same percentage of the total 
figure in each company, if not 100%. However, the total emissions of each firm regulated 
                                            
56 The exclusion is primarily due to restrictions of data access as well as the reason explained in 3.4.1. Given Cole et al. (2012) 
excludes 85% of their full sample, the inclusion rate of analyses in this chapter is considered acceptable. 
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by EU ETS is not necessarily 100% of the firm’s emissions, as the EU ETS Directive 
includes installations that pass a certain threshold, which is indicated in Annex I of the 
ETS Directive (EC, 2003a). The total production output of each firm, which is used to 
scale the emissions, is obtained from Datastream, which in most cases would be expected 
to represent 100% of each firm’s production output. 
 
Therefore, a new denominator to scale the absolute emissions is required in this chapter to 
ensure the accuracy of the dependent variable, which is essential to obtain meaningful 
estimation results. The objective of the entire thesis, thus including this first empirical 
chapter, is to observe and empirically test how much impact the mandatory emissions 
restriction, in this case the EU ETS, has upon the regulated firms, given their either full or 
partial inclusion in the EU ETS. The way to form the dependent variable in this chapter 
using all EU ETS data ensures that the new dependent variable is more accurately 
constructed using data of the same scope for each firm. This will be the first empirical 
evidence to date showing the factors that are relevant to the firm’s performance in terms of 
emitting below its cap, which is imposed by the EU ETS. 
 
b). Independent variables  
Based on the theoretical background gathered from previous literature, five firm-level 
emissions-related effects are proposed and each effect is tested by a corresponding 
independent variable. The propositions are briefly summarised in Table 6.1. The set of 
independent variables is built largely upon the previous literature that specifically 
examines firm-level emissions, while a mixture of empirical evidence at the industry and 
national levels as well as the corporate environmental performance literature is also 
utilised. This is intended to better configure the specification of the estimation model to be 
used in explaining firm-level emissions intensity. The set of independent variables contains 
a series of firm characteristics which have been previously tested and linked to corporate 
emissions/environmental performance, and are considered the most relevant to the research 
question in this chapter. Each variable is defined and discussed in more detail below. 
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Table 6.1. Proposed firm-level emissions related effects and the corresponding 
variables 
(1) Proposed effect (2) Variable and proposition (3) 
1 Production Output Effect 
Firm production is positively related to 
Verified Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
2 Capital Intensity Effect 
Capital–Labour Ratio is positively related 
to Verified Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
3 
Action Taking Effect 
Renewable Energy Use (by firm) is 
negatively related to Verified Emissions-
to-Cap Ratio 
4 
Early Action toward EU ETS taken by 
member states is negatively related to 
Verified Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
5 Sector Differentiation Effect 
Determinants of Verified Emissions-to-
Cap Ratio are Sector-specific, as 
indicated by the Sector Dummy 
6 Sector-Specific Effect 
Sector-specific interaction terms are 
expected to show if any of the proposed 
effects (1) to (4) are significant in a 
specific sector 
This table lists the proposed effects and corresponding hypothesis of the estimation model used in 
examining the determinants of firm-level emission behaviour. Column (2) lists the proposed effect 
on emission behaviour, column (1) lists the respective hypothesis and column (3) describes the 
underlying hypothesis for each effect and the independent variable used in the model. 
 
 
• Production 
The production effect is motivated by two observations that imply a linkage 
between production output and the two figures which are used to form the 
dependent variable in this chapter, respectively. First, following Cole et al. (2012, 
2005), carbon emissions could be modelled as the supply of and demand for 
environmental services, which compose an input into a firm’s production 
function. In other words, absolute emissions are correlated with the firms’ 
production output. The production output of each firm is defined as the 
summation of each firm’s total sales, finished goods, and work-in-progress 
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figures. The figure is estimated in its natural logarithmic form to minimise the 
effect of extreme values. 
 
• Capital–Labour Ratio 
The capital intensity of the production processes is likely to influence the 
pollution level of firms in the same direction; that is to say, more capital intensive 
firms, which are generally heavily dependent on machinery and equipment, tend 
to be more pollution intensive than labour intensive firms. Empirical evidence is 
provided at both the industrial and firm levels of investigation by Cole et al. 
(2005, 2012) and Cole and Elliot (2003). The capital–labour ratio is defined as 
capital expenditure divided by the total number of employees of each firm. To 
minimise the effect of extreme values, the capital–labour ratio is estimated using 
its natural logarithmic form. 
 
• Renewable Energy Use 
The link between renewable energy use and emissions performance is 
hypothesised based on the technology effect. As obsolete machinery and 
equipment can be less energy efficient and more pollution intensive, newer 
equipment is expected to incorporate greener technologies, which should lead to 
better environmental performance, and will be less emissions intensive. A 
proposition with similar equipment/technology-specific concerns is documented 
in Clarkson et al. (2008) and also used in de Villiers et al. (2011). This factor is 
controlled using a dummy variable, with 1 representing a company that uses 
renewable energy in a specific year. 
 
• Early Action 
Prior to the implementation of EU ETS, a number of EU member states had 
implemented or prepared to implement their own carbon emissions/climate acts 
(Ellerman et al., 2010: 19–20). For instance, a voluntary ETS was initiated and 
ran from 2002 in the UK. The UK DEFRA57 and NAO58 reports indicate that the 
direct participants in the UK ETS on average committed to a 13% reduction in 
                                            
57 Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs. 
58 National Audit Office. 
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emissions over the lifetime of the trading scheme (DEFRA, 2006: 18–20; NAO, 
2004: 13). Furthermore, participating companies gain experience and are well 
prepared for a mandatory scheme while the managing governmental agency also 
learns from the experience of running a trading scheme prior to a mandatory EU-
wide trading scheme. This factor is controlled using a dummy variable, with 1 
representing the member state in which the company’s HQ is located, adopting 
early actions prior to the official implementation of the EU ETS. 
 
• Sector59 
Firms that operate in different sectors are expected to face different levels of 
exposure regarding environmental issues, and thus different sectors will 
demonstrate varying levels of environmental management capability. This aspect 
is particularly relevant to analyses in this chapter, as the sample dataset employed 
consists of firms operating across sectors. The Cole et al. (2005) study that 
empirically examines the relationship between industrial pollution intensity and 
industrial characteristics enhances the motivation to test the sector differentiation 
effect. The industry dummy was also applied in Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), 
and is found to be significant. The sample contains seven sectors, as the inclusion 
of firms in the EU ETS follows the Annex I of the EU ETS Directive (EC, 2003), 
which is briefly documented in Appendix 2-B of Chapter 2. The intention of EU 
ETS for the first two phases is to regulate installations with higher thermal 
inputs/outputs caused from fuel and energy consumption, as this allows a 
relatively comparable measurement. The transportation industry is only included 
in the scheme from the beginning of Phase 3 (2013-), which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis as data had not been available. 
 
 
Model Specification 
 
The propositions raised above are tested by a random effect Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) regression. The GLS random effect model is applied and proved to be appropriate 
                                            
59 See Appendix 4A for reasons for sector categorisation, sector definition, and data distribution across sectors. 
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after conducting the Hausman Test, see Table 6.2. The random effect is specified in order 
to allow the sector differentiation effect by adding sector dummies.  
 
Table 6.2 The result of the Hausman Test 
 -coefficients- (b-B) √(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑉(𝑏) − 𝑉(𝐵) 
(b) (B) 
 fixed random Difference S.E. 
Production 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.03 
K–L Ratio 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 
Renewable Energy 
Use 
-0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 
ROA 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
Leverage -0.25 -0.26 0.01 0.11 
Chi2(5) = 5.94 (P-value = 0.31) 
This table shows the result of the Hausman test for the baseline model for a fixed/random effect 
specification using STATA. b = consistent under Ho and H1; obtained from the regression. B = 
inconsistent under H1, efficient under Ho; obtained from the regression. Test: Ho: difference in 
coefficients not systematic. The result indicates that the null hypothesis that the difference in 
coefficients is not systematic cannot be rejected, and thus a random effect model is appropriate. 
 
Firstly, a baseline model is constructed to test the general proposed effects (1) to (5), and 
can be written as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝐾=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         Eq (6-1) 
 
where, 
i = 1st, 2nd,......,141th firm in the sample and t = 1st, ......6th year of figures recorded (2005–
2010). Y = verified emissions-to-allowances ratio of Firmi. Sectorj denotes the sector 
dummy while j indicates which sector represents. Z presents a vector of general control 
factors including ROA, leverage, and a year dummy, which serve as control variables for 
their potential to influence corporate performance. Their link with emissions-specific 
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performance has, however, been mixed and inconclusive (Cole et al., 2006; Nakamura et 
al., 2001; de Villiers et al., 2011). 
 
The inclusion of the independent variables in the estimation model considers the most 
relevant firm characteristics, as the dependent variable in the model represents the firm’s 
emission management capability, rather than a return series of the type commonly used in 
asset pricing models. Previous literature (Cole et al., 2012, 2005; Apergis et al. 2013) have 
also mainly considered firm characteristics that are more relevant to emission or 
environmental performance rather than the common financial market risk factors (market 
capitalization, book-to-market value and momentum) used in the previous two chapters of 
the thesis. 
 
Secondly, another attempt is made to further disentangle the extent to which the proposed 
effects differ across sectors. More specifically, this analysis intends to determine whether 
the proposed effects appear more prominent in certain sectors in explaining firms’ 
emission behaviour. This approach is expected to further distinguish sector differences in 
firm-specific emissions intensity, by adding interaction terms on firm characteristics and 
sector dummies into the baseline model, with which the dataset is estimated. 
 
The inclusion of sector-specific interaction terms aims to address the issues raised in 
section 4.3.1, which explains that the sample used in this analysis contains firms that 
operate across different sectors, as opposed to previous studies that examined emissions 
within a single industrial sector, such as Cole et al. (2012) and Shadbegian and Gray 
(2003). The same technique to capture the potential effects caused by two factors 
interacting with each other is also applied in previous studies, such as Antweiler et al. 
(2001) and Cole and Elliot (2003). These studies control for the interaction between a trade 
liberalisation measure and country-specific characteristics, in order to better address the 
problem that a weak and inconsistent relationship between emissions sources and free 
trade measures can sometimes be detected. Only the energy, materials, and utilities sectors 
are included in the sector-specific analysis as none of the other four sectors accounts for 
more than 1% of the allowances share in the sample dataset. Also, the three sectors 
included in the second set of analysis all have a company count of more than 20, which 
ensures at least 120 observations in each sub-sample. A detailed sample distribution across 
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each sector is provided in Appendix 4-A. The interaction term is formed by the product of 
the firm characteristics effect, such as production or capital intensity, and the sector 
dummy. Interaction terms are made sector-specific and estimated separately. For instance, 
to examine whether the production effect is significantly influential for the energy sector, 
the regression is run by applying the energy–production interaction term. The same applies 
to other effects and sectors. 
 
The estimation model using only the energy sector interaction terms can be written as Eq 
(6-2), and the other two models with the materials and utilities sector-specific interaction 
terms are written as Eq (6-3) and Eq (6-4), respectively. Following the estimation with an 
individual interaction terms-added model, the dataset is estimated lastly by Eq (6-5), which 
contains all the sector-specific interaction terms. 
 
Eq (6-2) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝐾=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Eq (6-3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗−1 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝐾=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Eq (6-4) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝐾=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
Eq (6-5) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐾 − 𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑛
𝐾=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
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6.4 Results and discussion 
6.4.1 Result of estimations using the baseline models 
This section presents the basic descriptive statistics and correlation of the variables before 
the estimation results of the baseline models are shown and discussed. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
present the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Results are summarised with 
regards to the hypothesis tested in Table 6.5 and the full estimation results and the 
discussion of practical relevance and further implications of the findings follow. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 N Mean S.D. Min. Max. Median 
Emission–Cap Ratio 821 -0.15 0.36 -3.30 1.65 -0.11 
Production 821 19.54 2.10 12.06 23.89 19.90 
Capital–Labour Ratio 811 3.40 1.15 0.38 8.33 3.19 
Renewable Energy Use 840 0.46 0.5 0 1 0 
Early Action tw. ETS 840 0.43 0.5 0 1 0 
ROA 821 6.61 6.59 -24.30 62.35 6.02 
Leverage 821 0.27 0.13 0 0.64 0.27 
The panel dataset contains 140 firms and covers six years of the sample period. The loss of data 
points is due to (i) some firms dropping out of the EU ETS in phase 2,60 and (ii) the incomplete 
data of certain firms in some years.61 
 
 
None of the correlations between proposed independent variables exceeds 0.4, which 
ensures minimum interference among independent variables that could lead to erratic 
estimated coefficients caused by multicollinearity. Increasing ROA and a capital–labour 
ratio sees an ascending trend in the emissions-to-allowances ratio, which is consistent with 
the hypotheses proposed. 
 
 
 
                                            
60 Greencore, The Linde Group. 
61 CIE Automotive in 2010, Cyprus Cement Company in 2010, Tenaris SA in 2005 and 2006, Vassiliko Cememt Works in 2010. 
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Table 6.4 Correlation Matrix of dependent and independent variables 
 E-to-A Product
. 
C-L Renew
. 
Early 
Act 
ROA Lvg. 
Emission–Cap Ratio        
Production -0.07       
Capital–Labour 
Ratio 
0.35* -0.06      
Renewable Energy 
Use 
0.02 0.36* 0.13*     
Early Action -0.11 0.26* 0.04 0.15*    
ROA 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.00   
Leverage -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.15* 0.05 -0.24  
 
 
The summarised estimation results of the baseline models indicate that three out of five 
propositions are supported, among which the capital intensity effect and production output 
effect are consistent with the previous literature, including Cole et al. (2005, 2012) in that 
both factors drive the emissions of firms. Full estimation results are presented in Table 
64.6. Columns (1) and (2) report results using only control variables and sector dummies to 
test the reliability of the model. The results suggest the sectoral differentiation effect 
hypothesis holds from two aspects. The added sector dummies provide considerable 
amount of explanatory power, with energy and utilities sectors showing significant effects 
on the firms’ emissions levels. Column (3) reports the estimation results from testing the 
production output and capital intensity effect propositions. Both propositions are supported 
and the findings appear consistent with those in Cole et al. (2012), which also suggest that 
capital intensity is a positive function of emissions. Column (4) reports the results of 
testing the environmentally friendly actions effect proposition and indicates that the 
statistical significance is insufficient to support it. Columns (5) and (6) report the 
estimation with the full baseline model with all variables in place, and the results remain 
unchanged since capital intensity and production effects as well as the sectoral 
differentiation effect still show significant explanatory power while the action effect 
remains insignificant. The robustness of the baseline model can be verified by the results 
of testing all proposed effects jointly, as the directions and magnitudes of the coefficients 
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relating to the major factors remain consistent. Overall, the baseline model demonstrates 
reasonably strong explanatory power, as indicated by the overall R2 for panel datasets with 
a rather short sample period. 
 
Table 6.5. Summary of hypotheses tested with baseline models 
Proposition 
(1) 
Related Variable 
(2) 
Result 
(3) 
1 
Firm production is positively related to Verified 
Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Supported* 
2 
Capital–Labour Ratio is positively related to 
Verified Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Supported* 
3 
Renewable Energy Use (by firm) is negatively 
related to Verified Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Coefficients at 
expected direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
4 
Early Actions toward EU ETS taken by member 
states is negatively related to Verified 
Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Coefficients at 
expected direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
5 
Determinants of Verified Emissions-to-Cap 
Ratio are Sector specific 
Supported* 
This table summarises the regression results regarding respective proposed hypothesis tested. 
Column (1) gives the number of each hypothesis, column (2) lists the independent variable which 
explains the respective hypothesis and column (3) indicates the result. * coefficients with statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%, respectively. 
 
 
The production effect, as anticipated, forms a positive function of firms’ emission 
performance although the significance level varies in different model specifications. This 
could be related to the Kahn (1999) study, which shows that manufacturing activities are a 
strong driving force of pollution emissions levels. Capital intensity shows the strongest 
influence on a firm’s emission levels, as its statistical significance remain highest under 
different estimation model specifications. This finding adds supporting evidence of capital 
intensity impacting on emissions, which is found in the Japanese manufacturing sector 
context by Cole et al. (2012) as well as in the UK industrial context by Cole et al. (2005). 
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Table 6.6. Extended regression results of baseline estimation model (2005-2010) 
Random-effects GLS regression, Robust control for heteroscedasticity 
Dependent Variable: Verified CO2 emissions-to-cap ratio (at firm level) 
Model 
Specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Production 
  0.01*  
(1.92) 
 0.02*** 
(2.69) 
0.02** 
(2.29) 
Capita–-Labour 
Ratio 
  0.06*** 
(3.28) 
 0.06*** 
(3.25) 
0.05*** 
(2.82) 
Renew. Energy 
Use 
   -0.05  
(-1.43) 
-0.06*  
(-1.75) 
-0.03  
(-0.88) 
Early Action re 
EU ETS 
   0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.04  
(-0.92) 
-0.04  
(-0.84) 
Energy Sector  0.32***  
(3.65) 
0.21** 
(2.25) 
0.3*** 
(3.29) 
0.16* 
(1.66) 
0.17* 
(1.81) 
Materials 
Sector 
 0.12 
(1.51) 
0.16** 
(2.04) 
0.1 
(1.19) 
0.13*  
(1.7) 
0.12 
(1.57) 
Utilities Sector  0.38*** 
(3.9) 
0.35*** 
(3.49) 
0.37*** 
(3.57) 
0.34*** 
(3.36) 
0.32*** 
(3.16) 
ROA 0.004 
(1.57) 
0.005* 
(1.68) 
0.006** 
(2.42) 
0.005 
(1.64) 
0.005** 
(2.38) 
0.002 
(1.18) 
Leverage -0.26  
(-1.53) 
-0.16  
(-1.02) 
-0.28  
(-1.61) 
-0.13  
(-0.85) 
-0.26  
(-1.49) 
-0.23  
(-1.41) 
Other Sectors No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year No No No No No Yes 
Observations 810 810 788 810 788 788 
R2 overall  
(within)  
(between) 
0.03 
(0.01)  
(0.04) 
0.22 
(0.01)  
(0.36) 
0.24 
(0.04)  
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.02)  
(0.34) 
0.24 
(0.05)  
(0.37) 
0.27  
(0.10)  
(0.37) 
P-value (Wald 
Chi2) 
0.06 0 0 0 0 0 
The table presents estimated coefficients (z-statistics) of the baseline model. Model specification 
(1) tests control variables without any hypothesis, Model specification (2) tests Hypothesis 5 on 
sector differentiation, Model specification (3) tests Hypothesis 1 and 2 on firm characteristics, 
focusing on production and capital spending, Model specification (4) tests Hypothesis 3 and 4 on 
actions taken against emissions, Model specification (5) tests all hypotheses without year control, 
while Model specification (6) tests all hypotheses with year control. *** represents significance at 
1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%, respectively. 
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The estimated coefficients of the action effect, including renewable energy use and early 
action taken to prepare for a mandatory ETS, show the expected sign that reduces the 
emissions, which is in line with the proposition; however, they are without sufficient 
statistical significance. The lack of significance could be explained by the relatively short 
length of the estimation period, as it is reasonable to assume that the effects of these 
environmentally friendly actions, such as the adoption of new technology, renewable 
energy, as well as proactive regulations, could only be detected in the medium-to long-
term (Apergis et al., 2013). 
 
The sector differentiation effect can be recognised consistently under different 
specifications, which supports the hypothesis proposed and also appears in line with 
previous studies, such as de Villiers et al. (2011), Cho and Patten (2007), and Patten 
(2002), which explicitly suggest the rationale to control for industries based on their 
environmental sensitivities. In our case, the utilities sector is among those with the highest 
exposure to the mandatory emission restriction based on the analysis of allowances 
allocation plans and verified emissions data (Zetterberg et al., 2004; Betz et al., 2006; 
Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). This high exposure is indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the utilities sector dummy. 
 
The capital intensity effect implies that business models could significantly matter with 
regard to firms’ sustainability and environmentally friendly concerns. Business operating 
activities inevitably impose substantial consequences on the environment, as indicated 
empirically by the positive link between production output and emissions behaviour. One 
solution to improve environmental performance without compromising operating activities 
or business models would be to effectively enhance technology innovation. Based on the 
current empirical data and analysis, the magnitude of action effect is not sufficient to 
moderate firms’ emissions levels, which could imply a lack of effort by firms to invest and 
adopt new technology. Moreover, policy makers are also expected to generate adequate 
incentives for large-scale investments in technology innovation, which should ultimately 
aim to benefit all the parties involved, including industries, the public, and the 
environment. One relevant aspect would be the heterogeneity of the environmental 
sensitivities of different sectors, as to tailor-make sector-specific policies is likely to be 
more environmentally effective and cost efficient in the long term. 
Chapter 6 Determinants of the firm-level emission performance ratio 
216 
By comparing the results of Specifications 5 and 6, it can be noticed that time effect also 
increases a certain degree of explanatory power of the full model, which is another 
interesting aspect to be developed in the future. The regression results show significant 
negative coefficients in Year 2009 and Year 2010, which indicates a downward trend of 
the firms’ emissions-to-allowances ratio. Further analyses could aim to distinguish the 
temporal effects of other factors from the time effect. Another research opportunity would 
be to estimate with the same dependent variable using refined region-specific data. As 
shown in the results, the statistical significance levels of the production effect vary across 
different specifications. One possible cause comes from the origin of the production data, 
which are collected through overall operating activities of firms instead of being EU 
region-specific. Furthermore, as mentioned on several occasions, and particularly in the 
data sections, limited sources of reliable GHG emissions data subject to independent and 
standardised verification is one of the major restrictions of conducting empirical analyses 
for this subject. Nevertheless, with the development of comprehensive compulsory 
schemes, such as the EU ETS, the quantity and quality of emissions data should see a good 
degree of improvement and should enable more empirical investigation in this area. 
 
6.4.2 Results of estimation with sector-specific interaction terms added 
This section reports the results of estimations that are further extended with industry-
specific interaction terms added to the baseline model, which is intended to capture 
industry-influenced firm characteristics and their effects on emissions intensity. The results 
are presented in the following order: energy sector, materials sector, and utilities sector.  
 
Energy,62 Materials, 63and Utilities64 sector-specific analysis 
 
Table 6.7 summarises the results of estimations with energy sector-specific interaction 
terms-added models for each effect proposed. Capital intensity appears to be related to the 
emission levels of firms in the energy and utilities sectors, but not to those in the materials 
                                            
62 The energy sector comprises firms with oil and gas activities as their main business. A number of those included in our sample 
dataset are British Gas Group, British Petroleum, and ConocoPhillips. 
63 The materials sector comprises firms that operate a wide range of industrial activities, such as chemicals, metal and mining, and 
forest and paper products. Example firms in the sample include Acerinox S.A., Ahlstrom, and ArceloMittal. 
64 The utilities sector comprises firms that operate as electricity providers and distributors. The sample includes firms such as Centrica, 
E.ON, and EDF. 
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sector. The production effect remains influential for the utilities sector, while the energy 
sector appears to be more subject to the effect of early action. None of the suggested 
effects are significant in the materials sector. The full results are presented in Table 64.8 
and a detailed discussion follows. Column (1) of Table 64.8 presents the result of the 
original baseline model, column (2) reports the results of testing if any of the suggested 
firm-level emissions-related effects is significant in the energy sector, and columns (3) and 
(4 ) report the results of the test in the materials and utilities sectors, respectively. Column 
(5) reports the result of testing all sector-specific effects jointly. The proposition 
suggesting that the emission-related effects are sector-specific is supported under the new 
specifications. 
 
Table 6.7 Summary of the results from sector-specific interaction terms added-model 
Related Variable 
(1) 
Result 
Energy 
(2) 
Materials 
(3) 
Utilities 
(4) 
Firm production*sector 
interaction term is positively 
related to Verified Emissions-to-
Cap Ratio 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Supported* 
Capital–Labour Ratio*sector 
interaction term is positively 
related to Verified Emissions-to-
Cap Ratio 
Supported* 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Supported* 
Renewable Energy Use (by 
firm)*sector interaction term is 
negatively related to Verified 
Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Early Actions toward EU 
ETS*sector dummy interaction 
term taken by member states is 
negatively related to Verified 
Emissions-to-Cap Ratio 
Supported* 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
Coefficients in 
expected 
direction but 
lack statistical 
significance 
This table summarises the regression results regarding respective proposed hypothesis tested.  
Column (1) describes the independent variable which tests the corresponding proposed effect and 
the expected outcome. Columns (2)–(4) report the result of the Energy, Materials, and Utilities 
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sector, respectively. * represents that the estimators are of commonly acceptable statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%, respectively. 
The energy sector appears more sensitive to the capital intensity and early action effects, as 
these two energy sector-specific interaction terms show consistent statistical significance 
in two model specifications. On the other hand, the production and technology effects are 
less influential in the performance ratio within the energy sector. Firms within the energy 
sector are believed to be capital intensive given the nature of their operating activities, such 
as oil and gas drilling, equipment and services, exploration and production, which are 
basically the raw materials of other end-products that produce higher emissions. As the the 
results show, the production effect is not as significant within the energy sector. Of the 
other interaction terms, early action appears important and works in the expected direction, 
which suggests that the regulatory framework in which the firm operates can play a crucial 
role in affecting its emission behaviour. Surprisingly, renewable energy usage is positively 
related to emissions levels, though without statistical significance, in both energy and 
materials sectors, indicating that the technology adoption has no profound effect so far in 
improving the firms’ emission efficiency. 
 
One reasonable speculation is that the production effect plays a more dominant role in this 
case and offsets the technology adoption effect. Financially more sound firms are more 
likely to invest in new, environmentally friendly technology such as renewable energy, a 
similar concept raised in an early country-level emissions study (Komen et al., 1997). A 
firm’s financial conditions can be correlated with its operating conditions, implying that 
firms having sufficient financial resources to invest in technological innovation are likely 
to have better operating conditions, such as higher production outputs, which eventually 
lead to increasing emissions levels. Also, as the data collected regarding a firm’s 
renewable energy use are binary (YES for use, NO for no usage of renewable energy) 
instead of the actual quantified amount of renewable energy usage, the factor could only be 
constructed as a dummy variable and thus the estimation results might not be as precise as 
estimation with quantified variables. However, this does not mean the estimations are of no 
value as they still provide a clear picture of the effects of the actions adopted by firms; on 
the contrary, the models with interaction terms-added still demonstrate robust power in 
explaining the variation in firm-level emissions, as indicated by both p-values and overall 
(between) R2. 
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None of the proposed emissions-related effects appears influential at any statistical 
significance level in the materials sector, and the results are consistent across different 
estimation specifications. One possible explanation is the extensive inclusion of different 
firms in the sector. The materials sector contains a wide range of industrial activities, from 
chemicals, construction materials, metals and mining to paper and forest products, which 
could explain the lack of firm characteristic effects at sector level. The heterogeneous 
nature of firms in the sub-sample formation within each sector makes it difficult for 
specific firm characteristics to show any distinct effect on the entire sector. For instance, 
the capital intensity effect on the chemicals industry might offset the same effect on the 
paper and forest product industry. Similar to the energy sector, the utilities sector is also 
found to be subject to in particular two proposed emissions-related effects. The capital 
intensity effect is equally associated with the emission behaviour of firms in the utilities 
sector, which appears to be a reasonable outcome and in line with Cole et al. (2005). 
Furthermore, the utilities firms are also exposed to the production effect, which enhances 
the significance of the association of business models with firm-level emissions. As the 
utilities sector mainly involves the production and distribution of power/electricity, its 
capital intensive and production-driven business model inevitably drives up emissions and 
results in relatively high emissions-to-cap ratios. The renewable energy use and early 
action effects appear to work in the expected direction; however, the magnitude of the 
association lacks statistical significance. This again highlights the fact that the current 
states of investment in technology or regulatory inputs are not of sufficient levels to 
effectively improve the firms’ emission performances. 
 
While the utilities sector constantly forms a positive input into emissions levels under the 
baseline models, its statistical significance disappears after the utilities sector-specific 
interaction terms are controlled for in two model specifications (4 and 5 in Table 64.8). 
This result is of particular interest; given the nature of the utilities sector’s operating 
activities, which mainly involve the production and distribution of power, the sector is 
inevitably the largest emitter65 within the EU ETS, and thus the loss of significance of the 
sector dummy appears unusual. One explanation is the shift of explanatory power from the 
utilities sector dummy caused by certain utilities sector specific-interaction terms. An 
extended experimental regression is conducted in order to understand whether the 
                                            
65 Details are in Chapter 3, Data section. 
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proposed explanation on the shift in explanatory power is supported. It is shown that the 
production effect within the utilities sector takes away the statistical significance of the 
utilities sector dummy, while the capital intensity effect demonstrates less dominance in 
taking over the explanatory power of the sector dummy within the utilities sector.  
 
This finding indicates that capital intensity is in general a stronger determinant of the firm-
level emission performance ratio, which again supports the conclusion drawn from the 
main analysis that the business model is highly related to the firm’s emissions performance 
ratio. It should be noted that the primary purpose of this test is not to decide the optimal 
model. It is rather intended as a supplementary analysis to the main analysis to further 
explore the interaction between the explanatory factors, in particular capital intensity and 
production, and the sector dummy within the utilities sector, which potentially explains the 
shift in the explanatory power. The results and model specifications, Eq(6-5a) and Eq(6-
5b), are reported in Appendix 6-B. 
 
To briefly sum up and reflect, sector-specific models overall still provide strong robustness 
in explaining emissions variations, with several interesting findings observed. First, the 
energy sector is unique in comparison with the other two sectors in terms of its sensitivity 
to legislative action. Energy sector firms with their headquarters in the member states that 
adopted early action prior to the EU ETS see a reducing trend in emissions levels relative 
to their respective caps. A similar regulatory focus is empirically tested in Cole et al. 
(2005) in the UK context, and the formal regulatory pressure shows a generally significant 
impact on reducing pollution intensity. The materials sector contains a large degree of 
heterogeneity of firm characteristics, which makes it difficult to provide significant 
explanatory power at the sectoral level for individual firm characteristics. The utilities 
sector shows a certain degree of sensitivity towards the production and capital intensity 
effects, at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively, under three different 
specifications. The results remain robust under the model specification that tests all sector-
specific effects jointly. 
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Table 6.8. Full regression results with updated interaction terms-added models 
Random-effects GLS regression, Robust control for heteroscedasticity 
Dependent Variable: Verified CO2 emissions-to-cap ratio (at firm level) 
Model 
Specification 
Eq (6-1) 
(1) 
Eq (6-2) 
(2) 
Eq (6-3) 
(3) 
Eq (6-4) 
(4) 
Eq (6-5) 
(5) 
Production 0.020** 
(2.29) 
    
Capital-Labour 
Ratio 
0.060*** 
(2.82) 
    
Renew. Energy Use -0.032  
(-0.88) 
    
Early Action re. EU 
ETS 
-0.041  
(-0.84) 
    
Energy Sector -0.761  
(-0.95) 
-0.738  
(-0.94) 
0.312*** 
(3.50) 
0.312*** 
(3.50) 
-0.761  
(-0.95) 
Energy * 
Production 
 0.020 
(0.66) 
  0.020 
(0.66) 
Energy * C-L Ratio  0.145** 
(2.15) 
  0.149** 
(2.17) 
Energy * Renew. 
Use 
 0.118 
(1.21) 
  0.121 
(1.23) 
Energy * Early Act.  -0.320** 
(-2.25) 
  -0.327** 
(-2.29) 
Materials Sector 0.124 (1.57) 0.125 
(1.57) 
-0.015  
(-0.08) 
0.121 
(1.52) 
-0.039  
(-0.21) 
Materials*Product.   0.004 
(0.44) 
 0.005 
(0.54) 
Materials*C-L 
Ratio 
  0.022 
(1.07) 
 0.025 
(1.21) 
Materials*Renew.   0.012 
(0.42) 
 0.021 
(0.70) 
Materials*Early 
Act. 
  -0.020  
(-0.40) 
 -0.025  
(-0.51) 
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Table 6.8 (continued) 
Random-effects GLS regression, Robust control for heteroscedasticity 
Dependent Variable: Verified CO2 emissions-to-cap ratio (at firm level) 
Model 
Specification 
 
Eq (6-1) 
(1) 
Eq (6-2) 
(2) 
Eq (6-3) 
(3) 
Eq (6-4) 
(4) 
Eq (6-5) 
(5) 
Utilities Sector 0.330*** 
(3.16) 
0.375*** 
(3.88) 
0.370*** 
(3.83) 
-0.516  
(-1.29) 
-0.540  
(-1.33) 
Utilities*Production    0.041* 
(1.82) 
0.041* 
(1.83) 
Utilities*C-L Ratio    0.048** 
(2.02) 
0.052** 
(2.08) 
Utilities*Renew. 
Use 
   -0.048  
(-0.66) 
-0.043  
(-0.59) 
Utilities*Early Act.    -0.084  
(-0.56) 
-0.085  
(-0.56) 
ROA 0.002 (1.18) 0.003* 
(1.67) 
0.002 
(1.29) 
0.002 
(1.30) 
0.003 
(1.55) 
Leverage -0.235  
(-1.41) 
-0.202  
(-1.29) 
-0.176  
(-1.10) 
-0.176  
(-1.10) 
-0.232  
(-1.47) 
Other Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 788 788 788 788 
R2 overall  
(within)  
(between) 
0.267 
(0.370) 
(0.105) 
0.270 
(0.381) 
(0.105) 
0.250 
(0.357) 
(0.090) 
0.263 
(0.377) 
(0.091) 
0.285 
(0.399) 
(0.110) 
P-value (Wald 
Chi2) 
0 0 0 0 0 
This table presents the estimated coefficients (z-statistics) of sector-specific interaction terms-
added models. Column (1) shows the result of the original baseline model with all sector dummies 
and year controls. Columns (2)–(4) show results of the energy, materials, and utilities sector-
specific interaction terms-added models, respectively. Column (5) shows the result of the 
regression with all sector interaction term controls. *** represents significance at 1%, ** at 5% , and 
* at 10% ,respectively.
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the determinants of firms’ emissions performance ratios, given 
that a compulsory emission cap has been imposed. It intends to shed light on the firms’ 
emission behaviour while they are subject to a mandatory emission restriction in the 
Europe. The analysis benefits from a panel dataset of a multi-national and multi-sectoral 
scale, which comprises the largest European-based listed firms in terms of their shares in 
allowances allocated and emissions verified, and covers in total six years of operation of 
the EU ETS. The scale of the dataset enables analysis to be conducted at both general and 
sector-specific level. The results from the general-level analysis show that three out of five 
proposed effects are supported, among which the capital intensity and production output 
effects are prominent. This finding implies that the business model of a firm appears 
prominent in determining its emissions performance and appears similar to that in Cole et 
al. (2005, 2012) where both factors drive up the emissions of firms, within or across 
sectors. However, Cole et al. (2012)’s focus appears to be the determinants of the CO2 
emissions of firms within a single sector and the effect of spatial correlation, whereas this 
chapter explores the relationship between the determinants and the sector in which the 
examined firm operates. 
 
The sector-specific analysis adds more insights to the current empirical literature by 
revealing the degree of sensitivity facing different sectors. The results show that the energy 
sector appears more sensitive to legislative action, as the early action–energy sector 
interaction term is significant, and indicates a decrease in emissions levels. Production 
output does not seem influential in explaining emissions levels within the energy sector at 
any statistically accepted significance level. None of the material sector-specific factors 
turns out to be significant, which might be attributed to the more diversified industrial 
activities included in the materials sector, compared to the relatively homogeneous 
business activities of the energy and utilities sectors. 
 
With extended experimental analysis that focuses on the utilities sector, a shift of 
explanatory power from the utilities sector dummy is revealed, caused by the utilities 
sector-specific effect. The extended regression results indicate that the production effect 
within the utilities sector takes away the statistical significance of the utilities sector 
dummy, while the capital intensity effect within utilities demonstrates less dominance in 
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taking over the explanatory power of the sector dummy. The main policy implications 
from the analysis in this chapter include the necessity for sector-specific environmental 
targets and incentives to achieve the target, as different sectors inevitably experience 
different levels of sensitivity to certain environmental issues, such as carbon emissions. 
 
The research method designed in this chapter also enhances the links among all three 
empirical chapters and provides a better practicability, as a suitable approximant of the 
firm-level emission status is obtained through the application of the estimation models 
with the known firm characteristic inputs, such as the capital-asset ratio, production output, 
or ROA before the actual emission data are published. The approximant of the firm-level 
emission status can then be utilised for any portfolio construction that requires the specific 
emission status information. This aspect has in particular real-practice implications for any 
asset manager who is interested in incorporating the firm-level emission status into their 
investment selection and decision process. 
 
The empirical findings of this chapter provide the first set of evidence on the determinants 
of firm-level emissions behaviour within a mandatory emissions restriction setting with a 
multi-national and multi-sectoral coverage, as opposed to the previous studies which 
focused either on a single sector or country (Cole et al.,2012; Apergis et al., 2013). The 
results add value to the current literature on environmental management – in particular 
within the GHG emissions management area. Moreover, as the focus of this thesis lies on 
the EU ETS and its implications, the analysis in this chapter is performed in a way that 
best utilises firm-level emissions data in the EU ETS context, which essentially accounts 
for the endogenous regulatory effect within the system. 
 
Nevertheless, given the scope of the trading scheme, and the accessibility of firm-level 
financial and characteristics data, the prospects to extend the analysis look good. More in-
depth analyses, which could aim to disentangle the firm emission determinants within a 
certain industry, could be performed provided that an extensive set of data with detailed 
firm characteristics and verified emission data spanning a reasonable period of time could 
be obtained. One opportunity is to break down the sectors into industries or sub-industries 
on the basis of certain commonly used industry classification standards, e.g. the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS), and perform an industry-specific analysis. 
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Appendix 6-A 
In the original EU transaction log (EUTL) that records the installation-based data, each 
unit is assigned an activity based on its main operating activity (EC, 2003a). The firms in 
the sample dataset are categorised using the Global Industry Classification Standards 
(GICS)66 for the consistency through the thesis. 
 
Table 6-A.1. Sample dataset distribution 
Sector Main Activity Firms % of total* 
10 Energy Oil and gas 25 13.66% 
15 Materials Cement and lime, iron and steel, 
pulp and papers, chemicals 
61 
26.65% 
20 Industrials Glass, iron and steel 9 0.95% 
25 Consumer Discretionary Motor industry 7 0.14% 
30 Consumer Staples Food and drink 10 0.25% 
35 Health Care Pharmaceuticals, chemicals 5 0.21% 
55 Utilities Power and heat 27 58.13% 
* % is the percentage of the allowances allocated to each sector in terms of the total allowances in 
the sample dataset. 
 
Table 6-A.2. Variable Measure 
VARIABLE Definition Source 
Emission Level Verified emissions per unit of EUA allocated 
Carbon 
Market Data 
Production Total production output in € Datastream 
Capital–Labour Ratio Capital expenditure per employee Datastream 
Renewable Energy Use Dummy; 1= firm that uses renewable energy Datastream 
Early Action tw. ETS 
Dummy; 1= member state that takes early 
actions prior to EU ETS 
Ellerman et 
al. (2010) 
ROA Returns on assets Datastream 
Leverage Debts-to-assets ratio Datastream 
                                            
66 GICS is jointly developed by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI, and is widely used in capital market research (Bhojraj et al., 2003). The 
full GICS methodology and structure can be found in www.msci.com/products/indices/sector/gics/. 
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Appendix 6-B 
 
Table 6-B. 1. Results of extended tests with Utilities Sector-Specific estimation model 
Random-effects GLS regression, Robust control for heteroscedasticity 
Dependent Variable: Verified CO2 emissions-to-cap ratio (at firm level) 
Model Specification Eq (6-5a) Eq (6-5b) 
Production 0.017** (2.05)  
Capital–Labour Ratio  0.056*** (2.77) 
Utilities*Production  0.041* (1.83) 
Utilities*C-L Ratio 0.051** (2.03)  
Utilities*Renew. Use -0.024 (-0.36) -0.046 (-0.64) 
Utilities*Early Act. -0.059 (-0.42) -0.084 (-0.56) 
Energy Sector 0.335*** (3.79) 0.193** (2.05) 
Materials Sector 0.166** (2.05) 0.105 (1.33) 
Utilities Sector 0.255* (1.75) -0.400 (-1.02) 
ROA 0.002 (1.28) 0.002 (1.19) 
Leverage -0.211 (-1.34) -0.207 (-1.33) 
Other Sectors Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Observations 788 788 
R2 overall  
(within)  
(between) 
0.258 
(0.0927) 
(0.370) 
0.268 
(0.101) 
(0.380) 
P-value 0 0 
This table reports the results from estimations made with model specification  
Eq(6-5a) 𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝑲 − 𝑳 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗
𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒘)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒋(𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓)𝒊𝒕
𝒏
𝒋−𝟏 + ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝒁𝒊𝒌𝒕
𝒏
𝑲=𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 and  
Eq(6-5b) 𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑲 − 𝑳 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗
𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒘)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒(𝑼𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒋(𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓)𝒊𝒕
𝒏
𝒋−𝟏 + ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝒁𝒊𝒌𝒕
𝒏
𝑲=𝟏 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
which jointly test whether the explanatory power of the utilities sector dummy is shifted towards 
the sector-specific KL ratio or the sector-specific production factor. ***, **, and * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and at 10%,  respectively. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Thesis overview 
This thesis is particularly interested in one of the European Union’s major climate policies, 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and empirically examines its 
implications with regard to firm-level emission behaviour and to stock market 
performance. The EU ETS is an interesting topic of great relevance, for a number of 
specific reasons. First, the scale of the EU ETS is largest in terms of its trading activities in 
relation to the global carbon market. Approximately 45% of total greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) in the European Union is regulated and for the first two trading periods (2005–
2012), EU ETS covers more than half of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions within the 
community (EC, 2009b). It is also the first multi-sector and multi-nation trading scheme. A 
stream of EU ETS literature had started to develop before the official launch of the trading 
scheme in 2005, and has seen considerable growth since. Compared with other streams of 
the EU ETS literature, however, studies with empirical evidence of an EU ETS-related 
impact on stock markets are limited, presumably due to the lack of accessibility to 
company-level data (Bushnell et al., 2013). 
 
This thesis empirically examines the EU ETS effect on emission behaviour, as well as on 
the stock market performances of exposed and non-exposed firms. The analyses and 
findings benefit from econometrics techniques and verified carbon emissions data that are 
sourced from the transaction log administered by the European Commission (EUTL). 
Three sets of empirical analyses are conducted, which are designed to answer the 
following questions posed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively. First, what factors are 
systematically associated with firm-level emissions within the EU ETS context? Second, 
what are the effects of the EU ETS on the share price performances of the exposed firms? 
Third, can EU ETS effects on stock price performance be differentiated at sectoral level? If 
‘yes’, is the emissions status, a.k.a., the net allowances holdings position of firms value-
relevant? 
 
The results of the analysis for each of the questions that are conducted in the respective 
empirical chapter (Chapters 4–6), are summarised and concluded in the following sections. 
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The implications of the results are also discussed following the summarised findings of 
each chapter. The last section discusses the limitations of this research project, as well as 
future research opportunities. 
 
7.2 Aggregate-level EU ETS effects examined from stock market perspectives 
The examination on the implications of the EU ETS on the share price of exposed firms is 
conducted in the second set of empirical analyses, which is the core interest in this thesis. 
These estimations provide the first piece of empirical evidence on the EU ETS’ stock 
market implications using firm-level real market data from multiple sectors, as opposed to 
previous studies that primarily focused on electricity/utility providers. Results from this set 
of analyses reveal the impacts of the trading scheme by examining the stock price 
performance of a comprehensive dataset containing a considerable proportion of all EU 
ETS-exposed firms. Specifically, Chapter 4 examines in detail the effect of not only the 
implementation, but also the planning, of the EU ETS on the stock market performance of 
the regulated firms. 
 
The majority of previous empirical studies of the effect of EU ETS and its stock market 
relationships focus on small samples of listed firms participating in the EU ETS 
(Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009; Knight, 2011; Mo et al., 2012). The findings are 
rather inconclusive, as some identify the negative impacts of the ETS on firms’ equity 
prices (Mo et al., 2012; Diltz, 2002) while others find no significant performance 
disadvantages associated with the ETS (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009). The 
empirical analysis in Chapter 5 consists of two parts: the first tests the impact of the EU 
ETS on the stock market performance of participating firms; the second investigates 
whether the participating firms’ emissions status (i.e., whether a firm emits CO2 higher or 
lower than their allocated allowances) determines the impact of the EU ETS on the firms’ 
stock market performance. 
 
The results show that the portfolio constructed by all ETS-exposed firms sees an expected 
underperformance at the highest statistical significance level, but only in the sample period 
2001–2004 during which the EU ETS was going through the proposed and negotiation 
process before its launch (Ellerman et al., 2010; EC, 2003a). Once the EU ETS was 
officially in place in 2005, regulated firms did not experience any subsequent negative 
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effects on their stock market performance. These results are in line with previous studies 
that observe no adverse impacts on the performance of regulated firms within the EU ETS 
context (Oberndorfer, 2009; Veith et al., 2009), as the performance impact appears to 
arrive ex ante in terms of reduced investor expectations (Chapple et al., 2013; Hughes, 
2000). No significantly negative contemporaneous impact of the EU ETS on stock market 
performance is identified in the tests conducted. However, the possibility that the effect 
exists but has been offset by another unidentified factor can certainly not be ruled out, 
though it is beyond the current scope of this chapter to examine. It still remains 
questionable if firms, and eventually their shareholders, are internalising sufficient costs to 
contribute in a significant way to the proposed climate change mitigation. The forward-
looking nature of the financial markets may have forced firms to internalise sufficient costs 
during the Pre-ETS period (2001–2004). However, they have clearly not done so during 
the EU ETS itself and since meaningful climate change mitigation requires consistent 
effort it seems fair to argue that firms currently may not have internalised sufficient costs 
(EC, 2009a; Stern, 2006, 2008). 
 
7.3 The sectoral differentiation of EU ETS effects on the stock market 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) attempts to reveal first whether EU ETS effects 
on the share prices of exposed firms are differentiated at the sectoral level. It also 
investigates the performance of Non-ETS-exposed firms at the sectoral level in order to 
better understand if the ETS is indeed a differentiating factor. The chapter further 
examines whether the effect on the share prices of firms within the respective sector is 
differentiated by the firm’s emissions status. First, the performance of sector-based 
portfolios, which are constructed by ETS and Non-ETS exposed firms operating in seven 
different sectors, is estimated with extended Carhart models. The portfolios using the 
long–short strategy for each sector are also tested to further verify the degree of difference 
in the performance of the ETS and Non-ETS-exposed firms. The analysis further focuses 
on estimating the performance of firms with different allowances holdings positions within 
sectors, which may reveal whether stock market investors consider the firms’ emissions 
status relevant in the equity valuation process. The sectoral performance analysis is 
achieved by running regressions with the Carhart model and an extended version to 
evaluate the performance of sector-based portfolios. The emissions status-integrated 
analysis contains first the comparative and statistical analysis of sectoral emissions status 
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and the related stock prices performance measurement. This takes the investigation of the 
emissions status effect differentiation a step further by utilising the same econometric 
method and forming portfolios that consist of firms with the same emissions status within a 
respective sector. For example, the firms in the Energy sector are separated into over-
emitting and under-emitting groups to form sector-based portfolios with emissions status 
specification. 
 
Six out of seven ETS sectors are found to have significantly underperformed the market 
benchmark during the Pre-ETS period (2001–2004), during which the ETS regulation was 
proposed, negotiated, and passed. The differentiation of the performance of ETS-exposed 
sector portfolios and the Non-ETS sector portfolios can be clearly identified during this 
period, and is further verified by the estimation results of the sector-based long–short 
portfolios. As time progressed, the ETS-exposed Energy portfolio was valued indifferently 
by the stock market after the official launch of the EU ETS in 2005, while its Non ETS-
exposed peer saw a constant outperformance through all the estimation periods tested. 
During the estimation period 2005–2011, the Utilities, Health Care, and Consumer Staples 
sectors experienced an underperformance while Materials, Industrials, and Consumer 
Discretionary sectors saw an outperformance against the market benchmark. It is 
interesting to observe that the performance estimation results of the regression conducted 
for the portfolios consisting of firms with different emissions status in the main sectors 
appeared fairly similar to the results of the sector-based portfolio performance estimation. 
No abnormal returns were detected in both portfolios formed by the Energy firms, both 
under-emitting and over-emitting ones. Materials sector firms saw a significant and 
constant outperformance against the benchmark in the full sample period in both over-
emitting and under-emitting portfolios. Utilities sector firms experienced a consistent 
underperformance, even in the case of the under-emitting firms. 
 
Two aspects drawn from the findings of Chapter 5 are of particular interest. The first is to 
identify that the stock return performance of ETS-exposed firms can be differentiated at 
sectoral level. More specifically, the estimation done for the ETS-exposed, Non-ETS-
exposed, and long–short portfolios jointly indicate that the share prices of firms in certain 
sectors – namely Energy, Materials, and Consumer Staples – are more prone to the effect 
of the emissions trading regulation, while the abnormal returns identified in other sectors 
could not be fully attributed to ETS. It appears that the performance can also be 
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differentiated by sectoral emissions status, as the under-emitting sector sees a reward in the 
share value while the over-emitting sector experiences a value penalty. Another aspect 
concerns the stock return performances differentiated by the emissions status that cannot 
be seen at firm level within sectors. The results are interpreted as suggesting that stock 
market investors consider the emissions status and the net allowances holdings positions of 
the sector as value-relevant. This is generally consistent with the positive value-relevance 
view by Johnston et al. (2008). However, stock market investors have not yet been able to 
value specifically the net positions at the firm level, as indicated by the portfolio 
performance estimations of the emissions status-based within-sector portfolios. This is 
consistent with Bushnell et al.’s (2013) views regarding the lack of easily accessible firm-
level allowances holdings and trading information of the EU ETS. The findings in this 
chapter thus appear to confirm the difficulties in evaluating the firms’ net position of 
allowances holdings by stock market investors, while it is relatively easy to gain the 
information or a general sense regarding emissions status at the aggregate sector level.  
 
In summary, the most interesting finding in this chapter highlights the fact that stock 
market investors are able to value sectors according to their overall emissions status but 
unable to do so at company level with the sector. This enhances the proposition about the 
lack of adequate company-level emissions information raised in Chapter 5, as the results 
show that stock market investors are not able to distinguish over-emitting firms from 
under-emitting ones and value them indifferently in terms of the signs of estimated 
abnormal returns. This finding implies that the current level of corporate carbon reporting 
is insufficient in terms of value-relevance for the market. This may lead to fewer incentives 
for long-term investments on low-carbon technology, as explained earlier. It is thus 
considered very encouraging that the UK has taken the first step towards mandatory GHG 
emissions reporting with support from the businesses community (DEFRA, 2012). 
 
7.4 Determinants of firm-level emissions-to-cap status 
The last empirical chapter (Chapter 6) sheds light on identifying the determinants of firm-
level carbon emissions behaviour within a regulated ETS context and answers the 
following question: what factors systematically explain the carbon emissions intensity, 
which is measured by emissions per production unit, at the firm level within the EU ETS? 
The analysis performed in this chapter provides the first empirical evidence of the 
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determinants of firm-level emissions behaviour within a mandatory ETS at multi-national 
and sector scale, and hence the results are value-added to the current literature on the 
environmental, in particular the emissions management, area.  
 
The analysis benefits from a panel dataset that comprises the largest European listed firms, 
in terms of their shares in allowances allocated and verified emissions subject to the 
mandatory emissions restriction. The sample dataset covers six years of operation of the 
EU ETS and is on a multi-sector scale. It also benefits from verified emissions data from 
the EU ETS covering 140 listed firms during 2005–2010 and the reliability and quality of 
the data being sourced directly from the EUTL administered by the European Commission. 
Given the properties of the dataset of research interests, a panel regression with multi-
factor model, which draws inspiration from previous studies with a similar research 
subject, such as Cole et al. (2012, 2005) and Pargal and Wheeler (1996), is used in this set 
of analyses. In addition to the baseline model that encompasses firm characteristics and 
sector dummies, the interaction terms between such characteristics and dummies are added 
into the baseline model, to better differentiate the potential effects from sector differences 
on firm-specific emissions intensity (Antweiler et al., 2001; Cole and Elliott, 2003).  
 
The results suggest that the capital intensity and production output effect are associated 
with increasing emissions, a similar finding to that seen in Cole et al. (2005, 2012). 
However, the novel and more accurately constructed emissions performance measure, 
which best utilises the emissions data from the mandatory scheme, has advanced the 
quality of the estimation outcome. With regard to the sector-specific analysis, the Energy 
sector appears sensitive to legislative action while the firm characteristics do not seem 
influential in explaining the emissions variation within the sector at any statistically 
accepted significance level. The Materials sector does not show particular sensitivity 
toward any explanatory variable while the Utilities sector-specific interaction terms for 
production and capital intensity are statistically significant. The sector differentiation 
effects again remain supported at the overall level, while the hypothesis of a sector-specific 
effect has no significant coefficients. A sector differentiation effect can be recognised 
consistently under different specifications, which supports the hypothesis proposed and 
also appears in line with previous studies, such as de Villiers et al. (2011), Cho and Patten 
(2007), and Patten (2002), which explicitly suggest the rationale to control for industries 
based on their environmental sensitivities. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, the utilities sector is 
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among those with the highest exposure to the mandatory emissions restriction based on the 
allowances plan analysis and the verified emissions data (Zetterberg et al., 2004; Betz et 
al., 2006; Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). This high exposure is indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of the utilities sector firms. 
 
The main policy implications from the analysis in this chapter include the necessity for 
sector-specific environmental targets and incentives to achieve such targets, as different 
sectors inevitably experience different levels of sensitivity to certain environmental issues, 
such as carbon emissions. The capital intensity effect implies that business models matter 
in terms of how a firm behaves in terms of sustainability and environmental concerns. 
Moreover, business operating activities inevitably impose substantial consequences on the 
environment, as indicated by the positive link between production output and emissions 
behaviour. One solution to improve the environmental performance of a firm without 
compromising operating activities or business models will be to effectively enhance 
technological innovation. As indicated by the results, the magnitude of the action effect is 
not sufficient to moderate firms’ emissions levels at this stage, which can imply a lack of 
effort from firms to invest and adopt new technology. Hence, policy makers may need to 
generate more suitable incentives for large-scale investments in technological innovation, 
which should aim to benefit all parties concerned, including the industry, public, and 
ultimately the environment. One aspect to which extra attention should be paid would be 
the heterogeneity of the environmental sensitivities of different sectors, for it could be 
more environmentally effective and cost efficient in the long term to tailor-make sector-
specific policies and particular incentives. 
 
7.5 Limitations and future research opportunities 
The analysis in this thesis has several limitations, which allow scope for future research 
opportunities. As the focus of this thesis lies in the EU ETS and its implications from 
various aspects, the empirical analysis in this chapter that examines the firm-level 
emissions determinants is performed in a way that best utilises the company-level 
emissions data in the EU ETS context. However, given the scope and history of the trading 
scheme and the lack of accessibility of company-level data for non-listed firms, future 
research may be able to extend this research once more data become available. For 
instance, more in-depth analyses which aim to explore firm-level emissions determinants 
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within a certain industry could be performed provided that an extensive set of data that 
comprise detailed firm characteristics and verified emissions data spanning a reasonable 
period of time are available. One opportunity will be to further break down sectors into 
industries or sub-industry.  
 
The main research challenge of this thesis, which shares similar interests to Oberndorfer 
(2009) Veith et al. (2009), and Knight (2011), is the limited number of firms qualified for 
the analysis. Although the dataset used in the econometrics analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
is by far the largest compared with the previous studies mentioned above, it appears that 
the availability and amount of reliable real market data remains a shared limitation among 
all the EU ETS studies that attempt to empirically examine similar topics. Investigations 
with an extended dataset can thus be expected to add value to current research as it can 
provide a more complete picture of the EU ETS implications for relevant parties within 
both complete trading periods.  
 
The equity valuation process is certainly a procedure subject to numerous complications 
and there undoubtedly will be other unidentified but relevant factors. Future research may 
want to investigate the effects of the volatility in the price trends of allowances, especially 
with relation to the information shock in the first trading period, as both could have 
considerable impacts or cause imprecise estimation results. The EU ETS is also currently 
progressing its third phase as planned, which covers an eight-year period from 2013 to 
2020. The third phase has undergone several major amendments aiming to improve the 
system and mitigate a few shortcomings identified in previous phases. These systemic 
improvements in the subsequent phases of the EU ETS will be another promising topic to 
explore, given that significantly different levels of stringency of the reformed EU ETS are 
expected (EC, 2010, 2012). As more emission trading schemes emerge 67  (The 
WorldBank, 2011, 2012), the problem of small datasets in the literature on this particular 
subject can be addressed more extensively than already done in this thesis. It will be very 
interesting to examine whether the EU ETS effects found in this thesis differ substantially 
from the results of equivalent analyses performed on the third phase of the EU ETS, once 
data becomes available.
                                            
67 Australia, California, RGGI and other trading schemes are emerging worldwide. See TheWorldBank (2012). 
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